

THE
PROSPECTIVE REVIEW.

No. XXXI.

ART. I.—REGAL ROME.

Regal Rome, an Introduction to Roman History. By Francis W. Newman, Professor of Latin in University College. London. Pp. 171. 1852.

SINCE Niebuhr swept away the regal Rome of our early belief, the Rome of Livy, Dionysius and Plutarch, various attempts have been made to rebuild an historical structure on the space which he had left covered with ruins. That little success has attended these efforts, that one has built for another to pull down, is not very wonderful. For Niebuhr had shown not only that the historians on whom our faith rested had put together according to a false plan the materials which had come down to them, but that the materials themselves were in a great measure unhistorical, and consequently incapable of being built into a solid edifice. It may be true, in regard to later times, that while he has cleared away ancient errors, he has established positive truth in its place; but it is not true of regal Rome. We are often at a loss to discover any historical ground for preferring that part of a legend which he adopts to that which he rejects. And the same remark holds good of those who have since undertaken the same task of reconstruction. Had any new monuments of early Rome come to light, or any historical works been recovered ascending nearer to its regal age than those which Niebuhr used, his successors might have given its history a more positive

character: but nothing of this kind has occurred. A wide field therefore is open to each author for adopting or rejecting such portions of the story as seem to him historical or legendary; and the choice which he makes, according to his subjective sense of probability, does not satisfy the corresponding sense in other scholars. In one point there seems, indeed, a pretty general agreement among them—that the stupendous learning and wonderful sagacity of Niebuhr have not preserved him from some hasty conclusions. In other respects the “History of their Variations” may afford matter of triumph to the champions, if there are any, of the primitive faith, and we shall not be much surprised if it revive for a time, from the unwillingness of mankind to rest in mere negation.

Mr. Newman’s very acute and able work labours under the same disadvantage as the rest—that of having only the old and condemned materials to work upon; but his views are original, and illustrated with characteristic force and clearness of style. He is very happy, we think, in applying modern experience to ancient history, and finds a solution of administrative or legislative problems in the Roman constitution from familiar instances of modern practice. The distinguishing feature in his work, however, is that he endeavours to assign to the Latin, the Sabine and the Etruscan elements in the population of regal Rome, their respective shares of influence in forming the religious, political, military and social attributes with which the nation was endowed when its real history began.

The origin of the distinctive character of the Romans lies even further back than the settlement of the Alban Latins. At least if language acts on the national mind, as well as receives in turn an impression from it, as Vico has clearly shown, our first insight into the peculiarities of a people is to be gained by a knowledge of their speech—the necessary condition of their social union. Mr. Newman, adopting the belief which has been long familiar to the minds of Gaelic and Cambro-British patriots, regards the Celtic as having at least a joint claim with the Greek to the parentage of the Latin language, and even deduces the word *cliens*, denoting an idea which lies at the very foundation of Roman society, from the Gaelic *clan*, *cloinne*, children. He has produced many striking examples of this affinity; Arch-

deacon Williams had previously done the same in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh; Grant in his Thoughts on the Origin of the Gael has applied the argument to both the Greek and Latin; Dr. Prichard has shown the affinity of the Celtic to the Oriental languages. The misfortune is, that the establishment of these lingual affinities never brings us even within sight of historical facts. The modern ethnologist musters the sons of Japhet in the vallies of Caucasus, as his predecessors used to do on the plain of Shinar, and sends them forth to east and west, to leave the traces of their common language in India, in Persia, in the Slavonian and Teutonic countries, in Gaul, and Britain. The existence of a connection, at some time and in some place, between the nations inhabiting these countries is indisputable; but if we ask when, where, how, it existed or was broken up, the ethnologist can give us no answer. So it is with regard to the Celtic element in the Latin language; it is there, beyond question, but how did it come there? Certainly by no event of which history contains a trace. *Cliens* and *Clan* may be the same; but before we can argue from this that Roman clientship was a similar thing to Gaelic clanship, we must know something about the state of Gaelic society at the time when the engrafting of the word took place; for the root may branch into significations so widely divergent, as to destroy all but the most general analogy between the things signified. Mr. Dennis in his *Etruria* (i. 313) tells us that the meaning of *Clan* is simply *derivation*, and that it is the root of *Clanis*, a well-known river, as well as the Etruscan for *son*. Admitting that *Clan* in this sense was the root of *cliens*, we are met by another difficulty, that no idea of affinity to the Patron seems ever to have entered into the Roman notion of clientship. $\text{Κλίω} = \text{κλίνω}$, to lean, thence to be dependent, seems to us the most probable etymology.

Mr. Newman concludes, very justly, that the Celtic element in Latin is *intrusive*, because words appear insulated in Latin, which have a genealogy and affinities in Gaelic, and he instances *monile*, which has an obvious etymology in Gaelic from *muineal*, neck, while it has none in either Latin or Greek. What is not intrusive in the Latin is chiefly Greek; whence came this element?

Mr. Newman appears to think the Pelasgic wholly barbarous, and bearing no affinity to the Greek. Such was the opinion of Niebuhr when he published the first edition of his history; in the second he holds a vague and inconsistent language on this subject; but any one who will compare the passages in which he speaks of the Pelasgi and Hellenes will find, that though he assumes them to be different, he explains many things by their identity and nothing by their difference. A curious relic of antiquity has come to light since his time, which may seem to confirm the opinion that the Pelasgic was wholly barbarous. In a tomb at Cære (Cervetri) in Etruria, a vessel of black pottery has been found with an inscription, scratched around it and filled in with red paint, which Lepsius, a great authority in Italian antiquities, pronounces not to be Etruscan, but Pelasgic. If anywhere in Italy it is at Cære that we might expect to find Pelasgic remains, which Dionysius, Strabo and Pliny assure us was founded by the Pelasgi, under the name Agylla. That the language is neither Latin nor Greek, Etruscan nor Oscan, may be admitted on the evidence of dissimilarity to the known remains of these tongues; but that it is Pelasgic is not a necessary inference. Arguments too from single and especially *portable* antiquities must be cautiously used. Egyptian tablets have been found at Nineveh, Cufic coins on the shores of the Baltic, Chinese seals in the bogs of Ireland. We must therefore be allowed to hesitate before assenting to the inference that this is an inscription in Pelasgic, merely because it has been found in a city of Pelasgic traditions, and cannot be read into any known language.

The origin of the Latin tongue, as distinct from the intrusive Celtic, Mr. Newman finds in the language of the Siceli, who, before they were driven by the Oscans into Sicily, occupied Latium. Here another question arises, Was the language of the Siceli allied to that part of the Latin which is derived from the Greek, or to that which remains when we have taken away both Greek and Celtic?—for such a residuum there is. Mr. Newman appears to consider that it was the latter, quoting various words said to have been used by the Siceli, as Latin, with the implication, though he does not express himself very clearly

(p. 11), that they are not Greek. These words are *cubitus*, *patina*, *carcer*, *leporis*, *catinus*, *mutuum*, *gelu*, *campus*. There is hardly one of them, however, which does not appear to us to be immediately derivable from the Greek. *Κύπτω*, to bend or bow, is surely a very obvious etymology of *cubitus*, the bend of the elbow; *patina* the shallow dish, like *patera* the shallow vessel of libation, and *petasus* the broadbrimmed hat, are not remotely connected with *πετάννυμι*, to expand. *Carcer* is a grating, as the *carceres* of the circus are represented on monuments, and is naturally derived from *κάραρος*, a gaping row of teeth, whence *carcharias*, a shark, and Mr. John Carker, memorable for the display of his teeth, in the invention of whose most appropriate name Dickens must have been guided by the instinct of genius. *Leporis* seems not to be Greek; but *λεβηρίς* or *λεβορίς*, a rabbit, is evidently of the same root, and it was a small matter for the Greeks, who had but one name (*γαλήνη*) for a cat, a ferret and a weasel, to call a rabbit, a *leveret*. We do not find now in Greek *μοῖτος*, as the root of *mutuus*, except in the proverbial phrase *μοῖτον ἀντὶ μοῖτου*, "a Roland for an Oliver;" but proverbs are generally good evidence of archaic use. *Gelu* also has left its trace in *γέλινδρον*, explained by Hesychius as *ψυχρόν*. *Campus* is not a field, but a race-course; no Latin writer would have said *Ager Martius* or *Campus publicus*; and it derives its name from the *κάμποι* or wheelings of the race. *Catinus*,* in the slightly varied form of *κατίναξ*, is explained by Hesychius *παροψίς*, as far as the corrupt state of the gloss enables us to judge. Considering what a vast amount of Greek literature has been utterly lost, and how large a portion of a spoken language never finds its way into books, we must be cautious in inferring that a word did not belong to the Greek, because we do not find it in our Lexicons. Instead of concluding therefore with Mr. Newman that the whole language of the Siceli was fundamentally Latin, we judge it to have been fundamentally Greek, and one great source of the strong affinity of Latin to Greek. The alleged affinity or identity of Siculi and Pelasgi (Nieb. 1, 38) is therefore an additional

* *Κάτινος* or *κάρανος* was a wide shallow dish, whence *Κατάνη*, in Latin *Catina*, the wide plain at the foot of *Ætna*.

reason for believing that the Pelasgi spoke a language radically Greek.

To return to the history of regal Rome, Mr. Newman thinks that to the Latin element in its population we are justified in imputing the peculiar sagacity which the Romans manifested in organization and government. The Latins had gained varied political experience before their incorporation with Rome; they had a dictator for times of emergency, but otherwise their states were strictly republican. No serfs and no clients existed in Latium Proper. Even when forced to migrate they could keep up their organization, and preserve their nationality in the midst of a body of foreigners. But around this nucleus gathered an accretion of fugitives from neighbouring states; the natural preponderance of males in such a community led to the forcible abduction of females, and the rape of the Sabines was not, according to Mr. Newman, a single act, committed at the Consualia, but the mode by which the otherwise hopeless bachelors of Rome regularly provided themselves with wives. Hence the Sabine war, in which we agree with him, that the Romans, however they strive to hide the fact, were beaten and conquered by the Sabines.

To this conquest and the consequent incorporation of Sabines with Latins, and predominance of the Sabine element, our author attributes almost everything that is valuable in the character and institutions of regal Rome. Clientship, was Sabine; the law of marriage with its attribution of absolute power to the husband, was Sabine; the respect for religion, and an oath which so long characterized the Romans and distinguished them from the Greeks, was Sabine; so was the institution of the Senate and the forms of interregnum. The Sabine chiefs, called Quirites, from the word which in their language signified a spear, were the primitive *populus* of Rome, afterwards called Patricians, in contrast to the new plebeians. Throughout all this portion of his work, we regret that Mr. Newman has not given more specific references, in support of opinions the evidence of which, at least, does not lie on the surface of history. They may possibly be contained in the work of Götting (*Die Sabiner*) to which he refers, but we hope that in another edition they will be subjoined to the text. That Rome owed its religious institutions to Numa,

the Sabine, is the general testimony of historians; but we are not aware what is the ground on which our author relies for taking so much of its political institutions from Romulus, to give them to Titus Tatius or Numa; that is, taking them from the Latins to give them to the Sabines; for to the *name* of Romulus or Tatius we attach as little historical value as he can do. He recurs (p. 130) to the subject of matrimonial rites, and argues, that the difference in this respect which prevailed between the plebs and the *patricians* marked them off as separate nations even when they spoke the same Latin tongue. This does not express too strongly the feeling of repugnance which made the Canuleian Rogation so distasteful to the patricians; but if any conclusion is to be drawn from it to the Sabine origin of the *confarreatio*, the exclusively patrician ceremony, we must demur. How many of the high-born maidens of England would rather die in single blessedness than be married by banns, or in a conventicle, or a registrar's office! not assuredly from the difference between Norman and Saxon blood, but because a marriage by special licence or at St. George's Hanover-square is costly, pompous and fashionable—the others, cheap and vulgar. Much of the respect for religious forms, which everywhere characterizes the wealthier classes, is really reverence for etiquette and a desire to display worldly rank. We the more distrust (in the absence of direct authority) the aristocratic character which Mr. Newman attributes to Sabinism, because Plutarch, in his parallel between Numa and Lycurgus (c. ii.), says that Numa made his constitution the very extreme of democracy (ὀχλικὴ ἀκράτως καὶ θεραπευτικὴ τοῦ πλῆθους), making up a miscellaneous *demos* of goldsmiths and pipers and shoemakers; whereas that of Lycurgus was severe and aristocratic. We quote the passage in which the account of Numa's institutions is summed up by Mr. Newman.

“Whatever Numa may have instituted in Rome, it cannot for a moment be admitted that he originated principles of religion strange to the Sabines. His task was not to create—but to enact—their modes of worship and their politico-religious ceremonial. On religious questions he judged authoritatively, as the Pontiffs in later times; but it was understood that their decisions were made by precedent, certainly not by arbitrary will, and in every doubtful

case which involved religion, a king was expected to ask advice of professional *augurs*. In making war and peace, or ratifying treaties, precedents were sought from the *fetiales* or sacred heralds. Thus even in her infantine state, Sabine Rome showed the germs of those peculiarities which at length made her so great—high aristocratic feeling and an intense power of submitting to discipline: profound veneration for authority, and a rigid observance of order and precedent: devotion to the national religion, yet subjection of all religious officers to the state: honour to agriculture above all trades, and to arms above all accomplishments. In such a stage of half-developed morality, not to be warlike is not to be virtuous; and not to be devoted to established religion is not to have any deep-seated moral principle at all. As long as Rome was subjected to antagonistic forces from within and without, she went on prospering and improving, and wins our sympathy in spite of her heartlessness towards foreigners. Nor during any part of her history was the improvement more rapid than in the kingly period. Until the fatal destruction of her elective monarchy, she shoots up with a vigour so astonishing as to excite a momentary disbelief; and of this prosperity no better account can be given than that it was due to the rigid and self-devoting virtue of the Sabines, joined to the organizing genius of the Latins. The Sabine stamp is the deepest, but it was the kings of Latin blood or Latin party who gave comprehensiveness to the institutions, and expanded them to receive new and new citizens—a liberal policy, of which Rome never had cause to repent.”—Pp. 80, 81.

To Sabine Rome succeeds Etruscan Rome. In the much-debated question concerning the origin of this people Mr. Newman sides with those who admit the tradition of their being a Lydian colony. They are certainly a very mysterious people, whatever may have been their native country. Their language has no affinity with any other, either known to the ancients or hunted out by modern ethnologists, yet their alphabet is clearly archaic Greek. Their name in history is one by which they never appear to have called themselves. Their works of art show a close affinity to the archaic style of Greece; their sarcophagi are sculptured with subjects belonging to Greek mythology, in which we recognize the names of Grecian gods and heroes, barbarized to the rude genius of the Etruscan language, but in the entire inscription, except the names, we can trace no resemblance to the Greek. On the other hand their hypogæa are filled with fictile

vases, far surpassing in beauty of form, truth of delineation and fineness of material, whatever Greece Proper has furnished, bearing Greek inscriptions allusive to Attic customs. Amidst these perplexing phenomena, one thing, however, is certain, that, before the rise of Rome, Etruria was the predominant state in Italy, having great naval power and extensive commerce, skill in the arts and in agriculture, as well as a firmly-constituted aristocratic government, which blended in the same persons the chief power of church and state. Such a neighbour could not be without powerful influence on the new monarchy of Rome. This influence has been generally confined to the improvement of military discipline and armour, the increase of the splendour of monarchy, the importation of Etruscan superstition, and the execution of great public works by means of the skill and wealth in which Etruria far surpassed Rome. Mr. Newman thinks that Tarquin the Elder, besides all these changes, which, being material and external, drew the attention of historians, introduced also a modification into the constitution of Rome. From a passage in which Livy (i. 36,) remarks, that owing to the great increase of reputation which augury derived from the feat of Attus Navius in cutting a whetstone with a razor, the army when convoked could not be dismissed unless the birds assented, he concludes that Tarquin, elected by the commonalty, gave them, when assembled in military array, some portion of political power; and thus initiated the system which Servius Tullius carried to perfection in his arrangement of the *Comitia Centuriata*.

Whether all the influences which were brought to bear upon Rome under the kings have been rightly distributed and assigned, or not, there can be no question of their existence and operation. But we are startled when we come to calculate the time within which the changes produced by them must be compressed—six reigns, and those elective, according to Mr. Newman's estimate not a century. Are we to conclude that the Roman chronologers were right in allotting 245 years to the monarchy, but wrong in filling up that space with only seven kings? and must we consider Romulus, Numa, Tarquin, Ancus and Servius as representatives of certain periods and phases of national development, occupying two centuries and a half, rather

than as individuals? Mr. Newman seems to incline to this solution in his Concluding Reflections.

Our analysis will have shown that if this work does not contain a history of Regal Rome, it furnishes the student and historical inquirer with thoughts well fitted to excite them to comparison and research. The fruits of Mr. Newman's active and fertile mind meet us in the most various forms—theology, history, philology and political economy. May we venture to suggest to him that he might render good service to Roman history by a more full and elaborate treatment of some one of its important portions? The fall of the Republic is a noble subject—its materials ample—its characters some of the most eminent of the ancient world—its lessons weighty and of perpetual application. The author of Regal Rome could give us a history of it, which might serve as an antidote to a recent work of such Cæsarian tendency, that it might seem to have been written, as the French say, from the *inspirations* of the Elysée.

ART. II.—THE GIFT OF TONGUES.

Die Glossolalie in der alten Kirche, in dem Zusammenhang der Geistesgaben und des Geisteslebens des alten Christenthums; von Adolf Hilgenfeld. The Gift of Tongues in the Ancient Church, in connection with the Spiritual Gifts and Spiritual Life of Ancient Christendom. By Adolph Hilgenfeld. Leipzig. 1850. Pp. 152.

THE subject of this Dissertation is one which has excited little attention in our own country, though it has exercised the pens of many of the ablest of the German theologians. The names of Semler, Michäelis, Eichhorn and Paulus among the elder critics, of Neander, Bleek, Olshausen, Baur, in more recent times, are a sufficient proof that diligence, learning and ingenuity have not been wanting in the investigation; while the continued appearance of new treatises shows that no very satisfactory conclusion has been attained. Even in England, though we may generally pass the subject over as a difficulty, or acquiesce in some traditionary explanation, it is evident, that when an earnest and thoughtful inquirer is led to consider it in all its relations,* he is at a loss either to harmonize the various accounts of scripture, or to present to his own mind an intelligible conception of the gift of tongues, as an endowment of the primitive church and a means of assisting the diffusion of the gospel.

The popular notion of this gift is, that on the day of Pentecost, by the descent of the Holy Spirit upon them, the Apostles were miraculously endowed with the power of speaking languages which they had never learnt—a power which they forthwith exercised to the conviction of foreigners from all parts of the world there present; that this phenomenon was repeated in subsequent instances of conversion and the descent of the spirit: and that in the case of the church of Corinth, we have a proof of the general possession of such a supernatural power by its members, and in a pre-eminent degree by the Apostle Paul him-

* See the Rev. J. H. Thom's Commentary on 1 Cor. xii. xiv.

self. The purpose for which such a power was granted is supposed to have been either, specially, to enable the missionaries of the gospel to address natives of other lands in their own language, and so to facilitate conversion; or generally, like all the miraculous powers, to produce a conviction that the new religion was divine.

This is plausible enough so long as we do not descend to particulars; when we do, difficulties start up on many points. If the gift of speaking languages which they had never learnt were bestowed on members of the church, to aid them in the diffusion of Christianity, how has it happened that neither scripture nor ecclesiastical history has recorded a single instance of its being employed as an instrument of converting barbarians? We should hesitate to go so far as to say, that the general diffusion of the Greek, which the Apostles had learned, and the Aramæan, which was their native tongue, would suffice them as the means of addressing assemblages throughout the Roman world. In Asia Minor alone, there were no doubt other barbarous idioms, besides that of Lycaonia, which the missionary must acquire naturally or supernaturally, before he could preach with efficacy to the common people. And had the mission of the Apostles been to "Parthians, Medes and Elamites, and the parts of Libya about Cyrene," or to the native nations of Thrace and Macedonia, Germany, Gaul and Spain, a knowledge of their languages would have been indispensable to success. But it was not to these barbarians they addressed themselves. When they were rejected by the Jews and turned themselves to the Gentiles, it was not to rude native populations that they preached, but to those who had already received a tincture of Greek and Roman civilization. We know nothing of the apostolical churches at the first hand, except through epistles written to them in Greek. The time when a supernatural gift of tongues would have been really valuable to the church was when its missionaries undertook the conversion of the barbarians who knew no language save their own. But neither Augustine nor Boniface nor Patrick enjoyed such an aid. The apostolic Fathers are as silent as the scriptures respecting the use of such a gift, and it is not till we reach Irenæus* that we find any allusion to its exist-

* "Multos audivimus fratres in ecclesia, prophetica habentes charismata

ence. And his assertion has not been able to convince Protestant critics, at least, that such a miraculous gift was exercised by his contemporaries. Justin Martyr indeed claims a special grace,* enabling him to understand the scriptures, but he so generally misunderstood them that we cannot adjudge him even a gift of interpretation.

If not employed as an instrument for the conversion of the heathens, it may be said, however, that it was effective as a *sign*, convincing them that the power of God was with the preachers of the gospel. And in support of this view it is customary to cite the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. xiv. 22, "tongues are for a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not." If however we examine the passage to which he refers in proof of this, or the course of his argument, we shall find that he is rather depreciating the gift of tongues, as *not* fitted to produce the conviction of unbelievers. In Isaiah xxviii. 11, Jehovah threatens his people, according to the Septuagint, which the Apostle quotes, that he would speak to them "by men of other tongues and other lips;" i. e. by foreigners, who should enforce the lesson they had refused to learn from their own teachers; "and yet for all that they will not hear me, saith the Lord." The force of the quotation lies in this last circumstance; not in the efficacy of a foreign language to convince, but its inefficacy when other means have failed. When therefore the Apostle says that tongues are a "sign to the unbelieving," he means, that those to whom they are exhibited as a sign remain unbelieving in spite of them. In accordance with this inference he goes on to say that if all spoke with tongues, unbelievers who came into their assemblies would say that they were mad. This desire of the Apostle to keep under as much as possible the exercise of the gift of tongues, and his assignment to it of the last and lowest place in his list save one, is a singular contrast to the history of the Book of Acts, as commonly understood, in which its communication is supposed to have marked the birth of

et per Spiritum universis linguis loquentes." Adv. Hær. 6, 6. This passage is extant also in the Greek. Irenæus himself was obliged to *learn* the language of Gaul, in order to discharge the duties of his bishopric of Lyons. See Middleton's Inquiry, Works, Vol. i. p. 246.

* Dial. c. Tryph. p. 326. ed. Colon.

the Church, and gained its first converts, as well as to have been the test of individual conversion.

These are by no means the only difficulties which the twelfth and fourteenth chapters of the first Epistle to the Corinthians present. Michælis, though opposed to the rationalist explanations of Semler, admits them in the most ample manner. "Still more extraordinary is the ridiculous disorder which prevailed in the Corinthian community in the use of the gift of tongues; and it is wholly inconceivable how this could have happened, if all those who were able to speak foreign languages had received their knowledge from the immediate interposition of the Holy Ghost. They not only spake in languages which none of the community understood, but frequently when no interpreter was present to explain their meaning. They even expected that the whole assembly should say Amen to prayers which they were unable to comprehend, and what is still more, which the orators themselves were frequently unable to explain." And he concludes by asking, "Are talents like these the gifts of the Holy Ghost?" Yet after quoting some passages in the Acts relative to the gift of tongues, he says, "I doubt not that in the Corinthian community likewise there were some persons who had received this gift." As St. Paul makes no distinction between those who had received and those who only imagined they had received it, this by no means removes the force of his own objections. His learned translator remarks on the unsatisfactory state in which Michælis has left the whole question, but does not himself give any aid in clearing it up.*

Several of the recent German writers have had recourse to new explanations of the words *γλῶσσα* and *γλῶσσαις λαλεῖν*. Thus Bleek has collected various passages from the Greek grammarians and critics, in which *γλῶσσα* means not a distinct language, but obsolete, archaic, provincial and poetical words, and supposes that to "speak with tongues" is to indulge in the immoderate use of such words, and instead of a plain, intelligible discourse, give the Church a high-flown poetical rhapsody, which he who filled the place of the unlearned could not understand nor profit by. It would be advantageous certainly to be able

* Marsh's Michælis, i. p. 8. 351.

to put down such a style in Christian assemblies by the authority of an Apostle, but the interpretation cannot be carried through without the greatest violence ; and had St. Paul intended merely to dissuade from a vain display of human learning, unambiguous words were surely at his command, by which he could have stamped it with his reprobation. Hilgenfeld has revived in substance the opinion of Eichhorn, and holds that to "speak with the tongue" is used in contrast to speaking with the understanding, and means to speak in an excited state, in which the words, if not absolutely inarticulate or devoid of meaning, are yet so uttered as to convey no meaning to the hearer, and indeed, without the conscious co-operation of the understanding. This ecstatic state he considers, like prophecy, to be the effect of inspiration : but the difference lies in this ; in prophesying, the inspired person is in full possession of his reflective mental powers ; whereas "in the *glossolalie*, inspiration manifests itself through the medium of the intuitive side of the human mind directed towards God, accompanied with a suppression of discursive thinking (*νοῦς*)." We do not profess to understand the metaphysical distinction ; but on philosophical grounds we must object, that St. Paul would not have described such a use of the tongue by the plural *γλώσσαις*, nor have spoken of *γένη γλωσσῶν*, or of the tongues of men and angels ; nor would he have quoted the passage from Isaiah in illustration of his reasoning, had he not meant languages. The most plausible argument for this interpretation is, that he speaks in ch. xiv. 7, of the pipe or harp giving a sound without *διαστολὴ τοῖς φθόγγοις*, which may seem as if he was condemning *in-articulate* speaking. But to him who listens to a foreign speech it seems inarticulate, that is to say, he knows not where one word begins and another ends. All that the Apostle's argument requires is, that the speaker should be unintelligible, which he would equally be, whether he were muttering to himself, or haranguing in an unknown tongue. He is like a trumpet blown without a tune, by the sound of which no one can tell whether festivity or war is announced.

Since all that has been written on this subject leaves it surrounded with so much perplexity, we may perhaps be

excused for laying before our readers some thoughts, not hastily taken up, nor finally adopted without a sense of the uncertainty that is inherent in every interpretation, but which we still believe to be nearer to the truth than any that have yet been proposed.

It deserves to be remarked, that in those passages of the Old Testament which influenced the Jewish anticipations of the times of the Messiah, there is no allusion to any such event as a miraculous communication of the power of speaking foreign languages. The future diffusion of the knowledge and worship of Jehovah, the prevalence of peace, truth and righteousness, the enlarged communication of those spiritual influences which had been the exclusive privilege of the prophetic order—these and similar pictures of the coming age are familiar to us from the Jewish Scriptures, but of such an event as is commonly supposed to have occurred on the day of Pentecost there is no hint. The same silence is preserved in the gospels. A baptism with the Holy Spirit was announced by Christ's forerunner, but in words which would never lead to the anticipation that it was to consist in the power of speaking languages not acquired by human means. The descent of this Holy Spirit on his disciples is more distinctly promised by our Lord himself, but with characters widely remote from this. It was to enlighten their minds, reviving the recollection of all that their master had taught them, and guiding them into all truth (John xvi. 13), to furnish them with the power of defending themselves, if brought before kings and rulers, for adherence to his religion (Luke xxi. 12), to be within them a perpetual spring of the living waters of spiritual instruction (John vii. 38). These were to be the effects of the descent of the Holy Spirit, so far as its influence was to be exerted on the minds of the disciples. The only passage in our Lord's intercourse with the Apostles, which can be construed as having a reference to the miraculous power of speaking languages, is Mark xvi. 17: "These signs shall follow them that believe: in my name they shall cast out demons; *they shall speak with new tongues.*" It has been maintained in a former Number of this Journal (Vol. VI. p. 60) that the Gospel of Mark is the oldest, and as far as it goes the most authentic, record of our Lord's words and actions. But

from this character we expressly excepted the conclusion of the book, xvi. 9-20, which has so many marks, external and internal, of not proceeding from the same hand as the rest. If therefore there were any irreconcilable difference between the meaning of this passage, and what appeared from other passages to be the primitive notion of the Holy Spirit, we should decline to admit its authority. It may, however, though not a genuine part of Mark's Gospel, be a true record of our Lord's words. Receiving it as such, we think that it has no reference to a miraculous gift of speaking languages never learnt, but merely implies that by the change which the Holy Spirit would produce, a new energy and power would be given to the tongue, which would resemble a new creation. This is the only passage in which the combination "new tongues" occurs, but other uses of the word *new* will readily occur to the reader's mind, justifying this interpretation. Thus God is said to put a new spirit within his people, to take away the stony heart and give them a heart of flesh; and the prophet exhorts the Jews to make to themselves a new heart and a new spirit (Ezek. xxxvi. 26, xviii. 31). That the Christian is a new man—a new creature, is the language of St. Paul's Epistles. Taking these analogous expressions for our guide, we conclude that the promise of speaking with new tongues is virtually the same as that of Luke xxi. 15, "I will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay." Not that the "new tongues" were to be employed merely in self-defence; the promise included every accession of unwonted power, feeling, energy, persuasiveness, by which the converted was distinguished from the unconverted man.

In the narrative of the descent of the Spirit (Acts ii.) on the day of Pentecost, there is an undoubted reference to the use of various languages—unless indeed we suppose that the miracle was wrought upon the hearers, not upon the speakers, and that while the Apostles *spoke* in their native Galilaean, the Parthians, Medes and Elamites *heard* each in his own. When however we examine the whole passage from the beginning of the chapter to the end of Peter's speech, we shall perceive that the evidence of foreign languages having been spoken is contained entirely

in the parenthetical part (6-11), which relates the conflux of foreigners and their remarks on what they heard. Now the speech which is attributed to them is clearly a *framed* speech, which never can have been spoken by the parties into whose mouth it is put. It represents these dwellers at Jerusalem from every nation under heaven, as collectively describing the various countries from which they came, and all agreeing in a collective judgment upon the phenomenon which they witnessed. How was this collective judgment framed and delivered? Did they form themselves into a jury and speak by their foreman? otherwise, though we may well suppose that the audience expressed their wonder each to his neighbour, no individual can have heard the words here reported, nor indeed can they have been spoken at all. But if the speech has been framed and put into the mouths of the parties, then we have not the testimony of the foreigners to what they heard, but of the author of the speech to what he supposed them to have heard. Further, if, omitting this parenthetical part, we read the rest of the narrative by itself, we find not only no allusion to *foreign* languages, but strong ground for concluding that the use of them was no part of the phenomenon. "They were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance:" *other tongues* is one of those ambiguous expressions which must be interpreted by the connection. From the scoffing comment of a part of the audience, "These men are full of new wine," it is evident that the sudden access of religious conviction and enthusiasm on the part of the apostles was accompanied by a vehement excitement, for the time altering the speech and rendering it unintelligible; for the most illiterate person would never conclude that a speaker was intoxicated, merely because he spoke in a foreign language. It may be repulsive to our refinement to conceive that men like the Apostles should be so overpowered by the internal workings of religious feeling, as temporarily to lose the command of themselves, and become inarticulate in their utterance; we associate such occurrences with what we deem the lowest forms of fanaticism. But we must not judge the East by the standard of the West. What can be less accordant with our notions of the gravity of demeanour suited to religious offices, than

a company of prophets "prophesying with a psaltery and a tabret and a pipe and a harp before them," and so working on the sympathies of one who meets them, that he joins the band and prophesies among them (1 Sam. x. 19, 20, 24), that is, imitates their excited gestures and utterance? Such a state, when evidently produced by religious emotion, was regarded by the Jews with awe and reverence. And such was the case here. Peter, rising up, explains to the audience the true nature of that temporary excitement which they had witnessed. He makes no allusion to any supernatural gift of tongues; he quotes a passage of Joel in which it is predicted that in the last days, the age of the Messiah, there should be a universal outpouring of the Spirit. But in what was this to consist?—not in a gift of speaking foreign languages, but in the universal communication of that religious illumination and faculty of religious instruction, which in the former days had been exclusively vouchsafed to the prophetic order. "Your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions and your old men shall dream dreams; and on my servants and my handmaidens I will pour out in those days of my spirit, and they shall prophesy." And as the same passage spoke of fearful signs in the heaven and earth, indicative of approaching calamity, he calls on auditors as the means of saving themselves to repent and be baptized into the name of Christ. On these conditions he promises them also the gift of the Holy Spirit—a communication of similar influence to that which the Apostles had just received. How appropriate is this address, on the supposition that this influence consisted in a supernatural increase of religious knowledge, fluency, zeal and power; but how irrelevant, if its characteristic were the power of speaking languages never learnt! The symbolism of the tongues of fire distributed to the apostles (*διαμεριζόμεναι*, not "cloven") points to the same interpretation; they are an appropriate emblem of that inspiration which was to enable them to become powerful and energetic preachers of the gospel, but have no propriety as indicative of a gift of tongues, in the ordinary acceptation of the words.

The other passages in the Book of Acts in which the "speaking with tongues" is mentioned will naturally receive their interpretation according to the view taken of the

event of the day of Pentecost (x. 44-46, xix. 6). If to speak with "*new* tongues" in the promise of our Lord, with "*other* tongues" in the narrative of the descent of the Spirit, meant to speak as men in whom new faith, hope and knowledge, and the consciousness of a divine influence, produced a sudden and enthusiastic outburst of religious sentiment, then we must suppose that the abbreviated phrase, to "speak with tongues," means the same thing; and that this was the manifestation in which the Apostles recognized a true conversion. If these tongues were foreign tongues, then we must conclude that the ability to speak them, joined with the assurance that they had not been acquired in the natural way, was the passport into the Christian Church. One thing is evident, that those who spoke with tongues were intelligible to Jewish bystanders; for in one instance they are said to prophesy (Acts x. 44-46), in another to magnify God. And when Peter justifies his admission of Cornelius and his family into the Church, by the fact that God had given them the Holy Spirit, and put no difference between them and the Jews (x. 44-46, xi. 15, xv. 9), he speaks of God as purifying their hearts by faith, not of any power bestowed on them of speaking foreign languages.

The idea that the true tradition respecting the descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost has been distorted, by the introduction of the speech attributed to the foreigners, may be startling. But it must be remembered that in this portion of his work Luke does not write as an eye- and ear-witness, and that 65 A. D. is the earliest date which we can assign to the composition of the Book of Acts. Those who admit that the writers of the New Testament obtained the materials of their histories from the ordinary sources, must also admit that their credibility in different portions of their histories is to be graduated according to the proximity of the times in which they wrote to those of which they treat, and may therefore be very different, within the compass of the same volume.

Passing now to the mention of tongues in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, we must acknowledge that the interpretation which we have applied to the phraseology of the Acts is inapplicable here. The terms are not indeed precisely similar; the Apostle speaks of *γίνη γλωσσῶν*, which does not occur in the Acts, and which points so

clearly to a variety of tongues. But *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν* is common to both, and this is the chief difficulty of our case. For we see none in the supposition, that the church of Corinth contained among its members some who spoke a foreign language, and who, when the religious impulse came upon them, which it is evident, from the Apostle's exhortations, was sometimes so strong as to overbear considerations of propriety and sound judgment, broke forth in prayers or pious ejaculations, to which the hearers could not respond, not understanding the language in which they spoke. On such he imposes silence and communion with their own spirits and with God, unless there were some one present who could interpret their words. Others again, whose gift was of the lowest order, though not able to frame anything which could edify the community, could nevertheless serve as interpreters to those who could speak in a foreign tongue, but not in that of the audience. If any one spoke in a foreign tongue, he was not, according to the Apostle's direction, to occupy the whole time of the assembly; only two or three at most were to speak on each occasion; they were to do it in turn, and each was to have an interpreter.

Corinth was perhaps of all places in the ancient world that in which a Christian community would be most likely to be found, comprehending such a variety of tongues. Greek would, of course, be the language of the majority; but placed as this city was, at the point of meeting of the eastern and western world, by its double harbour inviting the commerce of Asia, Africa and Europe, men of the most various nations must have dwelt there, who, though they might pick up a few words of *Lingua-Franca-Greek*, sufficient for the purposes of commerce, could not utter their thoughts intelligibly in that language. On the other hand, so different was ancient education from modern in regard to philological culture, the Greeks might rarely understand Latin, and still more rarely Hebrew. The Apostle, who surpassed any other individual in the Corinthian church in his knowledge of languages (1 Cor. xiv. 18), certainly understood Hebrew, Greek and Latin; he had resided in Syria and Arabia; fastidious critics have thought they detected Cilicisms in his Greek. Men speaking all these and many more languages may have been found in

Corinth, and it was the wise purpose of the Apostle, if they joined the Christian church, not to preclude them from the privilege of communicating their thoughts and feelings to their fellow members, provided it could be done without confusion or rendering their meeting unedifying to the rest. He enforces the same lesson on the Church of Ephesus* as on that of Corinth, the duty of making all spiritual gifts harmoniously conspire to one end, and mentions among their functionaries, apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers; but we find no mention of him who speaks with a tongue, or him who interprets, although according to the common notion, as every church had the Spirit, this gift must have been found in all.

The employment of an interpreter in the worship of the Synagogue had been long familiar to the Jews, and some of the regulations (quoted by Lightfoot and Vitringa†) seem to have suggested to the Apostle his directions on this subject. The interpreter was a person of less dignity than the reader, agreeably to the place which St. Paul assigns him. Great care was to be taken that no confusion should arise; the interpreter (a useful caution still!) was never to let his voice be heard above that of the reader of the original; in reading the Law, the interpretation was to follow each verse; of the Prophets, three verses might be read consecutively. Two readers and interpreters might be employed at the same time upon the Prophets, but only one of each upon the Law.

It was the opinion of Semler that the persons endowed with the gift of tongues were appointed to their office in the Corinthian Church, in order that those who understood, for example, only Hebrew, Arabic or Coptic might not go without instruction. But we think it is evident that the speaking with tongues was a spontaneous act, not a prescribed duty, and performed under the same internal impulse as teaching or prophesying. That this impulse was strictly supernatural can scarcely be maintained against the obvious objection that it was exercised in a way so full of abuse, as to require the animated interference of the

* Eph. iv. 11. Comp. Rom. xii. 4, for a similar enumeration of gifts without any allusion to that of tongues.

† Lightfoot on 1 Cor. xiv. 2. Vitringa de Synagoga, 3, 2, 12, p. 1021.

Apostle, and a very energetic protest of his own authority (xiv. 37). On the other hand, it is evident that he did not regard the power of speaking with tongues as a mere philological attainment; it was a spiritual gift, though not of a high order. But here again we shall be in great danger of error, if we transfer modern ideas to the mind of Paul, and suppose that *spiritual* in his sense was equivalent to *miraculous* in ours. What was supernatural or not in the powers possessed by the Apostles and other believers is to be determined rather by the nature of the powers themselves than the language in which they are described. The conviction of a perpetual, all-pervading operation of divine power in every phænomenon of nature and event of Providence was so wrought into the mind of every pious Jew, that it is from the effects themselves, not from their language respecting the cause, that we must judge what was natural, what supernatural. In the Apostle's list of spiritual gifts, if we except the *δυνάμεις* and the *χαρίσματα λαμπάτων*, the rest imply no miraculous endowment. Their very diversity shows them to have their root in the natural diversity of human intellect, feeling and attainment. To one is given the word of wisdom, the talent of presenting truth with the attraction of eloquence; to another, the word of knowledge, deeper insight into the meaning of Scripture or the truths of religion; to another, faith, strong and ardent convictions; to another, prophecy, the qualifications of a religious teacher; to another, the discernment of spirits, intuitive sagacity in judging characters; to another, a fitness for relieving distress and sickness (*ἀντιλήψις*); to another, aptitude for the management of affairs (*κυβένησις*). It would be a very improbable supposition that the members of the Church of Corinth, previously destitute of all these qualifications, were supernaturally endowed with them as the consequence of their Christian faith.

In what sense then does the Apostle call them spiritual, and say that to each is given the manifestation of the spirit for a beneficial end? They became spiritual because they were enlarged, exalted, purified by the influence of Christian faith. Eloquence, sagacity, energy of character, talents for affairs, if directed to selfish and worldly objects as they were by men of the world, would have been in his

estimation only carnal ; devoted to religion, and employed under its guidance and for its advancement, they became spiritual. At the same time we do not doubt that he regarded that entire change of motive, principle and feeling which distinguished the Christian man from the Heathen or the Jew, as the effect of an influence of the Divine Spirit upon the mind of the convert. We can therefore readily understand how he should view the power of speaking foreign languages, when applied to the expression of religious feeling and the promotion of a religious object, as a spiritual gift, and the impulse so to use it as a spiritual impulse.

There is no great difficulty therefore in interpreting separately the Book of Acts and the Epistle to the Corinthians ; the difficulty is to combine them, since it certainly appears that phrases, similar if not identical, are used in them in different senses. Perhaps this difficulty might seem less formidable, were we not so much in the habit of considering the Bible as all one book, and so giving an undue extension to the maxim that "Scripture is the best interpreter of Scripture." Must the usage of the historian of the Acts necessarily govern the sense of an epistle of Paul, or *vice versâ*, seeing that neither writer was cognizant of the other's work, and that though the language is similar the things described are widely different ? The phraseology of the Acts and Mark is Hebraistic, that of the Epistle, Greek.*

One other remark occurs to us in connection with this subject. It is the leading idea of the Straussian hypothesis, that the gospels do not exhibit Christ to us in the truth of history, but that a certain conception of him formed itself in the minds of the early Christians, and that our gospels contain not a narrative of what he really said and did, but of what, according to that conception, he might be supposed to have said and done, mixed with

* Γλῶσσα, in the sense in which it was used by Aristotle and the Greek Lexicographers and Scholiasts, meant a word unintelligible without a translation or comment ; whence the translation or comment came to be called a *gloss*. It included archaisms, provincialisms, vulgarisms, and even words of a foreign language, when intermixed with a composition of which the staple was Greek. In the use which we have attributed to the Apostle it must be understood of a discourse the staple of which was foreign, though it might be intermixed with Greek. May he not purposely have adopted this instead of the harsher expression *φωνὴ βάρβαρος* ?

some vague and corrupted traditions of his actual life and preaching. Now we have seen that in one point the narrative of ~~the~~ descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost does essentially differ from the promise of the Spirit by our Lord to his disciples. If then the gospels have been framed to carry out the idea of Christ's teaching, how is it that his discourses respecting the Spirit have not been accommodated to the opinion that it consisted in the speaking of foreign languages? Should any one be disposed to reject our interpretation of Mark xvi. 17, this would still be an exception confirming the general truth, seeing the strong doubts which hang over the genuineness of that passage.

ART. III.—MEMOIRS OF CHALMERS.

Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Chalmers, D.D., LL.D. By his Son-in-Law, the Rev. William Hanna, LL.D. 4 vols. 8vo. 1852.

IN a former Number we reviewed at some length the first two volumes of this Biography. The delay of publication has been so great, and the expansion of the materials so wearisome, that the interest of the public has almost died away, not in the man but in the Memoirs, and we must finish off our notice in a very cursory manner. It is an unkind sort of retribution in Dr. Chalmers' son-in-law to visit upon himself all the evils and obscurity of that diffuseness which was at once the blemish and the forte of the great preacher, to hide him in long draperies which are more like the winding sheet of the dead than the garment of the living. In these Memoirs nothing is told succinctly: everything is detailed chronologically, and with all its circumstances and accompaniments, interesting or uninteresting. Every note that Dr. Chalmers wrote about the matter in hand, all the incidents of every negotiation, every misunderstanding that arose, and which he strove successfully or unsuccessfully to remove, and above all every speech he made of the smallest importance, published or unpublished, are here brought together,—an immense mass of descriptive materials. Dr. Chalmers' peculiar style of writing and of speaking rendered everything that came from him singularly unfit for such a method of biography. With a very noble enthusiasm, and a heart vigorously set upon practical results, his sentiments were yet apt to dilate into splendid abstractions of such enormous volume that the immediate and tangible object came to float, an almost invisible speck, in that sea of luminous ether. When any great interest was pressing upon him which by speech or writing he was to influence, he seems first to have turned his thoughts to the kind of sentiment which the occasion needed, and for the purpose of awakening this sentiment to have availed himself of any material that was ready to his hand. Essays and sermons

written in the fulness of a young enthusiasm were turned into speeches on occasions requiring the utmost practical vigour, closeness, and decision; and the unhappy consequence is, that in all the most heroic moments of Dr. Chalmers' life he is as declamatory as a great schoolboy—there is a frothy, spouting, fine and exaggerated manner in his most solemn words, or in what he and his biographer would call his most important "appearances." In the warmth of spoken delivery this might be more than endurable; but as a method of narration, as a medium of presentation for disputed facts and theories in the most critical period of the Church of Scotland, it is offensively distressing. We are compelled therefore to confess that, notwithstanding many moving incidents graphically described, we are not much wiser as to the essential principles affecting the disruption of the Scottish Establishment than we were when we published our article upon the Free Church nine years ago; and with all the details of the writings, actions, speeches, and, in the peculiar phraseology of these volumes, "deliverances," of the great leader of this movement in our hands, we can only adhere to our then impression that however right Dr. Chalmers may have been in the free constitution he desired for a Christian Church, he was absurd and unreasonable in expecting or desiring such a constitution in connection with the privileges of a State Church. He wanted to combine the uncontrolled liberty of Voluntarism with the dignity, the fixedness, the security, and the pay, of an Establishment. We speak doubtfully of the extent of freedom for the laity that would be secured under Dr. Chalmers' 'Idea of a Church.' On this subject he speaks vaguely and inconsistently, and there are many indications that, with the powers of an Establishment, he would gladly have carried the *clerical* authority to an extent that no Free Church, in actual dependence on the laity, will ever dare to attempt. There are many very significant traces that, earnest as he was for the freedom of the Church, he would have deemed this freedom best secured by what he called the "*liberum arbitrium*" of the spiritual powers.

"With many of the opinions held, and many of the sentiments uttered, by some of the most prominent evangelical leaders, he had

no sympathy. He did not participate in the conviction that the right to choose their own ministers belonged by divine donation to the people. He disliked when the contest on which the Church had now fairly entered was represented as a contest for the rights of the Christian people; nor could he approve of the phraseology, rife now in some quarters, according to which the privileges of communicants, in the matter of the appointment of their religious instructors, was spoken of as part of the liberty wherewith Christ had made His people free. Believing in the existence of no divine right, wedded to no abstract theory, his position was, that the *Church* should be left free to carry out her own conscientious convictions—should be left unbribed and unfettered, to do what she thought best for the Christian good of the people; and, as his own convictions most cordially went along with what the Church had declared to be a fundamental principle of her policy, he was prepared at any hazard to take any necessary step, at once for the preservation of the Church's general freedom, and the protection of the Church's humblest congregations."

The difference between the Church and the Courts of Law, and eventually between the Church and the Government, was one of a very intelligible kind. A patron presented to a vacant living; the Congregation objected, almost to a man, on the ground of total want of interest in his spiritual ministrations; the Presbytery sustained the objection, reported the living to the patron as vacant, and required him to nominate again a more eligible candidate. In most cases the patron would have respected the feeling of the Congregation and made no objection to the exclusion of the unpopular presentee; the Government especially showed itself disposed to exercise its patronage with this respect for the popular choice. But the disappointed nominee brought the matter into the Civil Courts, and there it was ruled, and on appeal to the House of Lords the judgment was confirmed, that neither Congregation nor Presbytery had any right to resist the patron's choice except upon the grounds of moral character or educational sufficiency,—and that the only qualification that the Church Courts could inquire into, of a clergyman so patronized, affected Christian conduct and literary fitness. The majority of the Church maintained its right to give effect to the objection of the people whether that objection was reasonable or unreasonable, or even if it was unsupported by any reason whatever, on the ground

simply that the existence of the objection was enough to destroy ministerial usefulness. Not that the Church Courts would have sustained every such objection, but they would not consent to be deprived of a power to do so. Undoubtedly such a claim as this went to the extent of the virtual abolition of patronage, for the Congregation might continue to veto until they obtained the man of their choice. On the other hand to compel the Church to ordain a Minister over a Congregation that refused to have him, was to deprive it of all spiritual or religious prerogatives, and to reduce its functions to the testing of scholastic attainments and the registration of secular appointments, to compel it, in one of the most important of all relations, to disregard the wishes and the interests of the party mainly concerned. The difficulty was insuperable. To yield to the Church was to make it supreme over State and people. To yield to the Law-Courts was to leave the Church without a spiritual office, without the power of protecting a single Congregation against the intrusion of the most inefficient or objectionable person who had only the modicum of character and knowledge requisite to obtain the license of a presbytery. It was impossible for the State to yield without giving unqualified power to the Church. It was impossible for the Church to yield without reducing itself to a mere State machinery. The difficulty lay in the irreconcilable nature of the things attempted. It cannot be, with security to popular liberties, that a Church shall wield the powers, be invested with the permanence, and supported by the wealth of the State, and yet the State be deprived of all control in the appointment of its Ministers, and in the regulation of those affairs upon which its power depends.

In the many negotiations which he held, with a view to the settlement of this question, with what he somewhat contemptuously called "parliament men," Dr. Chalmers had the misfortune to fall into serious mistakes as to the real views and intentions of leading individuals, and out of these mistakes arose painful charges affecting even his credit and honesty. The most serious of these differences was with Lord Aberdeen. Without imputing intentional unfairness to any one, we are inclined to think that the Government was not at first fully aware of all the difficul-

ties of the complicated question they had undertaken to deal with, and that the discrepancies and vacillations are with the Statesman and not with the Churchman. Certainly it would seem impossible to give a more absolute sanction to the freest, or wildest, demands of the Church than is contained in the following letter:—

“ It is agreed that, in all cases, the people objecting to a presentee shall assign the reasons of their dissent, be they what they may. Now let us suppose that any number of persons should object to a presentee because *he had red hair*. This would, no doubt, be a very bad reason; but if they persevered in their hatred of red hair, and the Presbytery found it consistent with their sense of duty, and the dictates of their own consciences, they might give effect to the objection by rejecting the presentee. But then the reason of dissent on the part of the people, as well as the rejection by the Presbytery, would be recorded; and if the Superior Church Courts should confirm the decision, the matter would there terminate. It is to this publicity, and to the common sense and justice of mankind, that I look for a security against arbitrary and capricious proceedings in any quarter.—*ABERDEEN.*”

And that there may be no mistake as to his meaning, the Non-Intrusion Committee state to Lord Aberdeen how they understand him.

“ The Committee are gratified to find that they have so entirely misapprehended your Lordship’s sentiments, and they trust that they do not misunderstand them now, in supposing you to agree that the Church Courts should have the *power* to reject a presentee in consideration of the continued opposition of the people, although they should think the reasons assigned for that opposition as frivolous as that in the case supposed by your Lordship, viz. his hair being red.”

Yet notwithstanding all this, Dr. Hanna informs us that Lord Aberdeen brought in a Bill, in which unacceptableness to the people was disallowed as a disqualification for a minister of the Church of Scotland presented to a living by a patron; and that he resented with imputations on his personal truthfulness Dr. Chalmers’ allegation of Lord Aberdeen’s substantial coincidence with the Non-Intrusionist portion of the Church. We give the particulars of this affair, as it contains an amusing touch of Lord Melbourne, and a characteristic specimen of the flowery

and ornamental, yet vehement, eloquence that Dr. Chalmers brought to bear upon practical matters. In reference to a statement supposed to be attributed to Lord Melbourne, in a Report drawn up by Dr. Chalmers, Lord Aberdeen remarked—

“I am sure there is no good ground for the statement of the noble Viscount, that any measure of the Government relative to the subject would be objected to by your Lordships. This is not treating your Lordships in a manner becoming the noble Viscount.”

LORD MELBOURNE.—“I do not remember it. Does the Report mention me?”

LORD ABERDEEN.—“No, the term is the Government; but my noble friend must excuse me if I look to him as the Government. At all events, I am certain that the Report refers to the noble Viscount.”

LORD MELBOURNE.—“I did not say anything of the kind.”

LORD ABERDEEN.—“I will fairly tell the noble Viscount, that I do not believe the statement contained in the Report. In the report of the communications which the Committee have had with me they have been so unscrupulous in their statements that it is probable they have not dealt more honestly with the noble Viscount.”

LORD MELBOURNE.—“*I do not mean to say that, however.*”

Dr. Chalmers deals with the two noble Lords in this fashion:—

“For ourselves, such is the strength of our natural veneration for rank, a sentiment that may be either of a chivalrous or a pusillanimous character, that we are most unwilling to relinquish the favourable opinion which we have been led to entertain of any person who may chance to inherit its honours; and would rather wait the most decisive evidence of ours being a misplaced and extravagant partiality, ere we could agree conclusively to let it go. But over and above this instinctive, or, as it may be termed by many, this blind affection, there are certain principles on what we hold to be the best for the stability and good order of the commonwealth, which strongly prepossess our inclinations towards the aristocracy of the land. We look in fact on the great families of Britain as the supports or buttresses of our national edifice; and, just as we love in architecture the graceful minarets, by which, not these ornaments but these lateral strengths of the building, are surmounted—so do we confess an affection for the crowns and coronets which

sit on the brows of our nobility. But greater, if not in the order of taste greater, far greater in the order of worth and solid importance than the supports of our edifice, is the foundation of our edifice; and on this principle a still mightier interest than even the character of our grandees is the character of our general population. The most essential element of a nation's health and safety is that we shall be sound at bottom; but this is an element which nothing tends more fearfully to endanger, than that the Christian instructors of a land, the officials charged with the highest of all education—the education of principle—that they should be brought down, whether by their own deservings or the injustice of others, in popular estimation. ‘Ye are the salt of the earth, but if the salt loses its savour, wherewith shall the earth be salted?’ It is a blow struck at the corner-stone when the moral integrity of clergymen is assailed; and when not in any secret or obscure whispering place, but on the very house-top of the nation, we behold, and without a single expression of remonstrance or regret from the assembled peerage of the empire, one nobleman sending forth his wrathful fulmination against the honesty and truth of ministers of religion, and another laughing it off in his own characteristic way, with a good-natured jeer as a thing of nought—we cannot but lament the accident by which a question of so grave a nature and of such portentous consequences to society as the character of its most sacred functionaries, should have come even for a moment under the treatment of such hands.”

Whatever may be thought of the ecclesiastical theories of the Free Church of Scotland, the act of disruption, by which upwards of four hundred ministers cast themselves out of dear homes and honourable dignities, was as noble a testimony to simplicity and truth, as noble a disregard of self-interest at the call of duty, as ever was witnessed by any age of the Christian Church. That solemn dismemberment is minutely and effectively related, and as it is the largest and most memorable attestation that the martyr spirit is not dead in these days, we give Dr. Hanna's narrative entire, notwithstanding its length.

“Thursday, the 18th May, 1843, the day named for the meeting of the General Assembly, rose upon the city with a dull and heavy dawn. So early in the morning as between four and five o'clock the doors of the church in which the Assembly was to convene opened to admit those who hastened to take up the most favourable positions, in which they were content to remain for nine

weary hours. As the day wore on, it became evident that the ordinary business of the city had to a great extent been suspended, yet the crowds that gathered in the streets wore no gay or holiday appearance. As groups of acquaintance met and commingled, their conversation was decisively of a grave and earnest cast. Towards mid-day, the throne-room at Holyrood, in which the Marquess of Bute, as Lord High Commissioner, held his first levee, was filled with a numerous assemblage of noblemen, clergymen, military and naval officers, the city magistrates, and country gentlemen from all quarters of Scotland. A portrait of King William III. hung upon the walls of the room, opposite to the spot on which Her Majesty's Representative was standing. The throng of the levee was at its height, when, loosened somehow from its holdings, this portrait fell heavily upon the floor; and as it fell a voice was heard exclaiming, 'There goes the Revolution Settlement.' When the levee closed the customary procession formed itself. In his state carriage, accompanied by a splendid *cortège*, and escorted by a troop of cavalry, the Commissioner proceeded to the High Church. The service was conducted by the Rev. Dr. Welsh, the Moderator of the preceding Assembly, whose discourse was made all the more impressive by the frequent allusions to the event by which it was so instantly to be followed. Elsewhere, within the Assembly Hall, as hour after hour passed by, the strained feeling of the multitude by whom every inch of sitting and standing ground had for so long a time been occupied, was beginning occasionally to relax. At last, however, the rapid entrance of a large body of ministers into the space railed off below for members, told that the service at St. Giles' was over. Every symptom of langour at once gave way, and expectation was at its utmost stretch. Dr. Welsh, the Moderator, entered and took the chair. Soon afterwards His Grace the Lord High Commissioner was announced, and the whole assemblage rose and received him standing. Solemn prayer was then offered up. The members having resumed their seats, Dr. Welsh rose. By the eager pressure forwards—the hush! hush! that burst from so many lips—the anxiety to hear threatened to defeat itself. The disturbance lasted but a moment. 'Fathers and brethren,' said Dr. Welsh, and now every syllable fell upon the ear amid the breathless stillness which prevailed, 'according to the usual form of procedure, this is the time for making up the roll. But in consequence of certain proceedings affecting our rights and privileges, proceedings which have been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, and by the Legislature of the country; and more especially, in respect that there has been an infringement on the liberties of our Constitution, so that we could not now constitute this Court without a violation of the terms of the union

between Church and State in this land, as now authoritatively declared, I must protest against our proceeding further. The reasons that have led me to come to this conclusion are fully set forth in the document which I hold in my hand, and which, with the permission of the House, I will now proceed to read.' In this document, after the wrongs of the Church had been succinctly recited, the parties who signed it proceed at its close to say,—' We protest, that in the circumstances in which we are placed, it is and shall be lawful for us, and such other Commissioners chosen to the Assembly appointed to have been this day holden as may concur with us, to withdraw to a separate place of meeting, for the purpose of taking steps, along with all who adhere to us, maintaining with us the Confession of Faith and Standards of the Church of Scotland, for separating in an orderly way from the Establishment, and thereupon adopting such measures as may be competent to us, in humble dependence on God's grace, and the aid of the Holy Spirit, for the advancement of his glory, the extension of the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour, and the administration of the affairs of Christ's house, according to his Holy word: and we now withdraw accordingly, humbly and solemnly acknowledging the hand of the Lord in the things which have come upon us, because of our manifold sins, and the sins of the Church and Nation; but, at the same time, with assured conviction that we are not responsible for any consequences that may follow from this our enforced separation from an establishment which we loved and prized, through interference with Conscience, the dishonours done to Christ's crown, and the rejection of His sole and supreme authority as King in His Church.' Having finished the reading of this Protest, Dr. Welsh laid it upon the table, turned and bowed respectfully to the Commissioner, left the chair, and proceeded along the aisle to the door of the Church. Dr. Chalmers had been standing immediately on his left. He looked vacant and abstracted while the Protest was being read; but Dr. Welsh's movement awakened him from the reverie. Seizing eagerly upon his hat, he hurried after him with all the air of one impatient to be gone. Mr. Campbell, of Monzie, Dr. Gordon, Dr. Macdonald, Dr. Macfarlan, followed him. The effect upon the audience was overwhelming. At first a cheer burst from the galleries, but it was almost instantly, and spontaneously, restrained. It was felt by all to be an expression of feeling unsuited to the occasion; it was checked in many cases by an emotion too deep for any other utterance than the fall of sad and silent tears. The whole audience was now standing gazing in stillness upon the scene. Man after man, row after row, moved on along the aisle, till the benches on the left, lately so crowded, showed scarce an occupant. More than 400 ministers, and a still larger number of elders, had withdrawn.

"A vast multitude of people stood congregated in George's Street, crowding in upon the Church doors. When the deed was done within, the intimation of it passed like lightning through the mass without, and when the forms of their most venerated clergymen were seen emerging from the Church, a loud and irrepressible cheer burst from their lips, and echoed through the now half-empty Assembly Hall. There was no design on the part of the clergymen to form into a procession, but they were forced to it by the narrowness of the lane opened for their egress through the heart of the crowd. Falling into line and walking three abreast, they formed into a column which extended for a quarter of a mile and more. As they moved along to the New Hall prepared for their reception, very different feelings prevailed among the numberless spectators who lined the streets and thronged each window, and door, and balcony, on either side. Some gazed in stupid wonder; the majority looked on in silent admiration. A few were seen to smile, as if in mockery; while here and there, as the child or wife of some out-going minister caught sight of a husband's or a father's form accomplishing an act which was to leave his family homeless and unprovided, warm tear-drops formed, which, as if half ashamed of them, the hand of faith was in haste to wipe away. There were Judges of the Court of Session there, who had placed themselves where they could be unseen observers of what took place, who must have felt perplexed, it may be saddened, when they saw realized before their eyes the fruits of their decisions. Elsewhere in the city, Lord Jeffrey was sitting reading in his quiet room, when one burst in upon him saying, 'Well, what do you think of it?—more than four hundred of them are actually out.' The book was flung aside, and springing to his feet, Lord Jeffrey exclaimed, 'I'm proud of my country; there is not another country upon earth where such a deed could have been done.'

"The large hall at Canonmills, prepared for the New Assembly, and fitted up so as to receive 3,000 auditors, had been filled, in the part allotted to the public, from an early hour in the morning. When the procession from St. Andrew's Church arrived, and the space marked off for ministers and elders was fully occupied, Dr. Welsh opened the proceedings with prayer, after which he rose and said—'Reverend fathers and brethren, I presume our first duty in the circumstances in which we are placed, unquestionably is to constitute ourselves by the choice of a Moderator; and I feel assured that the eyes of every individual in this Assembly—the eyes of the whole Church and country—the eyes of all Christendom, are directed towards one individual, whom to name is to pronounce his panegyric. In the exhausted state in which my duties have left me, it is scarce in my power to say more, but indeed I feel that more would be superfluous. The extent of his labours in connec-

tion with our present position would perfectly entitle Dr. Chalmers—(the mention of Dr. Chalmers' name here was received with extraordinary enthusiasm, the whole of the vast audience rising, cheering for some minutes with the utmost enthusiasm, and the house presenting a perfect forest of hats and handkerchiefs)—would justly entitle that great man to hold the first place in this our meeting. But surely it is a good omen, or I should say a token of good from the Great Disposer of all events, and the alone Head of the Church, that I can propose, to hold this office, an individual, who by the effort of his genius and his virtues, is destined to hold so conspicuous a place in the eyes of all posterity. But this I feel is taking but a low view of the subject. His genius has been devoted to the service of his Heavenly Master, and his is the high honour promised to those who, having laboured successfully in their Master's cause, and turned many to righteousness, are to shine as the stars for ever and ever.' In taking the chair, Dr. Chalmers proposed that the proceedings should be commenced by another act of prayer and praise. The psalm selected to be sung commenced with the verse—

‘ O send thy light forth and thy truth ;
Let them be guides to me,
And bring me to thine holy hill,
E'en where thy dwellings be.’

“ As the vast multitude stood up to sing these words, and as the swell of 3,000 voices rose up in melody to heaven, a sudden burst of sunlight filled the building, and there were some who thought of Dr. Chalmers' text, but six months before—‘ Unto the upright there ariseth light in the darkness.’ ”—Vol. iv. 341.

Dr. Chalmers' efforts to support the new Church which he had created were prodigious and successful. The responsibility of a movement, which involved the daily bread of four hundred and seventy clergymen and their families, without incomes, without homes, and without churches; which undertook to supply public worship and the administration of religious ordinances in all these ruptured parishes, as regularly as though the old system had known no disturbance; and which had to bear the whole expense of the existing Missions of the Church of Scotland, (for without an exception the Missionaries at foreign stations adhered to the Free Church,) had long been present to his mind, and when the crisis came it found him, with well-considered plans and methods of organization, fully pre-

pared to meet the difficulty. He had a happy art of fixing names which were in themselves a recommendation to what he wished to prosper, and a brand upon what he wished to condemn. For the maintenance of the outgoing clergymen, the flower of the Church of Scotland, he established the Sustentation Fund,—and the portion of the clergy that remained he contemptuously styled the Residual Establishment. Hardly was the Separation made when he was enabled to report that six hundred and eighty-seven associations had been organized, that two hundred and thirty-nine of them were in full operation, and had already sent in upwards of seventeen thousand pounds. In one week he was enabled to report that the Contributions to the Building Fund amounted to £104,776. Many had built their hopes upon distant sympathy and help, but Chalmers understood fully and valued justly the incalculable force of well-maintained local exertion, and as often as he heard of some large contribution from a distance exultingly reported, he plainly hinted, ‘that the eyes of a fool were in the ends of the earth.’ It is highly creditable to him that he steadily refused to employ in this service his immense personal influence in England and elsewhere, declaring that for his part he could have no satisfaction, nor confidence, in a movement for Scotland, which Scotland herself did not support. And he was not disappointed. Commencing with nothing, with everything to provide for from buildings to salaries, the Free Church of Scotland in the first year of her existence, beyond what was requisite for the supply of her own wants, raised £32,000 for independent schemes of Christian benevolence, a sum larger by £12,000 than had been raised by the whole Church in the previous year for similar purposes. In that year five hundred churches were built, and upwards of £300,000 were contributed by a community, not wealthy, which numbered less than one-third of the population of Scotland. The spirit that he called out in this service, and the energies and methods on which he relied for permanent prosperity, are amusingly exhibited in the following passage :—

“He would not admit the plea of poverty, when urged in excuse of such neglect of duty. ‘I am only sorry,’ he said in the General

Assembly of 1844, 'when some of the Highland Brethren were telling us of the inability of the people in some districts to give anything, that I did not put the question whether the practice of snuffing was at all prevalent among them. Why, I believe that I could make out by the Excise returns, that in the Island of Islay alone, some £6,000 a-year is spent on tobacco. The power of littles is wonderful. I began with pennies; I now come down to pinches, and say that if we got but a tenth of the snuff used by Highlanders—every tenth pinch—it would enable us to support our whole ecclesiastical system in the Highlands. It is astonishing, the power of infinitesimals. The mass of the planet Jupiter is made up of infinitesimals; and surely, after that, it is in the power of infinitesimals to make up a stipend for the minister of Ballachulish!'"

But perhaps the most honourable work of Dr. Chalmers, in this cause, was the conversion to civilisation and Christianity, through his personal labours or influence, of a barbarous district in Edinburgh called the West Port, which had an infamous notoriety as the scene of Burke's murders. Of this community one-fourth were paupers, receiving parish help, and one-fourth were street-beggars, thieves, and prostitutes. On one occasion the minister employed by Dr. Chalmers found a house with twelve or more apartments, in which every man and woman was drunk, and on purchasing bread for some of the famishing children, he discovered the already drunken mother carrying it off to the dram-shop. On another occasion he attended a funeral, and found the whole assembled company so drunk, that he had to beg some sober neighbours to carry the coffin to the grave. He divided the West Port into twenty districts, each containing twenty families, and to each district he appointed a weekly visitor. He opened a School at the end of the very close in which the murders were committed. There he invited the inhabitants of the neighbourhood to meet him, and expounded to them the measures he had projected for them and for their children. He carried with him the popular sympathies, as he always did, and not the less for insisting that they must do their part, pay for the instruction of their children, subscribe towards the building of their Church, and contribute to the support of their Minister. He raised them at once to some feeling of the dignity of

citizens and Christians, by showing that he looked to them for the cheerful discharge of the duties which attach to all good members of society. The ministrations and instructions which they would have despised, if offered as a charity, assumed another aspect when regarded as their own creation, called into existence by their sacrifices, and the outward and visible signs of their craving for religious life, and sense of religious responsibility. He told them in homely terms that he had obtained for them one of the best teachers in the country; that they must pay twopence a-week for each child's education; that the article they were to be supplied with was worth a great deal more than that; that they were quite able, and he was sure would be quite willing, to pay that much for it. The audience were quite delighted with this frank confidence, and promised every thing. A School was opened where School had never been before, and in the course of a year there were 250 scholars in attendance. So earnestly was his heart set upon the good work of reclaiming this wilderness, of making it rejoice and blossom like the rose, that in his private prayers it is the constant burden of his heart. Some of these prayers are very remarkable.

"Let me at least, if it be Thy blessed will, see—though it should be only in one or in a small number of specimens—a people living in some district of aliens, as the West Port, reclaimed at least into willing and obedient hearers, afterwards in Thine own good time to become the doers of Thy word.—Moving fearlessly onward may I at last obtain such possession of the West Port, as that the gospel of Jesus Christ shall have the moral ascendancy over a goodly number of its families. We would give Thee no rest, O Lord, till Thou hast opened the window of Heaven and caused righteousness to run down that street like a mighty river.—Reveal to me, O God, the right tactics, the right way and method of proceeding in the management of the affairs of the West Port. O that I were enabled to pull down the strong holds of Sin and of Satan which are there; and O save me, save me from the difficulties to which I am exposed should hollowness of heart or principle be found to obtain with any of the agency. O how incompetent I feel myself to be for acting the part of a cautious and wise general in the midst of them."

Before such practical energy, and such heart devotion, all difficulties disappeared. At the end of two years a Church was built and opened, nearly all its sittings were

taken by inhabitants of the West Port—and school fees amounting to upwards of £70 per annum were gratefully and cheerfully paid. At the present time Dr. Hanna informs us that it is not known that there is a single child of a family resident within the West Port who is not at school, that the habit of attendance at public worship has become general and regular, that the Church is filled to overflowing, that the people of the West Port, who contributed £100 among themselves to the building of their church, are now contributing with equal liberality to the erection of a gallery; and that during the last year, after meeting their own expenditure for religious purposes of nearly £250, the West Port congregation contributed £70 to missionary and educational objects. This is a result worthy of being reported.

Dr. Chalmers had a theory that a man's life should have periods like the days of the week, and that from sixty to seventy, the seventh decade, should be the Sabbath of his years. He was not enabled to carry out this scheme for retirement, and rest, and maturing of the fruits of the past. The circumstances of the Church with which he was identified caused labour and anxiety to accumulate upon him in his latter years. The two years before his sixtieth, whilst yet the Church of Scotland was unbroken, he had devoted to labours and journeys through the country in aid of the cause of Church Extension that he might earn a better right to retire,—but he soon got involved in the troubles and conflicts that were to end so fatally, and then until his death the care of all the Churches rested upon him. From the Chair of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh, he had now to transfer himself to that of the new College of the Free Church, whose Principal he became. His instructions in this department from both chairs seem to have been highly desultory and unsystematic, and often upon topics extraneous to his proper course. Learned theologians he could not have made, for he was not one himself, but it is probable that the method he pursued was admirably fitted to stimulate thought, and to make effective preachers and pastors. We cannot concede what his biographer claims for him, that he was "the greatest teacher of Theology our country has ever seen," but we

doubt not that he does him only justice when he says that he "filled the youthful breasts of those who were afterwards to occupy the pulpits of the land, with the fire of a generous and devoted enthusiasm." The fact is that Dr. Chalmers' mind was ambitious and discursive, little accustomed to habits of severe study, and, though capable of profound thought, wanting that full knowledge of what others have thought, which alone can give a man a mastery in any field of speculation. He was not a scholar, and his reading, so far as appears, seems to have been chiefly in the direction of practical divinity. Kitto, and Poole, and Henry, and Robinson's *Researches in Palestine*, constituted, we are told, the whole of his "Biblical Library." "There," said he to a friend, "there are the books I use—all that is biblical is there. I have to do with nothing besides in my biblical study." Yet he undertook to speak, *ex cathedra*, of German Theology, and of German Philosophers. His biographer tells us with great simplicity that, with no knowledge whatever upon the subject beyond what was supplied to him by Mr. Morell's *History of Modern Philosophy*, he forthwith announced his intention to deliver a course of lectures to his students upon the German Philosophy. But though his thoughts may have been but as sparks, they were always ready to kindle; and his mind, like his life, was never dead or inert. He was always occupied with some speculation that he thought the times required, or by some good work that he deemed more needful still; and it is quite characteristic, though his biographer does not say so, of his versatility and of his thorough goodness, that he abandoned a series of papers on Kant, Fichte, and Cousin, because his pen and his sympathies were occupied in devising measures to meet the failure of the potato crop. In the midst of these multiplied cares and labours, his faithfulness to which kept him buoyant and happy, death came upon him without notice. On the night of Sunday, May 30, 1847, he parted from his family in health and spirits: in the morning he was gone from them. He had been preparing a Report to be given into the General Assembly upon Monday, and in the morning one of his friends sent for papers which he had expected to receive at an earlier hour.

"The housekeeper, who had been long in the family, knocked at the door of Dr. Chalmers' room, but received no answer. Concluding that he was asleep, and unwilling to disturb him, she waited till another party called with a second message; she then entered the room—it was in darkness; she spoke, but there was no response. At last she threw open the window shutters, and drew aside the curtains of the bed. He sat there, half erect, his head reclining gently on the pillow; the expression of his countenance that of fixed and majestic repose. She took his hand—she touched his brow; he had been dead for hours: very shortly after that parting salute to his family he had entered the eternal world. It must have been wholly without pain or conflict. The expression of the face undisturbed by a single trace of suffering, the position of the body so easy that the least struggle would have disturbed it, the very position of arms and hands and fingers known to his family as that into which they fell naturally in the moments of entire repose,—conspired to show, that saved all strife with the last enemy, his spirit had passed to its place of blessedness and glory in the heavens."—Vol. iv. 516.

Dr. Hanna furnishes many very interesting personal traits of Dr. Chalmers. He was a man of a most hearty and kindly nature. A sweet and strong humanity was his chief characteristic, the source of most of his power, and especially the spirit of his eloquence.—In the spring of 1845 he visited his native Anstruther for the last time. Not a memorial of his boyhood, nor any remnant of an old friend, escaped his seeking heart and eye. Whilst walking the old way where he had so often trudged along to the parish school, he suddenly disappeared into a poor-looking dwelling, saying, "I would just like to see the place where Lizzy Geen's water-bucket used to stand," Lizzy Geen having been a great favourite with the school-boys for allowing free access to her water-bucket, when heated with play. He called upon two old men whom he had not seen for fifty years. One of them was a tailor, now upwards of eighty, who in his humble rank had been a prodigy of knowledge, one of those prodigies who get from children their surest meed of admiration. Chalmers delighted the old man by telling him that he was the first who made him understand that the earth was round like a marble, and not round like a shilling. To the other friend of his childhood, deeply marked like himself with small-

pox, he humorously remarked, "Well, John, you and I have had one advantage over folk with finer faces,—theirs have been aye getting the waur, but ours have been aye getting the better o' the wear." The method of his daily life was carefully arranged, and strictly adhered to. He was a man of order, and of perseverance, in all his occupations. No day passed, wherever or whatever might be the circumstances, without something being executed with his pen. He got through an incredible amount of work, not by long-continued labour, but by a small measure of daily faithfulness. He could afford therefore to take his mind only at the fresh, and never to press upon it when the spring was worn. At any severe composition he never wrote more than two or three hours at once, and seldom had more than one sitting in the same day. Dr. Hanna reports, what from the internal evidences of his writings we should not have supposed, that he was long and laborious in his preparations, and that the plan of every composition was carefully laid down, and fore-arranged even to minute digressions and particulars, before anything was written. We are even told that so far before him did he see, and so methodically did he proceed, that he could calculate, for weeks and months beforehand, the rate of his progress, and the day when each separate composition would be finished. In his personal habits the same nice, and somewhat fantastic, order was displayed. He had, like Dr. Johnson, not indeed a superstition, but a whim and fancy for numbers. He stropped his razor by an arithmetical rule. He dropped his staff at every fourth foot-fall, and whatever interruptions or conversations might take place he never lost the exact numbering of this pedometer. By the falls of his staff he could always tell how far he had walked. The way between his own house and the University was indirect and complicated, and it was a daily interest to find out a new route and keep a register of their relative lengths. It was an especial delight to find a new spot upon old ground, and so boyish was this fancy, that at Oxford he supposed himself to have discovered a dear old court that nobody knew. He was in the habit of keeping accurate registers of the number of persons that he daily met upon the road, and was very curious to mark the variations with the length

or shortness of the day. In his family intercourse he was most cordial—and in his demeanour to his daughters there is said to have been, what is so delightful to witness, a spirit of romance and chivalry. He was accustomed to remark that the geniality of his temper was affected by the faithfulness and success of his application to the work he had in hand, and “that successful exertion is a powerful means of exhilaration, which discharges itself in good humour upon others.” Every one who is occupied in the same kind of labours must have had experience of this portion of the daily wages of virtue, of the sweet coming of a peace unsought, and of the intimate dependence of right conditions of the moral nature upon the faithful fulfilment of intellectual duties. When entertaining his numerous visitors, especially the students of his class, he had often a difficulty in connecting names with persons; and fearful of wounding, he would ask a question, or make a remark to some impersonal name, throwing his eyes vaguely round until the name elicited a response and fixed the individual. In his private journals there are frequent self-accusations for excess in eating and drinking, but with Dr. Hanna’s explanations these accusations become testimonies to his singular moderation.

“He was indifferent about food, and remarkably abstemious. But there was no habit of life about which he was so scrupulous. His private journals are filled with constant laments over his own incautiousness and excess at table; so much so, that were those journals now to fall into the hands of one ignorant of Dr. Chalmers’ habits, he might draw from them a conclusion exactly opposite to the truth. One night at supper at Merchiston Castle, a water biscuit, as thin almost as a wafer, but of large circumference, was put upon the plate before him. As he got into an animated conversation, he continued breaking down this biscuit into small parts, and eating them. When he discovered that the biscuit was consumed, he expressed himself surprised and shocked; and although that was all he partook of upon this occasion, there was an entry that night in his journal,—‘exceeded to-night at supper.’ The truth was, that whenever he felt his capacity for any intellectual effort or any spiritual exercise impaired after eating, he attributed it to an excess, which it was his duty to curb. By a single extract from his journal, let us convey an impression of the light in which this part of self-government was regarded. ‘Incapable of study, and in great physical discomfort. How shameful: and let me here record

my humbling sense of it, and that this was in great part due to excess at table, which has made me bilious, and alive to all sorts of plague and provocation. I gave way to this vile indulgence at Mr. —'s, and have not been careful in the least for weeks past. Enable me, O God, to make a stand now, to enter on a new habit, and strive with all might for the mastery over this degrading appetite. But work in me by the might of thy Spirit, O God; not me, but the grace of God that is in me. Let me stay this enemy. Let me keep the body under subjection. Let me embark with all strength of purpose on this holy warfare. Henceforward may I be circumspect, awake—awake both to duties and consequences, with a constant sense in me of God, and the predominating influence of His Will, and that consciously, and with a distinct feeling of its obligation over my will, else how can I be said to be living otherwise than without God in the world? My God, let me enter now on a set career of self-government, and having the prospect of several convivial engagements before me, let me have the comfort of recording a victory over the lusts which war against the soul. Let me bethink myself of what I might yet do with my mind, and of what I have yet to recover of spirituality faded and well-nigh extinct, because overlaid by the sensualities of the flesh. The contest is for Heaven, which I shall never reach unless the spirit so lust against the flesh as to prevail over it. Let me, therefore, carry the principle of godliness abroad over the whole platform of my life, and downward to the minutest actions of it, that whether I eat or drink, or whatsoever I do, it might be to the glory of God; and O save me from those sad effusions of temper which are so opposed to the second law, to the charity of the gospel, and that long suffering which is one of the Spirit's most precious fruits.'"—Vol. iv. 454.

The admiration which Dr. Chalmers' extraordinary popularity as a preacher obtained for him might have corrupted a mind of feebler texture. He was of too genuine and elevated a spirit to be open to such danger, and when it encountered him rudely he treated it with undissembled contempt. A lady asked him, if he was proud or humble, in the idea, as he supposed, "that the admiration of her, and such as she, must prove a sore trial to his vanity." His answer was, "I am somewhat short in the temper, under the fatigues and annoyances to which I am occasionally exposed in my public labours." There was a thoroughness and individuality in his religious character, and in his views of vital religion, which protected him against all priestly assumptions, and sacerdotal tendencies. Whenever the doctrine of Apostolical succession

was introduced, Dr. Chalmers brought in a favourite story about a Highland baptism.

"A clergyman went to administer the rite in the house of one of his hearers, near which there ran a small burn or river, which, when he reached it, was so deep and swollen with recent rains that he could not get across. In these circumstances he told the father to bring his child down to the burn-side. Furnished with a wooden scoop the clergyman stood on the one side, and the father, holding his child as far out in his arms as he could, stood upon the other. The service proceeded, and when the time came for sprinkling the babe, the minister dipping the scoop into the water flung its contents across, aiming at the baby's face. He failed more than once, calling out to the father after each new trial, 'Weel, has't gotten ony yet?' Dr. Chalmers wondered what the great sticklers for form and ceremony in the sacraments would think of a baptism by a burn-side, performed with a scoop."

To this story about a baptism, we must add as a pendant another about a marriage.

"This brings to my mind a story connected with Buckhaven, which, you know, is a peculiar sort of place. It was long, and is yet, to some extent, behind other places in point of civilization; but some few of the inhabitants got to a little in advance of the rest. The minister of the parish went one day to solemnize a marriage; he made the bridegroom, of course, promise to be a faithful, loving, and indulgent husband—at least, he put the question to that effect, but could not get him to alter his stiff, erect posture. Again and again he repeated the form, but the man remained silent and stiff as ever. A neighbour was present who knew more about the forms and footsteps of the thing, and was considered to have advanced a little more in civilization than the rest. Enraged at the clownishness of the bridegroom, he stepped forward, gave him a vigorous knock on the back, and said to him with corresponding energy—'Ye brute, can ye no boo to the Minister!' Dr. Chalmers' commentary on this scene was brief but emphatic—'The heavings of incipient civilization, you know.'"

We close with recording our gratitude to Dr. Hanna for putting us in possession of another piece of genuine religious biography,—a biography which, though often clumsy, and encumbered with wearisome extracts and chronological details, will yet, for its reality, its clothing of flesh and blood, its vivid picturings of the daily life of an earnest, laborious, spiritual man, of great natural gifts and powers,

take rank with the memoirs of Foster and of Arnold. Dr. Chalmers was one of those men who practically influence the moral history of their country and their times. He was one whom it must have been impossible to know without feeling that he had become one of the determining forces of our life, and it is the great merit of this biography that it makes Dr. Chalmers a living person to its readers. Even to those of them who had no other knowledge of him, he, being dead, yet speaketh.

ART. IV.—HERESIES ABOUT INSPIRATION.

1. *Controverse sur la théopneustie des Écritures. Polémique touchant la Démission de M. Scherer.* Articles in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie Chrétienne*, publiée sous la Direction de T. Colani, for 1850 and 1851.
2. *Statement of Facts connected with the Expulsion of Three Students from New College, London.* By Robert M. Theobald, A.M., one of the expelled. Second Edition. London: Theobald. 1852.

IN the state of religious parties towards each other, five-and-twenty years ago, the proceedings described in these publications would probably have called forth a strong protest on the *negative* side of Protestantism, that any restriction of free inquiry as to points of Christian belief, was a violation of its fundamental principle; and there the matter would have rested, accompanied perhaps with a strong persuasion, that parties who had once moved, or been driven, over the strict limits of orthodoxy, could not consistently stop, till they had landed in the complete adoption of modern Unitarianism, as the only possible alternative. Without disclaiming in the slightest our unaltered attachment to the great principle of unlimited freedom of private judgment—as a negative condition indispensable to any genuine *positive* result—we still think, the circumstance of most interest and significance in these remarkable movements in London and Geneva, is the *particular* theological dogma on which they turn; nor do we deem it less deserving of notice, that the individuals holding the views which have caused their expulsion from certain religious communions, do not as yet appear to have avowed a decided predilection for any other *doctrinal* system, than that which they previously embraced. The three students, recently of New College, London, declare through Mr. Theobald, who has so ably and modestly stated their case, their sincere and earnest belief in the great facts and truths, which are expressed by the doctrines usually considered orthodox; and among the most decided opponents of the theory of M. Scherer respecting Inspiration, will be found the celebrated M. Chenevière, well known as a zealous ex-

pounder of Unitarian views of Christianity in the Church of Geneva. We do not of course mean to imply, that the notions about Scripture and its authority, and its relation to the human mind, which have found an entrance and an utterance in two of the most prominent seats of Evangelical Protestantism, can permanently co-exist with a retention of the entire range and compass of the old orthodox system, and will not lead to a very great modification of the traditional expression of belief on a variety of points. We believe that it will, and that it must. Nor do we intend to disguise our personal conviction, that Unitarianism, understood in its largest and most spiritual sense—recognising in the human Christ, a presence and a manifestation of the one living God, but not rigidly identified with the system either of Socinus, or of Biddle, or of Lardner, or of Priestley, or even of Channing—is the form of Christianity which the purified and emancipated soul of man will gradually approach, sympathise with, and finally adopt. We could not believe less than this, to be earnest believers at all. But we have long felt, that there was a question attaching to the very roots of all Christian belief, and lying below all the controversies that have agitated the surface of the religious world for centuries, which must first be settled, before any one of these controversies could be satisfactorily decided, and of which a very large proportion of Unitarians, still fettered with a textual Christianity, seemed just as slow to perceive the bearing and importance as the mass of their orthodox brethren:—we mean the nature of the inspiration of which the Scriptures are supposed to record the utterances, and the sort of authority which they acquire in consequence over the moral nature of man. It is to us one of the most hopeful signs of the times, and an omen of some great approaching revolution in the state of religious opinion—that this question is now fairly opened, and cannot be put back, and has become in fact the theological question of the day; and it is further noticeable, that it has sprung up and excited attention precisely in the bosom of those communities, which have been regarded as particularly distinguished for the cultivation of spiritual religion. The controversies of the last century and the beginning of this, like those of the old Greek Church, were speculative and metaphysical, and related chiefly to the unsearchable nature of Deity; those of the present day, more

like the early anthropology of the West, concern themselves rather with the human and practical, though still deep and difficult, topics of man's mysterious relations with the spiritual and unseen, and their influence on the development of his inner life. It is in this point of view, as indicative of a wide-spread and deep-working agitation of the religious mind in a particular direction, that the discussions which have grown out of recent transactions in Geneva and at the New College, London, seem to us to deserve more notice and to promise more enduring fruits, than the transitory controversies excited by ordinary outbreaks of sectarian bigotry.

M. Scherer, it may perhaps be known to some of our readers, was a professor in the Theological Academy, supported by the non-established Protestants of Geneva, which has acquired some notoriety from its association with the well-known names of Malan and Merle d'Aubigné. About two years since he resigned his situation in consequence of a change in his views concerning the inspiration of the Scriptures. This step which he wished to have taken quietly, produced a sensation among the French Protestants, which he little anticipated. In the *Journal* to which we have referred at the head of this article, he has noticed in succession the more important animadversions which the avowal of his opinions had drawn down on him. His concluding remarks are not particularly complimentary to the state of theological learning in that section of the Continental Protestants, with which he was immediately connected, and whose soundness in the faith has, we believe, been a special object of solicitude to the so-called Evangelicals of this country.

"I have thus," says he, "completed my review of the publications to which this question of inspiration has given rise up to the present time. I have been reproached for occupying the public attention with pamphlets, which their theological incompetency deprives of all intrinsic value. To this I reply, that the very feebleness of the discussion is a fact which deserves to be noticed. It has been less my object, in the foregoing pages, to write a piece of controversy, than to present a chapter of history. It is of importance to show, what is the actual state of theology in France and in French Switzerland, in the midst of the nineteenth century."*

The circumstances which led to the expulsion of the three students in London, have been so generally noticed in our

* *Revue de Theologie, &c.*, vol. i. p. 372.

religious periodicals, that it is unnecessary to dilate upon them. The College was opened by the Principal with an Address, which treated prominently of the Inspiration of the Scriptures. In the course of a conversation which had been invited on the subject of this Address, between the Principal and his pupils, some opinions were expressed by the young men whose names have been brought before the public, that were deemed "incompatible with the retention of their position as students for the Christian ministry;" and they were in consequence requested to withdraw from the College. Refusing to sign their own condemnation by a voluntary retirement, they were expelled. It is needless to dwell on the harshness and gross injustice of this sentence. Even admitting that their opinions were of dangerous tendency, it is obvious that they were placed in College for the avowed object of being guided and assisted by the light and power of superior minds, to the knowledge of what is sound and true. But what are we to think of instructors, who strip themselves of their proper functions, the moment the exercise of them is attended with any difficulty? who silence, instead of attempting to convince; and who summarily thrust out from their presence, the earnest, questioning spirits whom the mingled force of love and wisdom should have won over, if not to their own views, at least to views which might have a source, equally with their own, in deep reverence for truth and the God of truth? We read of such spiritual tyranny, perpetrated in the name of Christianity and Protestantism, with inexpressible disgust.

Our chief object in these brief remarks, is to call attention to the subject, on which the opinions of these ingenuous young men have been pronounced heretical—to the fact, that their course of thought has evidently been influenced by the deepest and most genial spirits of the present and a former time—Arnold, Hare and Coleridge—Owen, Leighton and Hooker,—and that their undesigned, in all probability their unconscious, coincidence of view with thoughtful inquirers out of the same theological school in other parts of the world, is a strong indication, that both have hit on some great and fruitful principle which is destined to produce an important change in the religious opinions of the coming age.

The source of the religious principle, the communion between the divine and the human spirit, the intuitive recog-

niton and unquestioning submission which the fundamental truths of religion claim from the *awakened* soul—all these are points, involved in the great question, to which these truth-loving men have made a generous sacrifice of their immediate worldly prospects, but lying as yet in the crude, undigested state which every truth must pass through, before it attains a scientific completeness of development. We can only say, that they seem to us on the right track for the discovery of very precious spiritual truth, and that we believe they have already opened a prolific vein. We heartily wish them help and encouragement to work it out to rich results. The main features of resemblance between the views put forth by the Genevan professor and those expressed by the expelled students, may be summed up in the following points: (1.) That the truth of Christianity is not contained in verbal propositions, but embodied and concentrated in the person and life of Jesus Christ, as the realization of a perfect union between the human and the divine; (2.) That the inspiration under which Christ attained his perfect moral excellence, and prophets and apostles their inferior measures of it, is not a gift that was limited to them, cutting them off from all spiritual communion with other moral natures, though it was enjoyed by them under rare and peculiar conditions—but is still open to Christians of every age, who imbibe the true spirit of Christ, in proportion to the faith and love which they derive from sympathy with him; (3.) That men need the help and stimulus of an outward revelation; but (4.) that the test of its truth and its means of moral influence must be found in its accordance with certain interior principles of the mind itself; (5.) that this does not make the criterion of religious truth purely subjective; because (6.) there is an objective, universal truth, which overpowers the wantonness and caprice of the individual judgment, and which commands assent and obedience, as soon as the spiritual organ is sufficiently opened to take it in and embrace it. Mr. Theobald says well—

“There is an authoritative, external standard of truth—an *objective* standard—if by *objective* is meant a standard that is independent of the will, consciousness and caprices of the individual. And it is the business of every man to bring himself into living relation to this standard. Happily, God has not left our knowledge of truth a less authoritative appeal than his own immediate

testimony. The privilege of man is, that he can 'live not to himself,'—that his life can be 'hid with Christ in God,'—and that thus he can become a standard to himself by merging his individuality in the life and will of God. But if by an *objective* standard is meant an authority which speaks merely *to* man and not *in* him,—which he can consult as an oracle speaking from some shrine into which he may not enter, and whose directions he must blindly follow,—which he can understand and receive without exerting himself to bring his moral being into inmost union and sympathy with it,—if this is the nature of an *objective* standard of truth, then assuredly man does *not* possess such an one, and it is well for him that he does not."*

The recommendation of such views above those ordinarily entertained, is, that they make religion an intrinsic and essential part of our nature, not something brought to it and put into it—a principle that carries its own glory and happiness along with it, not a task to be accomplished, for the sake of a specific reward. Divines of the rationalistic school have always been too prone to this latter view. No one can forget Paley's definition of Virtue. Faustus Socinus held, that the coarser virtues which are necessary to hold society together, may be sufficiently enforced by the benefits which attach to them in this world; but that there can be no adequate motive to the cultivation of the higher graces of the Christian life, without the distinct promise of a celestial recompense guaranteed in the express terms of Scripture. As if spirituality of mind were not a blessing in itself. We regret that one for whose name we have so much respect as Professor Chenevière, should have expressed himself on this subject, in his reply to M. Scherer, in such language as the following:—

"Once grant, that the word of the apostles is no longer the word of God, and their teachings become a philosophy which I can contest and reject. If my confidence in the preachers of Christ is not unlimited, I can no longer, in accordance with their injunctions and their example, count the most envied advantages of this world as but dung in comparison with the knowledge of Jesus Christ."†

For protesting against a system which leads to such conclusions, a professor has been forbidden to teach, and students are not permitted to learn. We are too remote from

* Statement, &c., p. 33.

† Quoted in the *Revue de Theologie*, vol. i. p. 360.

the scene of the Genevan controversy, to feel any strong personal interest in it. But we do hope, for the sake of our common country and the great interests of religious truth and progress, that the large and powerful and intelligent body of the Independents will not suffer the aspirations of their most earnest minds to be crushed by a pusillanimous deference to the prejudices of the uninstructed. It has been pertinently remarked,* that "the reference so often made to 'the founders and supporters of the Institution' will not bear examination,—besides that it seems to point to a very questionable kind of morality, and to make the ethics of an institution very different from the ethics of an individual."

* Statement, p. 40.

ART. V.—OXFORD.

Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners appointed to inquire into the State, Discipline and Studies of the University of Oxford, together with the Evidence, and an Appendix.
London, 1852.

It is much to have an exposition of Oxford usages from Oxford men. The ancient Universities of England retain from their mediæval origin a trace of the *disciplina arcani*:—contumelious divines reject a discriminating reviewer,—“He is not a University man, what can he know?” We with difficulty recognise the subject now that we find on every turn a basis for our arguments and an authority for our facts.

Some believe that Academical Reform is a new idea,—that the existing system of Oxford is coeval with Oxford itself,—that it was found out by Nebuchadnezzar, and is effectually confirmed by the book of Job;—that even if there have been changes, those changes have come from within;—that the authority of the Crown is an innovation of the Whigs; and that to ask a Learned Body if it have money and if it keep its statutes is a “Liberal outrage” and “a judgment for the great Rebellion.” But this is not so. A very little history, a very small number of facts, will prove conclusively that Reform in Oxford is very orthodox; that it flourished especially in the most palmy days of the most palmy Anglicanism; that it was formerly superintended by the straitest doctor of the straitest sect; that if Queen Victoria asks questions, King Charles “The Martyr” issued edicts; that a Commission to inquire—whether legal or illegal—finds at least a precedent in a previous Commission to *enjoin*.

“Many of the old statutes being grown out of use,” says the contemporary annalist under the year 1633, “by the change of Religion, and others also by long neglect and discontinuance, and some never rightly understood, and all so mingled and confounded, that it was very hard to say which of them were in force and which not, and yet all the Students bound to keep them under their corporal oaths, if not at their first matriculation then at their taking of degrees;—divers attempts were made to digest them into a new body, to the

end that every one might know what was to be done and what was not." Many of these attempts were made when the Earl of Pembroke was Chancellor, but these never prospered, and the great work, as it is called in the documents of the time, lay unfinished till the accession of Laud to the Supreme authority in the University. That remarkable prelate—whom Carlyle has depreciatingly termed "a College Tutor of the first magnitude,"—took extreme interest in the matter, was concerned in some of the previous unsuccessful efforts, and appears from the evidence to have formed very sharp opinions on the most minute points of Scholastic regulation. He immediately on his accession to the Chancellorship began, accordingly, to agitate for what we should now term Academical Codification and Reformation, and with unparalleled good fortune soon obtained the very utmost that he could desire. At a Convocation held in August, 1635, the learned authorities of the University, by a remarkable delegation of their legislative functions, agreed to be subject to and to obey whatever laws the Archbishop, who was much praised, might in the plenitude of his wisdom think it expedient to draw up for them.* And this it seems by Laud's own account passed without a single dissentient voice. The Archbishop, who was never accused of indolence or want of regulative activity, did not let the matter sleep; he took for his basis the abortive labours of the previous reformers, and in a short time sent down an entire and digested Code, and directed his subordinate, the Vice-Chancellor, "to declare and publish to the University and every member thereof, that the Statutes now printed," meaning his own Code, "are and shall be the Statutes by which the University shall be governed for this year; viz., till the Feast of St. Michael, which shall be in the year of our Lord 1635," and for that year, which was intended to be a year of trial, he did not think it necessary to require any confirmation of his enactments from the University itself—nor from any authority superior to his own. During that year various objections of detail were made to the Code, which is emphatically a Code of detail, and various suggestions were made to the Archbishop for its amendment, some of which he

* "Placuit Academiæ," says Laud himself, "in frequenti Convocatione (ne uno refragante) rem totam; ad me curamque meam referre ut sub incude meâ Statuta hæc limarentur et a me confirmationem acciperent."

complied with, but most of which it would rather seem he rejected.

What now remained, was to get this Code finally received and obeyed at Oxford. It seems to have struck the Archbishop that the resolution of Convocation, whereby he was empowered to draw up a "*sanam epitomen*" of statutes, and thereupon enact and confirm it by his own fiat and authority, was, to say the least of it, a resolution of extremely questionable efficacy: it is now clear, and could not even then have been much doubted, that a corporation—whether literate or illiterate—could scarcely delegate their power of making Bye-laws to a single subordinate legislator, and therefore Laud probably felt it requisite to have for his own Statutes some authority which should secure the respect and obedience of succeeding generations. The obvious course was to obtain a vote of the corporate body—to propose and pass the whole body of Statutes in the usual manner in the regular University Convocation. But this did not suit the Archbishop; a man of his temper—for though he is now commonly thought at Oxford to be a martyr and a saint, he was ever deemed in his own age a man of imperious and overweening disposition—could hardly brook that the results of his care and genius and industry should be discussed and criticized and perhaps rejected by a large and popular assembly. Moreover, there was a Puritan minority—a small one certainly—but very zealous, which would perhaps debate, certainly hint evil, and possibly destroy the *éclat*, unanimity and glory of the proceeding by voting against the entire enactment. Accordingly, the Archbishop, seeking a more certain and effectual confirmation, procured, by his influence with King Charles, the issue of a Royal Commission, composed of various then important persons, such as Dr. Bancroft, Bishop of London, Sir John Coke, the principal Secretary of State, and other gentlemen now forgotten, who were charged to bring down the new Code to Oxford, and to *require* its reception by the University under pain of the royal displeasure. With that view Laud sealed the "volume" with his own seal as Metropolitan, with the University seal then in his custody as Chancellor, and the great seal having been also duly affixed, the whole was delivered to the Commissioners. "These," says Wood, "coming to Oxford on the 21st of June 1636, bringing his Majesty's letters with them, dated the 12th of the same

month, a Convocation was celebrated the day following in St. Mary's chancel, wherein all the Heads of Houses, Regents and Non-regents being present, the said Commissioners were conducted thereto by one of the bedells from the *Sacellum Vestiarium*, commonly called Adam Brom's chapel, and being all seated near to the Vice-Chancellor, Sir John Coke delivered his Majesty's letters to the Vice-Chancellor, which he receiving with obeisance, delivered to the registrar to be read with an audible voice to Convocation. Therein it appeared that it was his Majesty's pleasure, 'that all the Heads of Houses under their hands should accept of the said Statutes, as the rule by which they should be governed and govern, and likewise to bind themselves upon oath to the observance of the said Statutes,' in the same manner as they formerly had done to the other loose and confused body." And then the seals were exhibited, and the enactment and confirmation by Laud as Chancellor and Metropolitan, and under the before-mentioned resolution, were announced, and also the enactment and confirmation by his Majesty *de jure coronæ*, after which Sir John Coke made "a grave speech in English," praising his Majesty and the Chancellor, and demonstrating from the nature of the prerogative the "full authorization and absolute necessity" of submission to the laws so presented by him on behalf of the Crown; to which the Vice-Chancellor replied "in an accurate oration in Latin, and praised the munificence of the prince, and the care and trouble of the Archbishop;" whereupon the Heads of Houses "received and embraced" the book, and swore to observe it; and with that recognition of royal authority the proceedings terminated, without any vote of Convocation or regular assent of the University to those laws (for they are still the *Corpus Juris* of Oxford), which are now said by the successors of those same Heads of Houses to be wholly removed from the just inquiry of the Crown, and to have sole reference to a subject-matter beyond the sphere of the legitimate Prerogative.

The language of the different actors on the two occasions runs in remarkable contrast. "I will not," says Lord John Russell in the present day, "enter upon the question of the legality of a Commission. Had it been intended to exercise power going beyond inquiry and report, such a question might enter into consideration. But the present Commission will be a Commission to receive evidence and report

opinions, without power to determine any question, or to prescribe any course;" which gentle intention the Bishop of Exeter could not see without the "deepest concern and astonishment," and the Heads of Houses describe as "of the nature of an unconstitutional proceeding," impairing "the rights and liberties of her Majesty's subjects." So speaks the nineteenth century, even in Oxford, with a democratic voice; but hear the seventeenth.

"That," we quote Sir John Coke, "which commands in chief, and which no reason can withstand, is his Majesty's sovereign power, by which those Statutes (as you see) are both enacted and confirmed. Him we all acknowledge to be our Supreme Governour, both of Church and Commonwealth, over all causes and persons, and to his Supremacy and Allegiance we are all obliged by oath. This, then, we must build upon as an axiom and Fundamental Rule of Government, that all our Laws and Statutes are the King's laws, and that none can be enacted, changed, or abrogated without him;" and after a little, "But for Universities and Colleges, they are the rights of Kings, in a very peculiar manner; for all their Establishments, Endowments, Privileges, and Orders, by which they subsist and are maintained, are derived from Regal power; and as it is your greatest honor, so it is your greatest safety, that now this body of your laws, as well as your privileges and immunities, are established, ratified, and confirmed by the King;" which oration the Rubric-bishop of that day calls 'a weighty speech, befitting the occasion;' and which laws the Vice-Chancellor received as a 'Pandect,' and the Heads of Houses as 'Leges æternæ'—the imperative Proclamation of an ordinance *for ever*.

Notwithstanding the enactment of several Novels, many of which are in point of legality very dubious, the Code which was thus enacted still remains, as it was intended to be, the Pandect of the University of Oxford. We see therefore that the law now in force, whether obsolete or not, is quite certainly anything but immemorial: that it is by no means *very* ancient: that it originated in times on no account entitled to a religious respect: that it began in a Reform—the last origin, we suppose, in which Sir Robert Inglis is likely to discern anything that is venerable.

Moreover the very circumstances which the annalist indicates as suggesting the enactment of the Laudian Code exist as

much now as they did then : some of the laws—most of them we should say—are ‘grown out of use ;’ the more important parts of the system are fallen into neglect—much is in decay, more obsolete, much impossible—everybody is bound under his ‘corporal oath’ to perform what he never attempts and to refrain from exactly that which he habitually performs. What is law is not done, and what is done is not law. It will be easy to show this at length in detail :—the only difficulty is one of selection ; for the Report of the Commissioners provides us with materials that are as abundant as they are interesting.

It would not be fair to select any of the portions of the Laudian Code retained from older times, which were perhaps only intended to be formal, and which seem never to have been carried out even as mere formalities. It would be tedious to raise a laugh at an academical jargon. Thus to become a Bachelor of Arts, a man was to attend the “variations in the Parvis and respond under the determining Bachelor”—which were scholastic disputations derived from a mediæval period when philosophical argument was a pecuniary pursuit, and it was a gain to be, in the simple sense of the words, a ‘sophist’ and a ‘wrangler’—so, for the Master’s degree, it is enacted that a candidate should solemnly determine in Lent, should be a respondent in the quodlibet disputations, the respondent or opponent in Augustines, and read six formal lectures, and afterwards to pass the vesperial disputations, an exercise of apparent length, at the end of which the Moderator is ‘to propound to each of the inceptors an antinomy or two, to be reconciled by them ; and when these have been reconciled, he shall put an end to the disputations in a short speech,’ which amicable adjustment is with great judgment omitted in disputations of Theologians, whereat the Vice-Chancellor is ‘to apportion the period for argument to the several opponents, and cut short the thread of the arguments at his discretion.’

But these enactments were even then falling into desuetude, and it is simply going the way of all the earth if the course of instruction and examination, which the Laudian Code plainly regards as practical, has shared the fate of that which it seems to admit to be obsolete. If there was any point to which Laud attached special importance, it was to the regularity and efficiency of the Professorial lectures. Both his

'History' and his 'Code' perpetually allude to it. "Because," says he,* "the man who should prefer to climb by the precipice to the pinnacle of elevation, though there are stairs by which to mount, seems to court a fall, it is ordained that scholars of the faculty of the Liberal arts, shall, before they aspire to the B.A.'s degree, thereon be bound to bestow four full years in the study of those arts within the University (not in any man's private house, but boarding and living without evasion in some College or Hall), and diligently to attend the public lectures as the Statutes require, that is to say, during the first year Grammar and Rhetoric, during the second those in Logic and Moral Philosophy, and during the third and fourth, those in Logic, Moral Philosophy, and the Greek language;" and in succeeding sections the Code strays into ridiculous *minutiæ* in elaborately enacting where and how the Students are to stand—when they are to be allowed to move—when they must suffer in silence—exactly when the Professor is to speak, exactly for how long, and exactly with what tone of voice, and exactly with what rapidity of utterance. But vain are laws against the indolence of mankind. In matter of fact, the Professors during a very long period have ceased to lecture at all. Gibbon observed in the last century, that they had relinquished the "pretence" of it, and the practice can scarcely be said to have been since his time revived. A very great and very notorious professor, like the late Dr. Arnold, may draw a very large audience, especially to Inaugural or Introductory lectures; a clever man may induce some of the more idle or literate of the elder residents to take advantage of his best instructions occasionally; but for any general influence on the Undergraduates, for any instruction which they give to the people to whom the Statutes refer, to the Students who go to Oxford to learn, the Professors might just as well be eloquent in Kamtschatka.

Again, the fate of the theoretical course of examination has been exactly that of the theoretical course of instruction. Laud gives the following account of the system by which he designed to supply the defects of the scholastic argumentations which were even in that age becoming impossible:

* We quote here, as on all other occasions, the translation of the Laudian Code by Mr. Ward, one of the many useful works which Academical Reformers owe to the zeal and liberality of Mr. Heywood.

"The examination is not to be in philosophical subjects merely, to which limits the narrow learning of the last age was confined, but also on matters of philology, and a principal object of inquiry with the examiners will be, what facility the several persons have of expressing their thoughts in Latin. For it is our will that no person should be admitted to the Bachelorship of Arts but those who can with consistency and readiness, and still less to the Master's degree but those who can with suitableness and aptitude, express their thoughts in Latin on matters of daily occurrence." This is not exactly the standard of linguistic information now necessary for a common degree.

But badly as the University has observed her Statutes, her very laxity seems scrupulous when compared with the scandalous evasions of her colleges. The Duke of Wellington, it may be remembered, publicly defended the present usages of Oxford, by alleging, that though perhaps hardly in conformity with the wants and ideas of the present age, they were strictly and literally pursuant to the deliberate wills of ancient founders and the coincident directions of subsequent benefactors. An excellent example of this rigid observance may be found in the history of the college of All Souls—which is one of the most conspicuous in Oxford, and the one about which a stranger is, on the whole, the most likely to ask information. Now if he wishes to know how many people are taught in that splendid building, and on how many subjects, he will learn that no one is there instructed in anything. The college does not receive any Undergraduates,* and the revenues are devoted to the maintenance and support of various gentlemen of aristocratic birth, and by no means preceptive habits, who are called Fellows, and though mostly pursuing their agricultural avocations in remote parts of England, occasionally reside for a term or two in the University, but who have never had any idea of studying anything at those periods. We feel sure our readers must have a high respect for the intelligent founder of so beneficent an institution, so conspicuously elevating perhaps twenty gentlemen above the irksome occupations of defiled mortality:—they will learn with regret, that the founder had no idea of the kind at all. The Fellows according to *his* design were to be "poor and indigent," and none were to be chosen save those, who having the first clerical

* Four "Bible clerks" to perform menial offices are the only exception.

tonsure, are qualified and disposed for the priesthood, are of free condition and born in lawful wedlock, and well adorned with good qualities and character, and are anxious to make progress in study, and *are really making such progress.*" It is curious that this is one of the institutions which the Heads of Houses in their Report to the Duke of Wellington particularly set themselves to defend. They observe, "The several colleges in Oxford have been founded at various times from one to six centuries ago, in some few instances by Royal but chiefly by private munificence. They have exercised an important and salutary influence on the discipline and the education of the University. But it should be observed that they have not been usually founded, or in all cases endowed, for the education of youth, but for higher purposes." In the case of All Souls these higher purposes are remarkable. The college was founded in the 15th century by a certain Archbishop Chichele, who had taken a great share in instigating King Henry the Fifth to declare war against France, and who in his old age was not unnaturally repentant and sorrowful at the amount of the useless suffering that he had caused. According to the ideas of those times, a certain reparation was still in his power: the souls of some of those who were killed in the war that he had stirred up might still be in purgatory, and might (he imagined) be more speedily released from that terrible region if a continual intercession were made for them on earth. He therefore established a Chantry, the Fellows of which are by his Statute expressly directed to pray, "not so much to ply therein the various sciences and faculties, as with all devotion to pray for the souls of glorious memory of Henry the Fifth, lately King of England and France, his own illustrious progenitor, and the Lord Thomas Duke of Clarence, and the other lords and lieges of his realm of England, whom in his own and in his father's times the havoc of that warfare hath drenched with the Bowl of bitter death, and also for the souls of all the faithful departed;" and this Chantry, from the last clause, is called "All Souls," and this devotional service is the "higher purpose" which the Fellows of the college, according to the Heads of Houses, are bound to subserve.

An almost parallel instance is presented by Lincoln College, founded by a certain Richard Fleming, a renegade Wickliffite, who designed to root out and destroy "the pestiferous sect which attacks the sacraments, estates and posses-

sions of the church," and wished in this, his foundation, to train up missionary theologians to preach continually against the new doctrines, and who directed that any Fellow tainted with these ideas should "be cast out, like a diseased sheep, from the Fold of his College;" and yet the whole college is now inhabited merely by "diseased sheep;" no one *not* tainted with the ideas which the College was to extirpate has the most contemptible chance of obtaining entrance within its walls: no one not adhering to the "pestiferous sect" has for 200 years derived benefit from its emoluments; the revenues of the renegade have been perverted to the uses of the creed which he relinquished; the man of most note, bred within the walls of his school, has been John Wesley; the votes of all that are educated there go quite unanimously to "the tainting of sheep," to the maintenance of Sir Robert Inglis, and the extirpation of Dr. Wiseman.

It is altogether idle to affirm that a Commission, which has brought to the public notice facts like these, was either unnecessary or uncalled for. The University magnates are in a dilemma: either it is their duty to observe their Statutes, and the inquiry was right, because they don't, or the Statutes must be modified to suit the public convenience, and the public have a right to see that, in fact, they do suit it. The resident authorities put it the other way: they argue, "We ought not to be inquired into, because we keep our Statutes, and we have adapted ourselves to the age because we don't." But this is nonsense; and clergymen should not want to have *at once* the advantage of performing their duty, and the gratification of neglecting it.

Nor must we be met by the dilatory plea that the present was not the time, because the University is reforming itself. It may be disputable how far even the intentions of the local Government are so meritorious as is alleged. But that may pass, for the labours of the Commission have elicited a fact which renders discussion of any other point quite irrelevant. It is very doubtful if the University *can* reform itself: perhaps the better opinion is that it cannot. It has always been regarded as pretty certain that the Colleges could not, by any act of theirs, dispense with the duties and obligations imposed by their Statutes; but it was only curious inquirers that knew how remarkable was the position of the University itself, and how disputable was its power to re-model itself from within.

From the brief sketch which we gave a short while ago of the events attending the enactment of the Laudian Code, it will be clear how different were its circumstances from those attending common academical legislation, or the customary enactment of a bye-law by an ordinary corporation. The idea at the time certainly was that its contents were imposed by Royal authority,—that the enacting energy (so to speak) was in the *fiat* of the Crown, and that a mere acceptance and declaration of obedience was all that could be required from the subject University, and the plausible idea has accordingly been suggested, that the Code, in fact, is rather a charter emanating from the Crown, and received by the Corporation, than a bye-law enacted by the Corporation itself of its own will and by its own power. So sound a lawyer as the present Chief Justice of England gave, when at the bar, a distinct opinion that such was the fact; and if so, there is no doubt whatever that the University would be quite unable, of its own authority, to alter an iota of what it had accepted from the “munificence” of Royalty; the election has been made: and if the University have subjected herself to a statutory yoke, she must petition the authority which imposed those Statutes, and desire to be relieved from their oppression. We only need to prove the existence of a doubt: the principle, it will be conceded, of a great national institution like Oxford, ought to be free from every shadow of question; people ought not to be left in doubt whether the greatest educational establishment in England is not conducted on an illegal system, is not guilty of a breach of trust, and is not governed by persons who take oaths to abstain from what they do, and constantly to do that which they constantly refrain from doing. Moreover, the language of the Statutes themselves is very much in favour of the doctrine of Lord Campbell, and the consequent inability of the University to deviate in the least from their provisions. Thus one section says expressly that no dispensation, whether total or partial, should be proposed concerning any Statute or Decree, framed, or to be framed at the command or suggestion of the Royal authority, unless a change or relaxation to some extent has been expressly enjoined by Royal authority. And another denies any ‘power of explanation’ to Statutes similarly enacted; Laud himself considered them to be enacted for ever, and would most certainly have imagined that the

Puritanical 'sin of rebellion' had strayed into the University of Legitimacy, if he could have been informed that there was even now a proposal to amend the ordinances that were to endure for the Platonic year—the *Leges Aeternæ*—the *Leges Regia Auctoritate confirmatæ et sancitæ*.

The Commission, therefore, justifies itself; it has brought to light these facts; it has shown us that the present system must be defended,—not by eloquence or by poetry—not by an appeal to the wisdom of King Alfred, a rhapsody on the great Chichele, or a playful panegyric on Queen Philippa—not by a mystical scruple as to deviating from the directions of any one deceased, because what is now done does not accord with the directions of any one who is dead—not by a eulogium on recent reforms by the resident authorities, for it may well be that those reforms are illegal, and those authorities guilty of perjury—not by erudite pathos on the academical attainments of the martyred Laud, for the archbishop's Statutes are hourly broken, and he would hardly know his own University again; but by coarser pleas and less winning topics,—by the doctrine of desuetude, the evils of a Pharisaic conservatism, the doctrine of utility, the change of religion, the change of politics, the unalterable necessity of alteration, and the mere impossibility of standing still in an ever-shifting and transitory world.

What is said of the Commission having troubled the peace of the University, we own we take very lightly. Indeed, it does not seem that the place has ever been allowed to enjoy an over-tranquil or untroubled calm. "That," commences perhaps abruptly the learned annalist, "the University of Oxford flourished after the going away of Grimbald and the preferment of the other Professors, many there are, I persuade myself, that doubt it not, and *especially in the reign of King Alfred*." As Oxford has been disquieted so long, she may be disquieted still. We doubt not that the University will continue to flourish after the advent of the Bishop of Norwich—the departure of Heads of Houses, perhaps as notorious as Grimbald—and the preferment of unscrutable Professors, equally profound with the most so of his contemporaries.

But if the Report of the Commission justifies the Commission, the evidence taken before the Commissioners in some sense justifies the University: Oxford is a fascinating city.

Here are a very considerable number of gentlemen, all of them Reformers—some of them opposed in spirit to the characteristic theories of the University—none of them in the least representing the school with whom it is connected in the popular imagination—all of them abounding in attainments—many of them able—some with a large knowledge of the world—and they are all of them fond of the place. They all look back to their residence there with an evident and singular fondness. They all feel too, that the effect of the system on their minds has been strong; they are conscious that they are materially different from what they would have been if they had not been educated at all, or been educated elsewhere, and not any one hints that the training of Oxford has not been in his own case beneficial. Not one can suggest even an alteration without evident and heartfelt remonstrances. To alter Oxford is to alter their own youth. A place of education so winning and so effective may have many failings, but it must have great merits. We hope to show that, though we wish much change, we can at any rate in some degree, though, no doubt, incompletely, appreciate a few of the qualities that have gained the affections and obtained the gratitude of so many superior minds.

Very odd, indeed, at first sight, is the received English theory, that as places of education Oxford and Cambridge are both perfection. The schemes of tuition seem so different. Cambridge teaches her students the discoveries of Cambridge men; she occupies them with great P. and little q., with Airey's tracts, perplexing dynamics, the last reachings of the Newtonian deduction, the best results of the best teaching of Francis Bacon. Oxford, on the other hand, disdains every approach to novelty. Till the time when, thirty years ago, the much reviled Dr. Hampden introduced an academical examination in the writings of Bishop Butler, not one of her most influential pursuits owed anything whatever to her own students: she taught exclusively from authors who were already very old when she was herself young; according to the admission tacitly suggested by the course of her tuition—she had not herself, any more than the rest of the modern world, contributed any considerable element to human knowledge, that it was desirable to introduce into common education. Surely these diverse systems, one thinks at first sight, cannot both be right; if Cambridge is right in

receiving the modern learning, then it should seem that Oxford is wrong in rejecting it; if Oxford rightly rejects it, then Cambridge is unwise in accepting and inculcating it. Is this true? We regret that we cannot answer the question save by a tedious disquisition, bare controversy, and mere principle.

Ποι και ποθεν; what is a University for? unless we know with some accuracy that which we wish to have done, we can scarcely expect to discuss satisfactorily whether it is done for us or not. It is quite clear, even from the blue-book before us, that on this point there is no agreement. The theories there suggested are very various; and the only gratifying circumstance is, that throughout the whole medley no one gentleman is bold enough to avow an adherence to a thorough-going theory of negation. Even the Fellows of All Souls decline, we observe, to maintain explicitly that the object of a University is exactly to do nothing.

A very common notion is, that the Universities are places for *study*, and this not for the study of youth and semi-men, but of grown-up gentlemen and bearded scholars. And this was most certainly the general design of the Founders of colleges. These great institutions were founded for the benefit of what are called in this age, poor scholars. As we have seen in the case of All Souls, so in general, the object was to train a band or order of rigid, ascetic, semi-monastic students, who were to spend their lives in acquiring the learning of the age. Nor perhaps was this idea perfectly unsuitable to the purposes and wants of that period. In mediæval society Learning was more than at any other time divorced from the finer and subtler, and given over to the coarse and voluntary energies of the human mind. The learning of that age was analogous to the learning of positive law. It was necessary to master a huge traditional theology, abounding in decisions, technicalities, and positive enactments, which no one could know without study; but which any man of energy and moderate ability could be quite certain of in some degree acquiring; and wherein a strong-natured man of poor parents—used to a hard life, with the dread of poverty behind him, and the hereditary energies of the working people within him—could not, and we see in history in general did not, fail to acquire great information. There was no poetry, no fine literature, no imaginative relaxation, in the scholarship of that time:

the bulk of the mighty tomes in which it is enshrined warns the experienced eye that he must not seek *in them* the record of the rarer thoughts or more elevated moments of human nature—for these come seldom and are soon ended; but of the laborious vigour, the coarse understanding, the deductive reason, which can be used when we will, which proceed on definite assumptions, which therefore lead infallibly to definite conclusions. But this is not to be thought of for the colleges now. The canon law is gone by, the mediæval theology is food for the inferior animals. The finer classics—the lighter thoughts—the more delicate fancies—the most evanescent shades of meaning and of language, these are what we now call scholarship: and we cannot expect to train any great number of persons in any age to spend their lives on these. Keen excitements are at hand, and carry off into the great and busy world the very minds whose exquisite structure is the best adapted for literary discrimination. Those who really enjoy the best books take an interest in human life, concerning which those books are entirely written; and it is not likely that such will be content to hear in the cloister the second-hand stories of others, when the gates are open, the train passes by, and in an hour they can walk in Parliament-street themselves. A strange timidity, an instinctive pedantry, an inaptitude for common life—may force them back again within the narrow cell. But this is painful and rare.

In England of course this is especially true. We are not Germans, who care for what is not. Take up the *Life of Niebuhr* that was translated the other day, and it is surprising to see the eagerness with which he withdraws from the living realities of life—not to the exquisite fancies or the profounder imaginations or the subtler observations of the higher orders, which might and do rest and invigorate and refresh the worn and troubled mind; but to the driest technicalities—to grammar and philology, to Basque refreshments and Polynesian recreations; and what is more strange still, he does not feel that his taste is queer or extraordinary. He seems conscious that in degree he feels it more powerfully than those who surround him. But the thing itself, the preference of what has been to what is, of what is abstract to what is fleshly, of what is in the grammar to what is in the ledger, the love of letters in general, and the contempt for *£. s. d.*, seems to him the natural notion common to all that are awakened to real en-

joyment—that are not of the earth, and earthy. In such a country as that it might be well to afford facilities for a race of Students. We might hope that they would be active and cultivated, and ardent and happy. But here in a land of larger enjoyments, and better opportunities, and bolder energies, it would be entailing misery on many to bring up many to a life of research. The taste is rare, and a library of lofty volumes is the worst of prisons to such as think it a prison at all; it is ‘hard labour’ without the stimulus: the bread-mill moves, but what is there ‘going on’ in the Bodleian? Nor is Natural science or Mathematical science better adapted to the inclinations of any great number of common Englishmen; on the contrary, we respect, and perhaps justly, fine scholarship more than a familiarity with cubic equations, or the details of the dissecting-room. We must not try to fill many buildings with naturalists, nor did Providence mean many Londoners to be devotees to the ‘factorial integral.’ In attempting by large bounties (and such would be the resource of the Universities) to increase much the number of life-long Students, we should but add to the supply of stupid and indifferent works, to the list of authors without a call. Why should we pay people to compose *A Structural Dissertation on the Walls of Athens*, *Abstractitudes of the Sciences*, *Thoughts on Tissue*, or *A Biography of Greek Heroes anterior to Agamemnon*? Some might write more agreeably; but these, if the partisans of the Students—a considerable number of estimable people—had but their way, these and such as these would be the labours of most inhabitants of Magdalene and Merton, which surely were not built for what is so superfluous.

A view exactly opposite to this has been advanced by an intelligent gentleman, who having recently become a legislator, seems entitled to very special attention. The member for Kidderminster, Mr. Lowe, regards Oxford as a ‘preparation for Australia.’ He tells us that he has seen in the colonies Oxford men placed in situations in which they had reason “bitterly to regret that their costly education, while making them intimately acquainted with remote events and distant nations, had left them in utter ignorance of the laws of Nature, and placed them under immense disadvantages in that struggle with her which they had to maintain.” And we have no doubt that this is so; nor do we deny that the present system of Oxford is

open to the sarcasm which is intended. We are not going to argue that there are now at Oxford sufficient facilities for the acquisition of natural science : indeed we hold rather strongly that these facilities might and ought to be somewhat increased. But if Mr. Lowe has, as we collect, a notion or imagination that a University ought to fit men for colonial life—that it professes to do so—that if it neglects to do so, as it does, a sentence of inefficiency is immediately due, we dissent. We imagine that in a hard and earnest conflict with material and brute nature, a literary education can never give any superiority. Take the case of a goldfinder who spends his day bent double grubbing in the bed of a stream for imperceptible dust,—of what use is literature to him ? Tacitus won't keep him from cold, nor is the *Principia* a preservative from damp. The thing there is the *knack* of finding gold. All that is requisite to be known of the laws of nature is rather obvious, nor will a profounder knowledge be really of extreme advantage. If all the people in Australia were taught a thousand sciences or a thousand languages, the yield of gold would be as it was before. And so of other pursuits. A certain small and rude knowledge of outward objects is all that is commonly wanted by common practitioners, and that knowledge is apt to puzzle if there be any attempt to inculcate it systematically. Turnspits are in general ill-informed about the theory or laws of rotatory motion, nor do the cleverest people tell the time a moment quicker for understanding the works of their watches. The real education for every practical pursuit is specific—a digger wants the habit of digging—a shepherd, of keeping sheep—a mining agent should be bred in the mines. Christchurch will never prepare men for Labuan nor Oriel for the Rocky Mountains ; and we suspect even from the case under consideration, that a superfluous conversancy with Sydney may much mislead a Reformer in Oxford.

A gentleman of great acuteness has adopted another theory. Mr. Clough is of opinion that the Universities are, ought to be, and must be, 'mere finishing schools for the higher classes'—and apparently would reject with impartial equanimity the studious delusions of common Reformers, and the Australian advice of Mr. Lowe. Now it is quite certain that the Universities do perform the very important office hinted at rather than expressed by Mr. Clough. "If," says Sir James Stephen, "I had the pen of Edward Gibbon, I could

draw from my own early experience a picture which would form no unmeet companion for that which he has bequeathed to us of his education at Oxford. The three or four years during which I lived on the banks of the Cam, were passed in a very pleasant, though not a very cheap hotel. But if they had been passed in the Clarendon in Bond-street, I do not think that the exchange would have deprived me of any aids for intellectual discipline or for acquiring literary or scientific knowledge." And notwithstanding many reforms and innovations, an increase of study and an inroad of private tutors, there can be no doubt at all that to very many of their youthful sojourners both Universities are much as they were. The real gain to perhaps a majority is anything but scholastic. The gentlemen of England are educated at many schools, they come to college for a year or two to learn one another's faces and names, to unlearn the overweening notions of public schools, and the "three-cornered opinions," as somebody calls them, of the private academy. They derive from the society of one another—from wine-parties—from the common *et ceteras* of college life—a certain cultivation, certain friendships, certain manners, which are a step in advance on what in each kind they previously possessed, and give them besides an excellent start in English life. The gentry of England are thus, as it is said, 'finished.' They take the social type which is to last them for life. But surely this is hardly a sufficient reason for so great Colleges? scarcely a sufficient account of such large structures and such enormous revenues? As Sir James says, the Clarendon would do. It is obvious that we must look elsewhere for the complete formulas of academical utility.

The Catholic church has busied herself, as with other matters of late, so with this. Father Newman, who seems expected, or who is of himself inclined, to interfere in every matter beneath the sun, has recently and elaborately expounded a theory of Universities. We opened 'The Dublin Lectures,' as they are to be called, with expectation, but we closed them with disappointment. Father Newman is a man to fail. With all his ability, and invention, and logical accuracy, there is generally in all his writings some impossible postulate, some incredible axiom, that mars the whole. So it is here. He deduces his entire theory of a University from what we had always understood to be the obsolete derivation,

that it is to teach 'universal knowledge.' This is odd enough. We are actually to receive from the emissaries of the Pope the very theory which twenty years ago was in vogue among certain rather advanced sectaries of the Radical philosophy. A man of some wealth and transactive ability sometimes has a family—he is struck with the importance of various subjects: he says, "There is Chemistry; what progress it makes day by day! What a scheme for making soap Dr. Dirtihands was mentioning yesterday!—my son must know Chemistry. And there is French; '*Commonng survatteel*?'—my son shall know French. And there is Physiology; what an interesting topic the human frame is! We are always having diseases we can't account for. I wonder where I caught that cold last week—*my* son shall know Physiology. And then too what was that when I felt so floored the other morning? I remember it was those barrister-fellows that were for me against the Brewer's Company, and they were talking of the late Lord Chancellor, and his always giving things to his relations—what's called Nepotism; and then a little red-headed man, who was very quick in business, said, 'Certainly, certainly, why he's *Nepos himself*;' and then everybody laughed at him, and I laughed. I wonder why we laughed? It is very unpleasant laughing when one don't know the reason. I fancy it is something in Latin—my son shall know Latin." And so on through all the range of the sciences; and the end is, that the young gentleman is sent to a 'Seminary' near London, where everything is taught, according to the *Times*, "without corporal penalties," whereat he learns at least nothing. Something of this sort, we learn, is the Catholic idea of a College. Universal information is to be diffused; all sciences, 'as the term University expresses,' are to be taught; everybody is to be set to learn everything. But was it necessary to have so great an apparatus for so small a work? Is this what the Catholic church is to do for us?—to build new lecture-rooms—to overteach a few pupils—to try, and fail, to induce mankind at large to search and seek for universal knowledge? Why did she come so far? We could do *that* for ourselves.

Nor must we repeat the yet more pernicious cant that education makes educated people cleverer than the uneducated. This idea is still believed in rural districts, where a

good deal of conversational information is sometimes derived from reading, and where it is not known that literary men as much over-estimate the importance of literature as the currier in the legend the repulsive resources of the substance leather. But, authors and schoolmasters apart, the generality of mankind are pretty well agreed that in trans-active ability, in common sense, in industry, in energy, people who read little are at least as eminent as people who read much. "I never," said Sir Walter Scott, "knew a Dominic that was not weak." "Do not," says Mr. Gilbert in his book on banking, "choose a clerk because he has studied for one of the learned professions, for that is no advantage." No one goes to Cambridge to inquire for a cutler. A first-class scholar would, in general, be a ninth-rate man-servant. If learning is an advantage for some things, it is a disadvantage for others. What does it then do?

In our notion the object of a University education is to train intellectual men for the pursuits of an intellectual life. For though education by training or reading will not make people quicker or cleverer or more inventive, yet it will make them soberer. A man who finds out for himself all that he knows is rarely remarkable for calmness; the excitement of the discovery, and a weak fondness for his own investigations, a parental inclination to believe in their excessive superiority, combine to make the self-taught and original man dogmatic, decisive, and detestable. He comes to you with a notion that Noah discarded in the ark, and attracts attention to it, as if it were a stupendous novelty of his own. A book-bred man rarely does this; he knows that his notions are old notions, that his favourite theories are the rejected axioms of long deceased people: he is too well aware how much may be said for every side of everything to be very often overweeningly positive on any point.

It is of immense importance that there should be among the more opulent and comfortable classes a large number of minds trained by early discipline to this habitual restraint and sobriety. The very ignorance of such people is better than the best knowledge of half mankind. An uneducated man has no notion of being without an opinion: he is distinctly aware whether Venus is inhabited, and knows as well as Mr. Cobden what is to be found in *all* the works of Thucydides; but his opinionated ignorance is rather kept in check, when

people as strong-headed as himself, as rich, as respectable, and much better taught, are continually avowing that they don't at all know any of the points on which he is ready to decide. And when those who are careful *have* opinions, they are in general able to bear the temperate discussion of them. Education cannot ensure infallibility, but it most certainly ensures deliberation and patience. It forms the opinions of people that can form the opinions of others.

This, too, is a function which increases in difficulty with the increase of civilization. As society goes on, life becomes more complicated, and its problems more difficult. New perplexities, new temptations, new difficulties, arise with new circumstances; every walk in life is clogged with tedious difficulties, and thronged with countless competitors, and overrun with infinite dangers. The moral problems, the political problems, the social problems, the religious problems, require a greater stress of understanding: we were in simple addition, we *are* in the Differential Calculus. Take the case of politics in this country now and as it was a century and a half ago. In Queen Anne's time the question was whether the Pretender should be king,—whether Popery should be the religion of the state, and that was nearly all;—on so large an issue very inferior and illiterate minds were quite competent to form a sound judgment. Sir Roger de Coverley, for example, who believed in witchcraft, and was not a college man, was quite able to reject the Pope and receive the Queen—'God bless her.' But how the poor old gentleman would have been confounded in the present day! what would he have thought of Free Trade, Protectionism, and Caucasian Christianity? He would we fear have reflected in this wise on the General Election: 'You see, though I can't quite tell, (for I am getting old) what Lord Derby has done with all his old principles, I shall vote for young John Rising, who intends to support him, for you know his father Sir John was my very old friend, and knew more of fox-hunting than any one in Worcestershire, notwithstanding some were so foolish as to think me his equal; and though the Chancellor of the Exchequer is said in London to be a Jew, I could not deny but the poor in my county *was* more comfortable than ever.' This was good influential reasoning in the first year of the eighteenth century, but it won't do now. We want men to

get up facts, weigh principles, suggest illustrations, appreciate arguments ; and this is the use of learning.

So too in religion,—how differently are we placed now-a-days in this Babel of sects, and the deluge of criticism, from the old times, when the choice was between two or three distinct creeds, depending on common and conceded postulates, and differing only in the respective correctness of a few not too complicated deductions ! Now that the postulates are gone, who is there that can estimate the insuperable task of, as it is phrased, making a religion ? And in the minor subjects of taste and refinement, with the growth of literature, the increase of luxury and the advent of æsthetics, who can too highly estimate the difficulty of reviewing works of art, and criticising styles, and comprehending the German speculations ? And in the practical concerns of life, though a prolonged education rather interferes than otherwise with a perfect and instinctive mastery of a narrow department, though it disqualifies men for special or mechanical labour and the petty habits of a confined routine, yet for affairs on a considerable scale, for a general estimate of general probabilities, and for changing the hand and the mind from one species of pursuit to another, a carefully-formed mind and a large foundation of diversified knowledge are indisputably wonderful and all but indispensable aids. Men who blindly and instinctively follow out and feel after the minute details of a single occupation, generally know but that one, and can learn no other. In the increasing and multiplying wealth of the world, in the various and ever-varying ramifications of human industry, it becomes necessary that some people should comprehend the general plan, while others elaborate the special minutiae, and it is lucky that the very wealth which by its superabundance, and the complexity of its nature, renders more than anything else all this enlargement of knowledge necessary, also by getting together in single hands, secures the easy conditions, the pecuniary resources, and the youthful leisure that are the necessary prerequisites for its extensive diffusion.

So too by common consent certain of the professions have long been called learned and literate. Not thereby meaning so much that a great deal of literary information is commonly necessary in their every-day practice, as that the tone of

mind commonly produced by a calm and deliberate education, by the habit of learning, by the acquisition of abstract knowledge, is especially favourable to the best exercise of the highest faculties in their more abstruse and difficult departments. Particular portions of legal business are very properly conceived to be of this nature; the same may be true occasionally in the applications of medicine; and in many other newer and yet unclassified pursuits similar points often occur requiring the application of much knowledge, and the steady exercise of a disciplined mind.

Does Oxford accomplish this? Does it frame a type of character capable of forming the more abstruse opinions and of transacting the more severe portion of the intellectual business of the world? We can be at any rate at no loss for an answer. The materials are ample. In public life the Oxford men are conspicuous; they seem more perhaps than the pupils of any other seminary to have a very marked type running through them all, though of course modified and qualified in each by the difference of circumstances and of natural character. They appear to represent a principle, and that in itself is a stimulus to curiosity.

In some respects the character is old enough. In a few outward features, it is certainly rather like that of the mediæval student whom Chaucer sang of some four centuries ago.

“A Clerk there was of Oxenforde also
 That unto logike hadde long ygo.
 As lene was his horse as is a rake
 And he was not right fat, I undertake
 But loked holwe and thereto soberly.
 Ful thredbare was his overest courtepy
 For he had goten him yet no benefice
 Ne was nought worldly to have an office:
 For him was lever han at his beddes hed
 A twenty bokes clothed in black or red
 Of Aristotle and his philosophie
 Than robes riche or fidel or sautrie—
 But all be that he was a philosophre
 Yet hadde he but litel gold in coffre;
 But all that he might of his friends hente
 On bokes and on lerning he it spent,
 And freely gave for the soules praie
 Of hem, that gave him wherwith to scolaie.

Of studie toke he most care and hede,
 Not a word spake he more than was need,
 And that was said in forme and reverence,
 And short and quicke and full of high sentence—
 Sonning in moral vertue was his speche
 And gladly would he lerne and gladly teche.”

“I regret to say,” observes Dr. Arnold, “that the prevailing spirit of many Oxford men is the very opposite of liveliness.”

“Sire Clerk of Oxenforde, our hoste said,
 Ye ride as still and coy, as doth a maid
 Were new spoused, sitting at the bord
 This day ne herd I of your tongue a word
 I trow ye studie abouten som sophime
 But Solomon says that everything hath time
 For Goddes sake, as beth of better chere
 It is no time for to studien here
 But precheth not as freres don in Lent
 To make us for our old sins wepe
 Ne that thy tale make us not slepe.”

A certain speechlessness is still a part of the character. “You will,” says Hazlitt, “hear more good things in one day on the top of the coach, going or coming from Oxford, than in one year from all the residents in that learned seminary.” A slightly excitable lady was once asked within our hearing what *she* thought of the literati of Oxford: she said “they were so stupid I could strike them.” But this is not quite conclusive. It is not good that every one should be loquacious or excitable or original: some must listen if it is meant that they should understand. Particularly the custom is to refrain from speaking on their own pursuits;—there is some story of a Head of a House who was presented to Napoleon after the peace of Amiens, and was asked on his return what was his opinion of the French Emperor. “Sir,” replied the dignitary, “you see at once he is not a University man, he talks about the *classics*.” Such was his opinion.

In moral and political opinions the Oxford man is quite as defined. Mr. Gladstone, to take the most marked and decisive example, is obviously and utterly different from what he would have been if educated anywhere else. He is the only considerable political Englishman who has undergone

what can even by courtesy be called a philosophical training. There is about him and in all his writings and in all his speeches a certain desire for principle, a wish to have an ultimatum, a reason, an axiom from which and to which the intellectual effort may start and be referred. His first principles are rarely ours; we may often think them obscure—sometimes incomplete—occasionally quite false; but we cannot deny that they are the result of distinct thought with disciplined faculties upon adequate *data*, of a careful and dispassionate consideration of all the objections which occurred, whether easy or insuperable, trifling or severe. How Dr. Arnold estimates this training—still conveyed from the same textbook as in Chaucer's time—may be read in a hundred passages of his letters and works. "We have been reading," says he, speaking of Aristotle, "some of the Rhetoric in the sixth form this half year, and its immense value struck me again so forcibly that I could not consent to send my son to a University where he would lose it altogether, and where his whole studies would be formal merely and not real, either mathematics or philology—with nothing answering to the Aristotle and Thucydides of Oxford." And again—"If one might wish for impossibilities I might then wish that my children might be well versed in physical science, but in due subordination to the fulness and freshness of their knowledge on all subjects. This, however, I believe cannot be; and physical science, if studied at all, seems too great to be studied ἐν παρόργῃ: wherefore rather than have it the principal thing in my son's mind, I would gladly have him think that the sun went round the earth and that the stars were so many spangles set in the firmament." And he acted on his theory. "You may believe," he remarks with respect to the London University, "that I have not forgotten the dear old Stagyrice in our examinations, and I hope that he will be construed and discussed in Somerset House as well as in the schools."

In other Oxford men this is as remarkable. You cannot open the writings of the most dissimilar among them without being struck by the thoughtful element which they have in common. There is a perpetual and often quite unconscious employment of expressions and illustrations derived from the Greek, but especially from the Aristotelic philosophy—a certain accuracy in the expression of principles—and a certain keen deductiveness of understanding, which distinguish the works

of men whom nature markedly and of set purpose discriminated from each other ; and this lasts their lifetime. Coleridge used to say, that if you took up a philosophical German writer, no matter whether second rate or first rate or fourth rate, you would be struck with a certain carefulness of tone, a curious and guarded discrimination in the use of exact terms, a foreseeing of objections and so on, which would induce you to remark, " Really this writer is a philosopher ;" whereas in fact it was only that the general style of philosophical thought was so diffused in Germany, that any man of fair ability, fair industry and fair power of imitation could easily acquire and affect it. Something of the same sort seems to exist in the very atmosphere of Oxford ; for if you turn even from such great writers as Dr. Whewell, Sir John Herschel, or Mr. Mill, to the writing of even an inferior man trained on the characteristically Oxford system, you will feel at once, that although you may and will lose in vigour of originality, in variety of knowledge, in brilliancy of illustration, in liveliness of mind, yet you will gain in mere speculative-ness. What theories there are will be expressed, as theories should be, with calmness, with accuracy, with dullness, with carefulness, with an anticipation of objections, after a conversancy with the ideas of what philosophers have preceded them.

On the theoretical side, therefore, we think that Oxford,—we won't say, succeeds ; nothing succeeds in this world—but fairly and with much credit approximates to valuable success. On the practical, we fancy that it wholly fails. This seems admitted in the 'Evidence.' Mr. Denison, for example, who has favoured the Commissioners with some schemes for the improvement of legal education, is decidedly of opinion that *at present* the University man is under a disadvantage.

"The usual routine," he says, "of what is now called a legal education is as follows : a youth of twenty-two years of age, after completing his studies at the University, comes to London to commence the study of the law. He is entered at one of the Inns of Court, is received as a pupil for a year by some eminent conveyancer, to whom he gives 100 guineas for the privilege of going daily to his chambers and seeing the business there transacted. That business is ordinarily the most technical, complicated, and difficult in the whole range of legal practice ;

and requires great professional knowledge and considerable experience in particular departments of the practical concerns of life. It is therefore obvious that the special knowledge there to be acquired is purely practical, and is confined to few subjects. The youth soon finds that, at the cost of 100 guineas, he has purchased the right of walking blindfold into a sort of legal jungle. Masses of papers are placed daily before him, every sheet of which contains numberless terms, as new and strange to him as the words of a foreign language, and the bare meaning of which he rarely arrives at before the clerk announces that the client has called to take the papers away. Fresh masses of papers replace those that have been thus untimely removed, and bring with them fresh grounds of vexation and despair; and thus throughout the whole year of his pupilage the youth has to struggle with difficulties which are an hundred-fold greater than they need have been, had he been fortunate enough to have learnt the alphabet of legal science before he undertook to grapple with the most subtle, abstruse, and difficult details of its practice. This unprofitable and disgusting year at length over, the youth is doomed to go through a second year of the like probation, at the same cost and almost as unprofitably, in the chamber of a special pleader or an equity draftsman; and by the end of that year he is either so bewildered or so wearied with wandering through the seemingly endless mazes that obstruct the very approaches to his profession, that he either gives up the attempt as hopeless, and becomes a clergyman (an event of extremely common occurrence with Oxford men), or finding out that he is at last beginning to feel his way a little, hopes, by dogged perseverance, to attain, sooner or later, to a knowledge of that art which he sees very many persons of only average capacity practising with credit and success."

The system works simply. The educated pupil prepares a draft;—the uneducated practitioner looks it over. "I do not," he remarks, "*quite* see the necessity for those recitals. Did it strike you that they had any relation to the present purpose? I am afraid this operative part would give the Court some trouble. Did you find any authority for giving an estate to A. B., his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns? Humph! Humph! Yes, Yes, I see you've taken great pains with that original covenant. Yes, Yes, we must put something in the place of that." What language to a solemn gentleman who has been during three years the idol of tutors, maybe been a tutor himself, and especially from a man who never heard of Sphaeria and can't define "distributive Justice:" no wonder if the victim thinks gently of a grammar school, or at the first opening absconds into a parsonage.

The fact is, that Oxford men want *εὐστοχία*,—they want intuitiveness. From a defect of liveliness, from an overcaution of understanding, they have not the *ταχύ τι*, the happy facility which takes hold at once and for ever of the right point or the right questions at the right moment. There is often not spring enough in the nature of such a man: he can go well in the high road of learning, but he won't do for the cross country exercise of human life. It puts him out. He does not like that there should be virtues not in Aristotle's list, and it is impossible to convince him that there is anything which is not dreamed of in his philosophy. Give him time and he will generally come right, but in this hasty world who can *have* time? as the best speaker in a concourse of men, is the man who has the best sayings there ready, so in action we must be able to act wisely at once, or else we must either do nothing or act unwisely.

In this respect the Cambridge men do better. A hard and mathematical Johnian is perhaps perfectly prepared for every abstract difficulty of active life. He may want taste and discrimination, and judgment in character, and skill in dealing with men, or art in persuading them; but in the bare application of mere principles, in the thorough mastery of appalling facts, in the technical manipulations—to speak absurdly—of any intellectual pursuit, according at least to our observation, he will never fail. Such men generally see a thing in the right light at first, and if they once get right, all the oratory which ever was or can be, all the eloquence of a private tutor, all the pathos of senior Fellow, will never induce them to swerve from their pragmatism honesty or to abate one jot of clear intellectual certainty in their dogmatic conviction. But they fail even in intellectual pursuits, when the finer faculties are required; they are good actuaries but bad metaphysicians; when they write books on thoughtful subjects they make blunders without end. Mr. Mill, we believe, somewhere says of the last generation of eminent Cambridge men—that he never heard an *argument* from them which was worth any thing, and though this be a trifle contemptuous, yet it is certain that of late the amount of general thought on general subjects for which we are indebted to Cambridge, is immensely less than what we owe to Oxford.

Is not this really good? We asked so long ago that no reader can be asked to remember it, whether there was not

something very singular in the old English idea that the educational systems of both the two old Universities were both perfect. Like most odd and old ideas, it has much truth. Is it not perhaps better that we should have one University which practically devotes itself mainly to the culture of thought, and another which devotes itself principally to the training men for the more difficult species of intellectual action? These are the two duties of a University, as we showed just now. It is perhaps good that they should be kept in a certain measure separate. Each fulfils its own task rather better, if it aim at one mainly, than if it aspire to both equally. Besides, it is to be observed that each selects out of the general society exactly those who are thought to be best fitted to excel in the requirements and studies which constitute its test and its training. A mathematician—the son perhaps of a blacksmith—goes to St. John's; the son of a country vicar, with a taste for moral subjects and the classics, is most properly dispatched to Oxford. Each is well trained; the first for the conveyancer's chambers; the second for a rural rectory.

In two points the two Universities coincide—selecting two elements which we believe to be quite necessary for the real education of an intellectual Englishman. They both teach a compact system of learning. If we were teaching a Frenchman who is versatile, or an old Athenian who was versatility itself, this might not be of so great importance, perhaps it would not even be possible, for we question whether those unstable and changeable organizations could be kept resolutely to a narrow pursuit. With the Englishman it is different. His intelligence is slow and stubborn and sure; his memory, though retentive, is not facile; it is certain therefore that if you bother him with many things, he will learn none; if you do not allow him to become, as he thinks, *possessed* of some one acquisition, you will discontent him and he will leave you. "It would be well," so says a thoughtful writer,* "to impress on the young men of the present day the value of ignorance, as well as of knowledge; to give them fortitude and courage enough to acknowledge that there are books which they have not read and sciences which they do not wish to learn, and to make them feel

* Sewell on Plato, p. 125.

that one of the very greatest defects in a mind is want of unity of purpose, and that everything which betrays this betrays also want of resolution and energy." For if this be not learnt easily and early, it will be learned painfully and late. One by one, day by day, the world will strip off the pretensions and false assumptions which we may put forth, no matter how great they be. What do you do for *me*? she asks; and she will require a solid answer. It has been a great happiness to many that two seats of national learning have consciously or unconsciously taken each a defined course and adopted a rigid system; the one by severe training in philosophers and historians, to teach men what *has* been thought, the other by a discipline in the technicalities of study, to prepare men for the like technicalities of abstruser action.

The other point of substantial unanimity between Oxford and Cambridge is the collegiate system. It is well observed by a gentleman who has given evidence, that this also is suitable to the national character. There is nothing for young men like being thrown into close neighbourhood with young men; it is the age of friendship; and every encouragement should be given—every opportunity enlarged for it. Take an uncollegiate Englishman, and you will generally find that he has no *friends*. He has not the habit. He has his family, his business, his acquaintances, and these occupy his time. He has not been thrown during the breathing time of human life into close connection with those who are also beginning or thinking of beginning to enter on its labours. School friendships are childish; "after-life" rarely brings many; it is in youth alone that we can engrave deep and wise friendships on our close and stubborn texture. If there be romance in them, it is a romance which few would tear aside.

Of course also the college system, quite beside the labours of Tutors and Fellows, mainly aids in the work of Education. All that 'pastors and masters' can teach young people, is as nothing when compared with what young people can't help teaching one another. Man made the school: God the playground. He did not leave children dependent on the dreams of parents or the pedantry of tutors. Before letters were invented, or books were, or governesses discovered, the neighbours' children, the outdoor life, the fists and the wrestling sinews, the old games,—the oldest things in

the world,—the bare hill and the clear river—these were education. And now though Xenophon and sums be come, these are and remain. Horses and marbles, the knot of boys beside the schoolboy fire, the hard blows given and the harder ones received—these educate mankind. So too in youth—the real plastic energy is not in tutors or lectures or in books ‘got up,’ but in Wordsworth and Shelley; in the books that all read because all like—in what all talk of because all are interested—in the argumentative walk or disputatious lounge—in the impact of young thought upon young thought, of fresh thought on fresh thought—of hot thought on hot thought—in mirth and refutation—in ridicule and laughter—for these are the free play of the natural mind, and these cannot be got without a college.

We admit, however, that these excellences of our elder Universities have often passed into excess—have become defects. The compact system has become exclusive, and the colleges have gained a monopoly. For although it may be quite right and quite prudent, that every one should be taught a compact system, it does not quite follow that every one should be taught the same. Although the general scheme of Oxford education, based on the old philosophy, and the more weighty classics, may still, in our notion, be rightly preserved, there will be no harm in a good sprinkling of mathematicians, in an increase of undergraduates, learned in modern philosophy, or even in a small deposit of naturalists. And though, in a general way, every body should be discouraged from learning everything, some versatile men will attain eminence in several, and these should have their reward. A choice between compact systems, as has been said, the good sense of our forefathers found out to be the fitting rule, and this choice which now only exists between the two systems of Oxford and Cambridge, should, without touching the rightful supremacy of the systems that are, be extended to an additional choice at Oxford and at Cambridge, between subsidiary and subordinate systems.

We shall be reminded, that this is there or thereabouts the very system which has been adopted in the recent statute passed in 1851; for by that statute three new schools were erected, in which, after evincing a certain acquaintance with the classics, a student may obtain a degree and a class by pass-

ing a sufficient examination in Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, in Natural Science—meaning the sciences of classification or observation, or in Law and Modern History. And though these three schools are not by any means exactly what we should like to see them, we very willingly acknowledge that if we believed that this statute would now really work in an efficient manner, we should applaud the Heads of Houses for having actually at last proposed something that is beneficial. But we believe that this piece of legislative extension will, in practice, turn out to be wholly nugatory. It is at best a mere expression of a desire on the part of the University as to what it wishes to have learned, and as to the subjects, proficiency in which it is willing to test by examination. Now, if the University were crowded with eager and disinterested students ready immediately to acquire and be examined in any branch of knowledge which the authorities of the place might indicate or mention, no reform would be more effectual. But more potent inducements are needed. People go to Oxford to get station and money—and they can only receive them from those who have them. The University is but a poor body, and has nothing of real consequence to bestow. The enormous wealth of which we hear so much, is in the gift of the colleges, and it is from their endowments, and the places in their gift, that the successful class-man looks and must look for his pecuniary reward. A very distinguished observer has given his opinion on this point. "I think," says Professor Vaughan—

" . . . that the fellowships should be opened practically to merit in all branches of learning which the University system now recognizes. At present they are practically devoted to the *literæ humaniores*; the examination at most colleges is traditional, and the only merit recognized in the award of fellowships is classical knowledge and taste, and the power of dealing with moral and historical questions—departments of prime importance and great value, but no longer deserving exclusive ascendancy. When a mathematical tutor is wanted in the college, an exception is commonly made in the principle of election; but as a general rule, even mathematical attainments are disregarded in the choice of fellows, and the consequence has been that in spite of distinctions, classes, and scholarships, the study of mathematics still languishes. The number of candidates for honours does not increase; the reason is not doubtful—mathematics in Oxford are a bad investment for intellectual, physical, and

pecuniary capital. The fellowships are the first substantial return for all the money and toil and self-denial involved in an intellectual education. The prospect of a fellowship closes the vista, it leads the eye, and *directs* the energies as well as animates them. On this account, notwithstanding all the honorary and titular encouragements given to mathematics, they are practically discouraged. This consideration is *one of vast importance in its bearing on the recent extension of University studies*. If it be seriously desired and intended to give vitality to new studies, we must operate upon the fellowships for this purpose. If the course of things is left to itself, the traditional system of election will probably prevail in the colleges. The examinations will embrace the old topics; the new either will not be admitted, or, if introduced, will but lightly or occasionally affect the election. Thus under a system nominally comprehensive we may find our actual course as narrow as ever in its range, and perhaps even less energetic than before. For if the fellowships be opened to merit, and this merit consist in the classical proficiency of persons destined to holy orders alone, the standard of excellence will fall, even in classical subjects, lower than at present. Let us suppose thirty fellowships vacant every year in the University: under this system every second-class man in classics might be sanguine of obtaining one. In lieu of the few fellowships now open to competition and stimulating to great exertions, the numbers will be largely multiplied, and the pressure of motive to exertion be proportionately lowered. I do not mean to state that an encouragement to mediocrity has not its advantages: it is better to be in the middle than at the bottom, to be indifferently good than bad. But I think that those who seriously consult the improvements of our institutions cannot be content with such: I would propose, therefore, *that a certain number of fellowships in each college should be specifically devoted to certain branches of learning*. This arrangement, I believe, and this alone, will secure the cultivation of all valuable knowledge—classical, historical, theological, philosophical, mathematical, and physical."

Nor can it be said that the endowments of the colleges are insufficient for the purpose—since a very accurate authority has described them as follows:—

"There are in Oxford 542 fellowships. This does not include the demys at Magdalen, but it does include all the fellowships at St. John's and New College, and all the studentships at Christ's Church, which differ from fellowships elsewhere in being tenable, and to some extent actually held, by undergraduates.

"From this body of men has to be supplied all the studying and all the educating power of the University—all the professors, all the

tutors, all those who pursue learning for its own sake and beyond the needs of practical life.

"Out of this number only 22 are in such a sense open, that a young man, on first coming up, sees his way clear towards them, with no other bar than may arise from his own want of talents or diligence."

It is evident, therefore, how nugatory the late statute will be ; also where we are to look for reform.

In another point too the colleges require innovation. They have a monopoly, and, like all Protected classes, they have a little slumbered on their work. Every student by the Laudian Code must be a member of some Hall or College. No college can admit more than the number, whether large or small, than its own buildings can accommodate, and by very natural, if not very commendable, arrangements, every student is a good deal confined to his own college for education and instruction.

The Commissioners substantially propose that all these restrictions should be broken down ; they would allow persons to keep terms at the University, without being members of any collegiate establishment, which was also most certainly the ancient system, as the present restriction dates only from the time of Queen Elizabeth and the Chancellorship of the erudite Lord Leicester, and they would also allow every college to admit students to its other advantages, without necessarily requiring their residence within the walls. The benefit of the latter plan, which is that pursued at Cambridge, is that the best colleges gain thereby the power of unlimited competition, and the inferior, if they would not see themselves altogether destitute of undergraduate residents, must, in some measure, emulate the well-doing of their superiors, and cannot rely on a certain annual dividend of students, who, better places being full, must go to them, or forego the University entirely. In both respects, it seems to us that the Commissioners are practically right. We should, as our readers will have gathered, regret to see any general abandonment of the collegiate system ; for we regard it as the sole mainspring of the best education. But exactly because we believe it to be the best, we are willing to let others be tried. We have no fear that the extra-collegiate residence or instruction can ever be more than a healthy and gentle stimulus from without. It may quicken

the lazy consciences of certain Fellows, but it cannot change the habits of our people.

The Commissioners also propose the revival of the Professorial element—which would indeed be necessarily needed if any considerable number of “unattached” students were to congregate at Oxford, but not to enter at any college; for the Professors, as we need not remind our readers, are the teachers provided by the University, and are the persons to whom the Laudian Code almost exclusively looks for Academical instruction. The great reason for doing this is not exactly connected with the detail of education; since it is very dubious if under any management the University lectures could be made of more than a subordinate or subsidiary usefulness. In practice and upon trial they have yielded to the inroads of the more modern instructions of the College Tutor and the Private Tutor, and though with the growth of the new Studies a fair place may perhaps be found for them, still they are not and cannot be necessary or essential or primary. The argument for their revival is different. It is odd how few men of European reputation Oxford has turned out. It used to be argued, “What University, I pray, can produce an invincible Hales, an admirable Bacon, an excellent well-grounded Middleton, a subtle Scotus, an approved Burley, a resolute Baconthorpe, a singular Ockham, a solid and industrious Holcot, and a profound Bradwardine? all which persons,” continues the wondering author,* “flourished within one century.” But now the mediæval luminaries are waxed dim, and admirers of Oxford are compelled to allow—

“The great want of Oxford hitherto has not been merely nor chiefly that the Professors have not been sufficiently active in teaching, but that the system has disfavoured the existence and missed the general effects of Professorial learning. Some powerful men we have had; a considerable body, or a constant succession of such, we have not had; men who could give authoritative opinions on matters connected with the sciences; whose words when spoken in public or private could kindle an enthusiasm on important branches of learning, or could chill the zeal for petty or factitious erudition; men whose names and presence in the University could command respect for the place, whether attracting students of all kinds and ages to it, or directing upon it the sight and interest and thought of the whole learned world; men whose investigations could perpetually be add-

* Anthony à Wood.

ing to knowledge, not as mere conduits to convey it, but as fountains to augment its scantiness, and freshen its sleeping waters. Of such men we desire more than we have had. The first care must be to encourage the existence and promote the creation of such."

There is no saying, in matters of this sort, so false as the dictum of Mr. Carlyle, 'the true University of this day is a collection of books;'—it is so if you wish to form a bookworm, but not else. Who doubts that the presence of a man like Arnold in any place is a dynamical power of the first intensity? Who does not see in the once omnipotent influence of Father Newman, a plain indication that if the Professoriate is silent, the pulpit of St. Mary's is ready to misuse its functions?

The greatest change in theory and principle of all, is one that is not technically before us—we mean the admission of the Dissenters. On this the Commissioners were not asked to report, nor is it one on which their inquiring or our writing is likely to be of extreme avail. In fact, the *onus probandi* is on the other side; here are, we will say, perhaps a hundred English youths, as clever, as able, as intellectual, as likely to participate in the full benefits of University instructions, as any other youths. Why then should they be excluded?

It is commonly said, that "the auspices are not favourable." The 'Founders' wills,' which are analogous to 'the chickens' under the Roman Republic, it seems are adverse, at least so the dignified magistrates who alone can duly interpret such occult mysteries explicitly declare, but from which however we must only infer that those magistrates dislike what is proposed, for it has long been observed that in the explanation of testaments and auguries, nothing is ever forbidden which is agreeable to the prejudices and purposes of the presiding authority. But with implicit deference to the Heads of Houses, who alone of course can form a court of competent jurisdiction in matters so ominous, it seems anomalous on this ground to exclude Roman Catholics, who are of the religion of the Founder. It appears odd and wonderful that every benefactor—though, as the divining authorities state, laudably anxious for the exclusive benefit of his own kin,—should have always neglected to provide any preference for his own religion. It is more singular again, that he should have always expressed a strong preference for the reli-

gion of others. No doubt it is so, if the augurs say so ; but it is not quite what we should expect.

Why do we draw the line at the Thirty-nine Articles ? Why should young Gorham and Philpotts, junior, learn side by side, if children of one religion only can safely be taught together ? *Their* parents don't agree at all—on the contrary, each suggests that the other will sometime be in a difficulty. Surely, with the recent history of Oxford before our eyes, it is idle to fear an access of theological disputation. Of the year 1182, it was remarked, " Politeness being now vanished, and declamatory orations and such like exercises being laid aside, those students of the University who had no intentions to busy themselves, or make benefit by the laws, applied themselves to controversial divinity, and spent their chiefest time in unfolding the thorny questions thereof—so that neglecting also the vein of purity both in writing and speaking, their Latin became generally barbarous, and they themselves so conceited, as to esteem all things most eloquent that they spoke. Baleus seemeth to be a great enemy to this divinity and the Professors thereof, for after his wonted way of exclaiming against all things done in these times, which he took to be altogether superstitious, he gives us an uncouth and harsh opinion of it, thus : ' Et stultior est hæc sententiarum Theologiæ ex hoc centaurorum biformi conflecto genere, quam sunt scripta fabulosa Hesiodi et Orphei Theologorum Gentilium.' In another place he calleth it, ' Theologiam ineptiorem quam erat antiqua illa Gentilium Sapientia poetica et fabulosa : ' " really Baleus was a great man. We suggest that an admission of the Dissenters may improve the quality of the discussion.

In truth, there is no reason. The University of Oxford is a part of the nation ; it has changed, is changing, and will change, with the nation. Notwithstanding that a verbal assent is exacted to the Thirty-nine Articles, what proportion of Oxford-bred men can give any rational account of them, or of the weary controversies out of which their very nomenclature arose. On a hundred points therein contained, the English nation has no opinion at all ; since our fathers fell asleep there has been no *bonâ fide* discussion of them ; we have grown to manhood, and must pick up our belief as we can. The English nation is divided ; English Dissent is a congeries of sects ; the English Church is a congeries of

sects : a really national institution should attempt and endeavour to embrace, if so it might be, reconcile them all. Certainly, the present system encourages jesuitry and equivocation. "Science," say the Tractarian divines, "tells us that the earth goes round the sun; Scripture that the sun goes round the earth : for our part, we believe both ; both may be." Excellent if you can—admirable if it be only possible ; but is the State to be asked to give a monopoly to the teachers of *such* a theology ?

We do not suppose, however, that the admission of the Dissenters would be practically any amazing change. Not an enormous number would go. It must be recollected that the theological division of the English people corresponds, though very roughly, with a social division. Nonconformists differ much from Conformists ; their habits are different ; their manners are different ; their ethics are different. A Unitarian marries a wife, and turns banker ; his son is made a lord, and turns to the Church ; *sic itur ad astra*. So subtle and so strong are the influences of life and society, of rank and homage and luxury—so feeble the strength of loose opinion, that few families resist the former long ; hereditary wealth, in a generation or two, very conscientiously retreats to the religion of the wealthy. All this was quite forgotten at the establishment of the London University. Lord Brougham is accustomed to describe the expectations of thronged halls, and eager students, and intense and ceaseless study ; and the astonishment of the promoters at the moderate number, and calm demeanor and brief sojourn of those who responded to their call. Nor is the case altered now. The expanse of Gower Street will not emulate the slopes of St. Geneviève, nor will De Morgan be followed like Abelard. The number of Nonconformists who desire to give their sons what can, in the English use of the term, be called a University education, is not very considerable, nor, according to the better authorities, does it increase. They do not design their sons in general for an intellectual life, for the learned professions, for business on a large scale or of a varied kind ; they do not wish their sons to form aristocratic connections ; but to be solicitors, attorneys, merchants, in a patient and useful way. For this they think—and most likely they think rightly—that twenty years of life are quite an adequate preparation ; they believe that more would in

most cases interfere with the practised sagacity, the moderate habits, the simple wants, the routine inclinations, which are essential to the humbler sorts of practical occupation. Open therefore the older Universities though you may, you will not practically increase or materially change the class who will resort to them; the Dissenters in Oxford will ever be but a small, a feeble, an immaterial, though certainly a respectable and perhaps an erudite minority. The English Catholics might be a more numerous, as we suspect they are in Oxford opinion a far more formidable, faction: a Catholic Hall, we can believe, would really be a nuisance in Oxford; yet even this, we imagine, should be boldly encountered. It would become much less fearful in a very few years. The English leanings and prejudices are so contrary to Romanism, that it is only the semblance of persecution and the fortuitous opportunities of recent years which have occasioned its recent prominence. Would not the Tractarian movement have come to a point sooner, have gained less strength, have effected less for the Roman Church, if the Oxford men had from early youth seen exactly what Catholicism was. Familiarity will spoil romance,—the charm of Romanism is its mystery. But any how, if what has been said be in the least true, if Oxford is, as we have hinted, to educate our thinkers—how absurd to train them in ignorance of what is—how peculiarly foolish to deny them the instruction of associating with people formed in other disciplines, and bred in other faiths, the only sure mode of comprehending those disciplines and estimating those faiths. How wretched to make them say exactly beforehand what they will believe—and that with an accuracy which hardly any cultivated man would like to apply even to his most elaborate or mature speculations. What wonder if this ends in the common doctrine that the articles are “forms of thought”—irremediable categories of the understanding—certain by nature,—as clear as if they were themselves revealed.

Of what would follow upon the admission of Dissenters—of the Halls or Colleges that should be established—of the rules proper for them—of the mode in which theology should be taught when there are known and tolerated differences of opinion to be taken account of—of these and other points it would be premature to speak now. What is wanted for the moment, is to take off the subscriptions to articles both at

entrance and at the degree. This, without any other change, would secure the great step, the admission of the non-Anglican classes : we have proved that this is wanted for Oxford itself, and what we have said of a modern University shows, we imagine, that the Dissenters are not numerous enough to form a University by themselves—that London is not, as Lord Derby has oddly argued, an equivalent for Oxford.

What is our chance of getting these Reforms? From within, exactly none. The government of the University of Oxford is one of the worst features of its present condition. A little principle will make this clear. The best and most natural administrative and presiding government of a corporate body professing to promote the pursuits of education is, we suppose, an aristocracy of the persons educated there—a select body, in a great degree, at least, composed of those who have had a practical experience of the benefits and evils of that institution itself, and who have shown during the period of their education—or otherwise in after-life—that they were competent to appreciate the one and counteract the other. In a college, we conjecture, of necessity, the power (division of pecuniary dividends perhaps excepted) must be mainly in the hands of persons engaged in education at the time, or recently before, within its walls. Few others will know the requisite detail, nor do the affairs of such an institution in general possess very great interest for any others. With a University it is otherwise. Teachers, in general, do not settle too well *what* is to be taught : the manner of teaching under a little healthy competition they will be pretty sure soon to know ; but why it is good to know anything—what are the advantages of each subject—which is best for what persons—on such questions they are little likely to be better informed than others, and on them their conversation has commonly, in our experience, a rather opaque texture, and a somewhat torpid effect. And if the University be prosperous and useful, it is likely that a considerable number will be found among its more distinguished students interested in its good fortune, and able and willing to take a share in its government and direction. Such a body exactly is, according to the theory of it, the Hebdomadal Board, or weekly meeting of the Heads of Houses—that is, of Halls and Colleges in Oxford. It might

seem likely that the Head of a College would be one of the best men in the University, one of the persons most distinguished, locally, and in the world. The duties of the office are light, they do not entail daily residence, and the emoluments are very considerable. They fill a fair station in the eyes of mankind, and have every opportunity to acquire much acquaintance with the external world. It might seem that this was just such a body as we have imagined and described. The whole is spoiled by a vicious system of choice. The Heads of Colleges are elected by the Fellows; and the Fellowships—we have seen—are, as it is termed, close—that is, not open to general competition, or given to merit. We have quoted already, from Mr. Temple's evidence, the rather startling assertion—which the Commissioners quote as accurate—that out of 542 Fellowships not more than 22 are really accessible to all the best men that may be at Oxford, whenever they chance to be vacant;—the rest are given to the Founders' relations—to people bred at the school where he was born—to people that were born within two miles and a half of the place where he is buried—not more than six precisely from that at which he beneficially died. And the remainder, as well as these in default of claimants, are given by favour. The candidate is some relation to somebody else—is gentlemanly—is praised by persons unknown—has connections with patronage in the Church—and he is elected. Sometimes there is an examination previous to election, but there is always a mischievous doctrine that the knowledge there shown is not to be the sole test for that purpose of merit; but that the Examiners may allow for what they otherwise know to a man's advantage—which is interpreted by a legend of a distinguished dignitary's observing to a friend of his that was a candidate—"I ain't going to read the papers—I shall vote for *you*, old fellow." And as the Fellows are elected, so in general do they elect. "They," says Mr. Senior, speaking of the Heads of Houses—

"... are generally taken from those who are or have been fellows of the college. When taken from those who have been fellows, the incumbent of a valuable college living is frequently chosen, as two persons unite their influence for that purpose, the incumbent and the person who according to the habits of the college is entitled to succeed him. When an actual fellow is chosen, it is frequently a man who has passed an idle Oxford life, and become familiar there-

fore with all the fellows, or has been an active useful bursar, and is supposed likely therefore to manage well the college revenues, or is recommended by sympathising in the doctrinal or political opinions of the majority, or simply by an easy temper. I am inclined to think that the peculiar qualities which fit a man to preside over a place of education have seldom much influence; the selection is made from a very narrow circle, and even in that very circle the best, or even the second best, man is seldom chosen."

Mr. Senior would vest the appointment of the Heads of Houses in the Crown. Professor Vaughan, whose evidence has been before quoted, propounds a different scheme. "The Heads of Houses," he observes,

"... do not necessarily, or even very generally, follow literary and scientific pursuits. Nor are they directly and closely connected with the instruction of the place. They simply appoint the tutors, and preside with more or less activity at the terminal examinations in College. They live generally with their families, and do not immediately imbibe the spirit or learn the wishes of those who more directly carry forward the instruction. They constitute a most valuable element for legislation as well as administration; but I think that it would be advantageous, if in addition to this, other influences were admitted to give their aid in suggesting and framing the laws of the University. It would be well, I think, at least to *comprehend* a learned element, such as in many European Universities has the chief if not the only sway. It would be desirable that in the seat of learning and instruction, those who have attained the highest position as cultivators of literature and science, who must be considered as intimately acquainted with the state of the several departments of knowledge, who are brought into occasional contact with students of all ages and degrees in the place, who have proved themselves to possess a considerable degree of intellectual power, and who are necessarily interested in the success and reputation of the University, should take some active part in making and administering the laws. I allude of course to the Professors as a body, who at present are scarcely recognised to be a part of the University system. That a University, in the higher sense of the term, should exist without such a class seems almost impossible; and it would be wasteful to possess it, or call it into existence, without assigning to it an important place in legislation and management. I do not suppose that there could occur any signal difficulty in the attempt to form a legislative and administrative Board out of the body of Heads of Houses and Professors. But I venture to suggest a scheme which would fulfil the conditions I have pointed out, and at the same time it would comprehend a third element tending to give the legislative Board somewhat of a popular and representative

character, and thereby aiding its efficiency. For in order to convey information as to the state of the students, their moral condition, discipline, and attainments—in order to bring the public opinion of the place to bear more completely on the legislation—and to harmonize the legislation with the actual working of the system—it might be well to include in the legislative body a certain number of representatives of the present Masters.”

The Commissioners think the present scheme would work well, in time, if only the fellowships were thrown open. Any how, and one way or other, we hope to see the presiding board composed of the best men that Oxford can train.

Even when that is obtained something will be left. It is not to be expected that a large and highly educated body of persons, like the graduates of Oxford, will remain contented without some real share in the government and direction of a University—to which, in general, they are very strongly attached—nor is it to be wished. A small board of a dozen people, however well formed, even if composed of the twelve wisest men now living on earth, would be liable to considerable errors. It will be exposed to pique, and prejudice, and mistake. It will now and then be indolent. It will be exposed to domination from a restless and resident man. Being a bureaucracy, it will have the defects of a bureaucracy. It will always require criticism, and will often work the better for occasional censure.

At present there is in theory ample scope for popular action. The Convocation of Master of Arts at Oxford is in theory supreme; not a single bye-law, not a single change in the curriculum, not a single honorary degree, can be enacted, effected or conferred without its authority. It has ample powers of debate; no Charter from the Crown can be accepted or surrendered without its assent. Savigny notices the popular Constitution of the Universities of England as one of their peculiarities, and it might really seem as if he spoke truly. But in fact, if we except an unlimited power of mere rejection, the Oxford Convocation has no power at all. Its right of debate and discussion are reduced to narrow limits, by the rule that all members must speak in Latin; their power of legislation is abolished by an exclusive right of initiating measures that has for a very long time been vested in the Heads of Houses. The effect is, that the Convocation has merely the right of rejecting or accepting without amendments,

or alterations, or modifications, the whole of what is proposed to them by the Hebdomadal Board. It appears to us that these restrictions are on principle erroneous, and that it is advisable that they should be immediately and entirely removed.

We have not here the good fortune to find our opinion confirmed by the authority of the Commissioners. The fact is, that the Convocation at Oxford is an eminently Conservative body; perhaps more so than any other body now in the realm; its members are exceedingly out of the way of new ideas; they never understood Latin by the ear, and it is forbidden to address them in any other language; they don't know what is wanted and they can't be told it: they are interred in parsonages, and dream over their youth; what wonder if they wish the University to be as it was in their time; and if they are altogether opposed to changes, the bent and bearing of which they cannot comprehend. They see that Modern History is of no use among the poor, and very commendably object to its being taught. It is clearly preposterous to give a miscellaneous and casual body of this sort, the final decision on the details of a *curriculum*. Its members are certainly not competent to exercise varied, or questionable, or complicated powers, but what powers they have they should really and truly exercise. The right of debate and petition (petition we mean addressed to the Hebdomadal Board) on matters connected with Universities, could scarcely in an assembly of English gentlemen lead to any very atrocious results. Several gentlemen argue in the evidence, and it is evident their representations carry great weight with the Commissioners, that there is an extreme danger in erecting "a vast debating society in which, as occasion offered, every question might from time to time be discussed." And certainly if it were proposed or designed to establish a society in Oxford for discussing theological or political questions in general, the objection might well be called unanswerable;—continual discussion on miscellaneous but exciting subjects would obviously interfere with the calm torpidity which does and should characterize the place. But if the discussion were by the law and constitution of the University rigidly and exclusively confined to matters affecting the welfare and interests of the University itself, the evil could not be of immense magnitude. Suppose there were—as very likely there would be just now—a striking

debate once in two years, and almost mere silence between, surely that would hardly annihilate Oxford. Big buildings and broad acres can outlive much eloquence.

In place of abolishing the restrictions on the freedom of the old Convocation—which they propose to leave pretty much as they found it—the Commissioners propose to revive an old body called the House of Congregation, to be practically composed of the working tutors and teachers of Oxford, who are on this scheme to exercise the controlling, suggesting and criticising function with respect to the higher authorities which it is generally felt some popular body ought to exercise. This is in fact a scheme to get a Convocation without what are sometimes called the ‘country masters.’ We will not say that we dissent from a recommendation which we do not feel very able duly to appreciate, but we doubt. We have a great suspicion of complicity in Constitution-making; two bodies, we should have imagined, were ample for duties so simple and problems so little perplexing as those which are likely to come before the consideration of academical authorities. The British constitution does very well for Great Britain and Ireland, and all the colonies, but it would be ridiculous for three acres of land. We would rather see a popular convocation with limited but efficient powers controlling and criticising and beseeching a select and admirable Hebdomadal Board.

From without, our chance of a reform in Oxford is much greater. The Heads of Houses do not know where they stand. Oxford is unpopular. Innovation may not come this year or next, but give destiny time, and it will be. It is useless to count up the number of her scholars—to demonstrate that, since the middle ages, her teachers have never been so many, or so diligent, or so useful. Mere labour will not save her. Year by year, hour by hour, as it were by a magical or secret influence, authority and dominion are leaving the classes that reverence her, and pass to those who know her not. What do the people in Wigan care for the Dons in Oxford? The authority which the cultivated and hereditary gentry of England have exercised for ages, is now to be transferred to classes not more instructed, not more wise, not more learned, not more refined—inferior in gentleness, in grace, in judgment, but superior in overbearing labour, in coarse energy, in the faculty of work. It will be well, if the wisest designs, the best opinions, the most beneficent institutions, the

most time-honoured and efficient establishments, prevail against that ardent ignorance, that unknowing energy, that sharp and overweening decision. It will be much if pure argument, if deliberate eloquence, if wise reasoning, avail with men whose notions are so narrow, whose fancy is so weak, whose indolence is so finite. To them we doubt if Reason will justify her children—we are certain she will do no more. If we are to defend the nonsense of antiquity as well as its sense, we shall speedily cease to defend either. Will Financial Reformers neglect the sinecures of All Souls? Will scoffers at the House of Lords crouch before the Hebdomadal Board? Will believers in Mesmerism be tender to Magdalene or Merton?

Lastly, Oxford has vexed the English people—she has crossed their one speculative Affection; she has encountered their one speculative Hatred. So often as a Tractarian Clergyman enters a village, and immediately there is a question of candlesticks and crosses and roodlofts and piscinæ—immediately people mutter, ‘why that is Oxford.’ More than that. A hundred educated men (as Romanists boast) with her honours to their names, and her token on their faces, and her teaching on their minds, have deserted to the enemy of England. This can *not* be answered. These people are ever busy; their names are daily in the papers; they visit out of the way places; they are gazed at in the quietest towns;—and wherever one of the grave figures passes with a dark dress, and a pale face and an Oxonian caution, he leaves an impression. The system which trained *him* must be bad. Such is our axiom;—tell an Englishman that a building is without use, and he will stare; that it is illiberal, and he will survey it; that it teaches Aristotle, and he will seem perplexed; that it don’t teach science, and he won’t mind; but only hint that it is the Pope, and he will arise and burn it to the ground. Some one has said this concerning Oxford; so let her be wise. Without are fightings, within are fears.

ART. VI.—THE ECLIPSE OF FAITH.

The Eclipse of Faith; or, a Visit to a Religious Sceptic.
London: Longman. 1852.

WHEN are we to have a few *whole* truths in England? We would respectfully suggest to our various enlighteners, theological especially, that advocates and special retainers have had a long run, and that many of the world's jurors would be thankful to have at length something of an attempt at an impartial and judge-like summing up. We have ourselves a good deal of patience. We can listen with equanimity to a lengthy pleading though knowing it all the time to be *ex parte*, and for the plaintiff, for the sake of the side which it represents, the truth which it contains, and the recollection that there are considerations which it is essential to entertain at some stage of the inquiry, and that these are of them. In like manner and for the like reasons, we can turn our heads another way, and listen with equal calmness and attention to the defendant's counsel. But when replies, rejoinders and explanations have had protracted and uninterrupted course, it is natural to look around for that valuable completer of the machinery for full and just representation, the Judge—and his non-appearance on the bench—or what is worse, the impertinent assumption of his seat by one of the advocates from below, is resented by us as an unfair demand upon our toleration. We frankly plead guilty to a very defective amount of respect for the advocate, however clever, zealous, eloquent, learned and even conscientious he may be, except when considered as a part of a respectable whole—a necessary step to a desirable position. It is the judicial faculty before which we have learnt in the progress of life to make our especial, if not our nearly exclusive, *congé* of absolute respect. This is the mental attribute (not exercised in perfection—this is not to be looked for—but in relative strength and power) the possession of which alone gives us any comfort and satisfaction in the guidance, any reverence for the mental fabric, or any confidence in the permanent usefulness and character

of the individual writer or thinker. But clever men know perfectly well that this is the most unpopular, unalluring, unstimulating and unreflecting of all the varied forms of human speech and writing. Observe a court of law or justice. It is the speeches of the counsel that attract the popular interest and attention. The summing up of the Judge is usually a dull, weary, technical, lengthy formulary, which lies like a flowerless desert, between the really significant and interesting extremes of the speeches of the counsel and the verdict of the jury. To the wise among the jury themselves, and the select few in the court, it and the *evidence* are the only things really worth attending to—at least, are the portions of the proceedings which contain the heart of the matter. The awful warnings, and the pathetic appeals, and the feigned indignation, and the fixed convictions of both of the counsel on each side of the same fact, go for garnish. But look at the people in the court! the eyes that were so intent and almost glaring, how listless and lustreless—what shiftings of incumbency among the sitters—what changes of the pedestal-foot among the standers. To most of those who do give any attention to what the Judge says, with what strange alternation and fluctuation of character does he appear, strong and weak, sensible and foolish, just and unjust—accordingly as he insists upon some point in the evidence on the side which the hearer has espoused, or shamefully goes over to the ranks of the enemy. The approach of the result, indeed, restores all the former and even an increased tension of the faculties, and every body sits still upon his seat, or stands on both his feet, as the jury come into the box. But the *process* of extracting the truth from the speeches and the evidence, and of preparing for a righteous sentence, is plaguily uninteresting to the crowd. Had the Judge to sum up after the verdict—to supply a justification of, instead of a preparation for, the verdict—he would not lack room or air! He might find it consoling to say with the ancient philosopher, on the subject of hearers, "*Satis mihi, inquit, pauci—satis unus—satis nullus.*"

All the great popular discussions of all the great Religious questions are of this advocate-like description. Our theological libraries consist of the bound-up briefs and speeches of counsel. Statutes—laws—verdicts—anything

in the shape of the calm judgments, which may form recognized precedents and rules for future guidance, are rare. The various Churches of Christendom are but these volumes stereotyped. The Roman Catholic Church holds a brief, and delivers an endless series of one-sided speeches, as advocate in the case of Authority *versus* Liberty, *communis sensus* v. individuality. The Reformed Churches hold a brief, and deliver in various tones, as seniors or juniors, the speeches, of advocates of the Bible v. corporate and individual judgment. We do not hesitate to avow our opinion, that there has now arisen an equally one-sided advocacy of the claims of individual judgment as against those of the *communis sensus*—and of the personal character and origin of religious influences as against their external and written sources. We have always considered the theory of religious derivation in its application by Mr. Theodore Parker and personification by Professor Newman, as marked by this character of extreme advocacy. And now the writer of the Eclipse of Faith meets this position by the equally extreme alternative of the bounden submission of the individual soul to a written Book.

Though we have at times pointed out, we have not felt in any way called upon to protest against, this defect in the wholeness and roundness of the views of Mr. Parker and Mr. Newman. For the element which they have with such wonderful power and skill introduced into the discussion has been deplorably needed. The old causes of authority and external revelation had had the ear of the court long enough to elicit the full merits and worth of their position. The interests of Truth required the introduction of other overlooked considerations of equal importance. Indeed, Truth was beginning to be endangered by the absence of such considerations. Religion, which had never stood firmly upon its one leg, was now beginning to totter, and threatened to fall from the unnaturally exclusive nature of its support. We therefore welcomed the help of such writers as Mr. Parker and Mr. Newman. They presented precisely the element that was missing. That they presented it by itself was perhaps a necessary consequence (as human nature goes) of their being able effectively to present it at all. Had they not seen their own views exclusively, they would not probably have seen

it so penetratingly, or been able to print it so clearly on the minds of others. We honoured them, therefore, in the capacity, not so much of full expounders of, as of faithful contributors to, the religious Truth we were seeking—as men who were supplementing the special deficiency of the majority of prevailing systems. It is no inconsistency, then, in us to avow our belief that the author of the *Eclipse* has, amid many clever, though sometimes unfair, hits at these authors, frequently taken just exception to the exaggeration of their statements—and to the unreasonable amount of duty they exact from the theory of intuitional religion.

"The Eclipse of Faith"—published without the name of any Author, is after the manner of Mr. Helps's conversational volumes, and with similar good sense, and the introduction of the results of similar reading habits—mingles much more wit, liveliness, repartee, and (shall we adopt the very word of the book?) much more *smartness*, than the works we have referred to have so far manifested. As in Mr. Helps's and the other drawing-room books on ethics and theology, which are now becoming frequent, we are not introduced into the dusty study of a recluse, or the humble parsonage of a lightly-beneficed clergyman—but to the elegant country residence of an educated, sufficiently-estated gentleman, who can carry on his conversations on the origin of evil and the source of "all our woe" in a luxurious library—can add the allurements of a good Dinner to the attractions of his discussion, and can furnish his friends all round with beds, to avoid the distracting effects of the night-air and a cold drive on the digestion and the argument. Theology is evidently becoming one of the fine arts in England. Its productions, theories and subject-matter are beginning to be discussed in the same interesting manner as statues, pictures, and coins, with the same easy indifference, too, sometimes as to results. Paulus, Strauss, Feuerbach, Parker, Newman, and Greg, lie side by side with the representatives of Roman Catholic and Protestant Theology, as quietly and peaceably as a coin of Caracalla in its receptacle in the same cabinet with one of Oliver Cromwell. From that earnest thing which Divines and Infidels made it, who, when they met, thought of nothing less than of shivering

their lances in the encounter, and unhorsing or slaying one another—theology has become a very gentlemanly pastime—no longer the preserve of the clergy, but the moors, on which any layman may take a day or two's shooting—has become, in the wealthy *ennuyé's* search for a new sensation, what Norway is to the wearied of the Grand Tour. In Germany it has too long been an affair of the study and the Lecture-room; it is becoming the same in England—*mutatis mutandis*—the library being substituted for the study, and society for the lecture-room. The Pulpit and the Universities—the places one would have supposed fittest for the discussion of such subjects—being already retained on one side—and freedom of thought requiring a less risky outlet, in the expensive review, the library-book, and the leisurely conversation of private life. We cannot consider this change an unmixed evil or good. While we rejoice in the interest which a large number of the cultivated laity are beginning to take in some specific form, or in the general subject of Theology, we are not without a dislike of the approach of that state of mind, which threatens to contemplate and discuss the awful subject of Religion as an article of *vertù*.

Our readers, then, will perceive that they are not likely to encounter in the *Eclipse of Faith*, at any rate, a dull book. Nay! we ask, were the gravest subjects that can come beneath the human examination ever made so entertaining? It is a book calculated—and this, probably, was the pious and worthy object of the author—to give pause to many a flashy young man in his too ready assumption of some of the unbelieving theories of our time—though the levity with which they are sometimes discussed (in order to keep up the genuineness of the characters and the reality of the book) may shock older folk, who are less *habitué's*, in the schools.

The Hero of the *Eclipse of Faith* is Mr. Harrington—a comfortably-estated gentleman, without encumbrance—and who, therefore, relieved from the cares of practical life, and stimulated by a disappointment of the affections, is able to devote himself to the serious amusement of theological speculation. He tries all things, and would hold fast to that which is good, if he could find it. But, unfortunately, this is not possible. His religious faith,

then, is doubt. He is an absolute Sceptic. He passes the Academy, and has scarcely even a Ciceronic *verisimile* or a favourable balance of probabilities. His business, then, is to declare war on every new-comer; and to do him justice, he is a much severer bruiser in his encounter with the unbeliever than with the believer. He has as keen an eye for the inconsistencies, improbabilities, impossibilities, miracles and superstitions of unbelief, as of belief. He is, therefore, an invaluable aid, not only in his own partial recovery, but to his uncle, the recorder of the conversations, and the anxious watcher, from his own liberal and intelligent point of view as a believer, of his nephew's deviations and approximations.

"My uncle" is kind enough to write letters, and send portions of his journal to a brother residing on the continent, who is anxious about the spiritual state of old England. He makes light of the dangers of Tractarianism, in the following amusing passage, but looks with serious apprehension on what he regards as certain new forms of virtual or avowed unbelief.

"The degree to which the infection tainted the clergy was no criterion at all of the sympathy of the people. Too many of the former were easily converted to a system, which confirmed all their ecclesiastical prejudices, and favoured their sacerdotal pretensions; which endowed every youngster, upon whom the Bishop laid hands, with 'preternatural graces,' and with the power of working 'spiritual miracles.' But the people generally were in little danger of being misled by these absurdities; and *facts*, even before the recent outbreak, ought to have convinced the clergy that if *they* thought proper to go to Rome, their flocks were by no means prepared to follow them. Except among some fashionable folks here and there—young ladies to whom *ennui*, susceptible nerves, and a sentimental imagination, made any sort of excitement acceptable; who turned their arts of embroidery and painting, and their love of music, to 'spiritual' uses, and displayed their piety and their accomplishments at the same time—except among these, I say, and those amongst the more ignorant of our rural population, whom such people influenced, the Anglican movement could not boast of any signal success. In the more densely-peopled districts, and amongst the middle classes especially, the failure of the thing was often the most ignominious. No sooner were the candles placed upon the 'altar' than the congregation began to thin; and by the time the 'obsolete' rubrics were all admirably observed, the priest faultlessly

arrayed, the service properly *intoned*, and the entire 'spiritual' machine set in motion, the people were apt to desert the sacred edifice altogether. It was a pity, doubtless, that when such admirable completeness in the ecclesiastical equipments had been attained, it should be found that the machine would not work; that just when the church became *perfect*, it should fail for so insignificant an accident as the want of a congregation. Yet so it often was. The ecclesiastical play was an admirable *rehearsal*, and nothing more. Not but what there are many priests who would prefer a 'full service' and an ample ceremonial in an empty church, to the simple Gospel in a crowded one; like Handel, who consoled himself with the vacant benches at one of his oratorios, by saying that 'dey made de music sound de finer.' And, in truth, if we adopt to the full the 'High Church' theory, perhaps it cannot much matter whether the people be present or not; the *opus operatum* of magic rites and spiritual conjuration may be equally effectual. The Oxford Tracts said ten years ago, '*Before the Reformation, the Church recognised the seven hours of prayer; however these may have been practically neglected, or hidden in an unknown tongue, there is no estimating what influence this may have had on common people's minds secretly.*' Surely you must agree that there *is* no estimating the efficacy of nobody's hearing services which, if heard by anybody, would have been in an unknown tongue."—Pp. 7, 8.

We have said, that to a certain extent we sympathize with the spirit and purpose of this Book. The reign of a tyrannous, one-sided view of the nature and sources of religious influences and truths, had been so long and so nearly unbroken; it had come to be so prevalent a misconception, that all religious truth worth anything must necessarily assume an express dogmatic form; that the opinions which we formed on theological questions were the all-important things of the religious profession; that these results were obtained by means of a correct logical process founded on certain data in the facts of nature, and the statements of Scripture; that the mind was in the first place simply recipient of these external means of truth, and active only in the elaboration and use of them; that it had nothing but what it received; that it could originate nothing, but could only learn and conclude; that there could be no religious impressions except through the media of the senses and the intellect, and from the sources of external Nature and the Scriptures; that certain lists of opinions, called confessions of faith, the supposed deduc-

tions from these materials, embodied therefore the essential forms and elements of religion ; that students therefore could alone achieve a thoroughly sound spiritual Christianity, though wayfaring men might be practical Christians—this virtual limitation of the highest and most perfect forms of Christian faith, to the scholar, the logician, and the philosopher—to the successful reasoner, the careful critic, and the acute student of the marks of wisdom and design in Nature—had held so prolonged, and with a few outbursts such as those of the Moravians and Quakers, so uninterrupted a sway over the English mind—and had been still further so much prolonged by the weight thrown into the same scale by such writers as Locke, Paley, Hartley, and Priestley—(men whose mental fabrics, notwithstanding their noble and admirable contributions to the cause of truth and sound philosophy which command our hearty reverence and gratitude, we still claim the liberty of thinking had a defective side)—that it was really high time that the neglected element in our religious nature should be summoned back into notice and regard, and that the province of the soul should be recognized as that of a substantial, originating power in the human being—as the seat and the fountain of religious emotions, the medium of communion with the Divine Being, and divine things, in possible and often actual independence of propositional religion, and received written sources. This conscious want—this desire of justice to religion and to our religious nature—in their universality and essence, apart from the ministrations made to them and for them by Divine Providence in special revelations, and in the outward traces of the Divine Being—led to the works of Mr. Parker, Mr. Newman and others of the same school. We do not remember a time when we did not feel the defectiveness, the exaggeration, and the one-sidedness of these supplementary views also in their turn. And in sight of this want of completeness, we welcome some of the arguments and representations of the present volume, as usefully supplementing again the supplementers and checking the checkers.

When, therefore, we are told that we might enjoy the Christian religion though there were no such writings as those of the New Testament—or that a book-revelation

of moral and spiritual truth is impossible—we observe an exaggeration of statement, and a confusion, or at least a limitation, of idea, which we are very glad to see exposed and corrected. We confess to the weakness of always having regarded the reception and continuance of the Christian religion in its purity as dependent on the continuance and preservation of the New Testament writings in their purity. That there is a universal religious sentiment which underlies all particular forms of religion—that there are systems of religious faith, guiding, restricting, and purifying in many of their influences and features—independently of the system of faith propounded in the Scriptures, God forbid that we should deny. And we do not at all relish, nor can we in any way respect or love, that fierce joy, which the writer of this book attributes to Harrington, at what he considers the small amount of religious truth and pure religious influence which is to be found in prevailing idolatries.* We should think ourselves engaged not only in a more agreeable and humane, but in a more truthful and philosophical pursuit, to trace with Constant or Parker the germs of devotion and faith in the inarticulate voices of idolatrous observances, than to look upon the whole as a “Meg Merrilies” cauldron, or “Devil’s Cookery-book,” for the mere sake of exalting the blessings of Christianity, forgetful that in thus exalting the special we proportionably depress the general providence of God. But when we come to special forms of religion, and recognize in the Christian incomparably the very highest of existing forms, we are eager to express our pre-eminent obligations to those writings in which the sacred fabric of faith has alone, and could alone in any tolerable purity, have been handed down to us. We are willing to allow that the Christian Faith was a joint product of the soul of Christ and the soul of Man: that is to say, it took its distinctive life and form by the emanation of spiritual truth and power proceeding from Jesus Christ, encountering and uniting with the existent spiritual truths and powers in the better human consciousness of that age. Of the sources of Christ’s power and wisdom and moral potency we speak not. We should be ready to accept our

* “Eclipse of Faith,” p. 143.

author's illustrative image of the flower,* whose growth is completed not only by the nutrition of the earth in which it stands, but also by the "skiey influences," that are not less real, though less palpable, had not St. John supplied us with a better, in the Vine—"I am the Vine, and my Father is the Husbandman." Whatever were the proportions in which the common and the special—the old and the new—the things that were already man's, and those which were given personally to Christ—mingled in that holy and august result—that result was the same. It would have remained in the solitude of that great spirit, had it not sought and found a chord of sympathy and communion with the already partially prepared and developed religious nature of the Apostles. Now so far, it is manifest, no Book-revelation existed or was wanted. A Book-revelation had doubtless existed before—of which Jesus had copiously availed himself—the Book-revelation of the Old Testament. But now soul spake to soul—and it would have been going back indeed to have asked for a Book-revelation in its place. As much as if, on the Mount of Transfiguration, Jesus in conversing with Moses and Elias had begged them to retire and leave him a MS. of the Pentateuch and the Book of Kings. But afterwards, when that pure spirit was removed—when those in whom its light had shone were removed—what should we have done if some memorials of those sacred intercourses had not been preserved? Mr. Newman himself acknowledges the infinite superiority of the New Testament to even the earliest and purest of the subsequent Christian writings: which incontestible fact bears witness to the value even of the trail of light which the passage of that sacred being left behind him in the world. We are ourselves therefore thankful that that trail has been ineffaceably preserved—that such as it is (and it is full of an inseparable light and glory) we have it for ever—never to be corrupted by the pollutions or darkenesses through which it passes among the centuries. Now it is certain that such a revelation from soul to soul is the best—nay, is in literal and exact truth—the only possible form of revelation; for even in a book, it is the soul of the book, or the writer, or the recorder, or of the words and deeds and character which he

* P. 285.

records, which alone (in this case through the book) communicates with the reader. But it is perfectly conceivable that Christ should have made a laborious written communication to the Rabbis of Jerusalem, which should have been received by them as containing divine and authoritative truths. The religion would have been different—then, indeed, probably a religion of scholars and critics—and would have influenced quite a different class of minds, and had quite a different career and influence in the world—but still, if this document conveyed in a sort the soul of the writer to the soul of the reader, and established a common ground with a jointly reared building upon it, it would have been strictly a revelation of moral and spiritual truth. To maintain the contrary, would be to deny the possibility of all communication of soul with soul. Then would there not be a *vivâ voce* or *word* revelation either; then would there not be a *thought* or *act* revelation. For all that is necessary to the communication of a revelation is a medium of communication, and an appropriate recipient power. Now this we know can take place, though in different and perhaps a directly less effectual manner, yet can take place between soul and soul, by means of written as well as by means of spoken or inspired thought. For what is the difference whether an impression is made upon my soul by a sound, by a sight, by an inspiration, or by a writing, so that the impression is made upon my soul? The peculiarity of Christ's revelation was that it was not made by writing, but by act and voice and personal moral training, coming on the back of a previous national training, chiefly through a word of mouth revelation, founded on a written revelation. And this probably was the main part of the truth which Mr. Newman wished to bring into prominence—that there really could not be any revelation of moral and spiritual truth except from soul to soul—that therefore the idea of a revelation being contained in a book—in a word-creed—was absurd, and represented an impossibility. Christianity is no revelation as long as it remains in a book or a creed. It is only when it has actually won its way into the soul, that the revelation has place. Nevertheless the desire to bring out this truth into due prominence—to divorce men's thoughts from the wretched misconception of a revelation being

contained in any written words, or statements or propositions, to convince them of the necessity of those very things becoming individualized, and becoming the actual personal possession of the soul, before there could be a revelation of them to that soul—to break up the tie that bound men to the residuary jargon of ecclesiastical word-quarrels, (in which each man took his side with a "*credo*,") as the sources and forms of their religious life—this probably was the chief practical object Mr. Newman had in view. But we are glad that as the terms in which what he meant (if this is what he meant) was expressed, were liable to be misunderstood, or interpreted too narrowly, others have been guarded against the conclusions they may have drawn from imperfectly understood language. There was nothing to prevent the Apostle Paul, and the Apostle John, and the Apostle James, from having a personal religion and faith of their own. Nay, it would be impossible to believe but that they had. Their religion could not be said to be absolutely the same as that of Jesus Christ. He cannot be supposed to have transfused his faith—his spiritual convictions and feelings—entire and unchanged into their souls. They would have been in such a case mere vehicles of the religion and faith of another—not possessors of any themselves. And what is true of Paul, and John, and James, must be true of every Christian since. No man's faith—notwithstanding creeds and racks, books and stakes—has ever been the same as another's—any more than his body or his mind have been cast exactly in the same mould. A man's religious faith is the produce of his own soul in communication with all the religious influences open to him, or of which he avails himself. A Christian's religious faith (as such) is the produce of his own soul in communication specially with the Christian influences, of which he lays hold. There is no revelation anywhere in the world to him till his own soul makes it one. The New Testament is no revelation—even contains no revelation to him. It is the *means* of one indeed, and a blessed means—a means, the removal of which, to our minds, would be practically tantamount to a maiming of the revelation itself. Other means of religion exist—other means might appear. There might be even a re-appearance in another form of substantially the same

means. But in removing the New Testament we should be removing the casket of the means by which the abstract Christian revelation, through the person of Jesus Christ, is made concrete in the souls of the men and women of our own and of future ages. Mr. Newman's position, however, we presume to be substantially, to vindicate the possession of an individual faith, an individual access to, and power of communion with, the Divine Being, to every man on his own account, and as Jesus Christ himself had, besides inherited means of faith and truth and means *ab extra*, others personal to himself; so the apostles had also, and every humblest Christian to this day has, an independent fountain of religious faith and truth flowing within him, which may be enriched and purified and strengthened indeed by waters from without, but which cannot be created by them—without which, in fact, he would be overflowed on the surface by a flood,—but not refreshed from within by a spontaneous and self-originated spring. And this, it cannot be doubted, is an important, vital, and in the days of sincerity-blighting articles, and parchment faiths, and “book-revelations,” and logical religions, and external evidences, a much-needed truth.

Perceiving, however, how calculated to mislead many of the statements of Mr. Newman, when taken by themselves, are, we are not sorry to see the other side turned to us in such passages as the following. Harrington (we should premise) has studied profoundly the principles of the Socratic dialogue, and practises all its wiles, and weaves all its meshes to perfection. In one of the conversations with Fellowes, entitled, “that may be possible with man which is impossible with God,” he starts with the observation, “Mr. Newman affirms, you say, that in his judgment every book ‘revelation’ is an absurdity and contradiction; or in the words quoted by you, ‘impossible’”—and then he leads poor Fellowes (from whose name one often feels inclined, preserving the epithet, to drop the final letter) through a preparatory labyrinth to the admission that mankind have very generally believed in a book-revelation, and to answer the question how he himself (Fellowes) came to escape this general error, and to be possessed of the antipodal truth:—

“‘For my part,’ said Fellowes, ‘I am not ashamed to say, that I
CHRISTIAN TEACHER.—No. 57.

2 E

think I ought to thank God for such a boon as Mr. Newman has, in this instance at least, been the instrument of conveying to me: I acknowledge it is a most momentous truth, without which I should still have been in thralldom to the "letter."

"Very well; then the book-revelation of Mr. Newman is, as I say, in some sort, to you, perhaps to many, a divine "book-revelation."

"Well, in *some* sense, it is so."

"So that now we have, in *some* sense, a *divine* book-revelation to prove that a *divine* book-revelation is impossible."

"You are pleased to jest on the subject," said Fellowes.

"I never was more serious in my life. However, I will not press this point any further. You shall be permitted to say (what I will not contradict) that though Mr. Newman may be inspired, for aught I know, in that modified sense in which you believe in any such phenomenon—inspired as much (say) as the inventor of lucifer matches—yet that his book is not divine—that it is purely human; and even, if you please, that God has had nothing to do with it. But even then I must be allowed to repeat that at least you have derived from a "book revelation" what it would not have been unworthy of a *divine* book-revelation to impart if it could have been imparted without contradiction. Such book-revelation, in this case, must be of inestimable value to man, because, without it, he must have persisted in that ancient and all but inveterate and universal delusion, of which we have so often spoken. There is only one little inconvenience, I apprehend, from it in relation to the argument of such a book; and that is, that I am afraid that men, so far from being convinced thereby that a divine revelation is impossible, will rather argue the contrary way, and say, "If Mr. Newman can do so much, what might not God do by the very same method?" "If he can thus break the spiritual yoke of his fellow-men by only teaching them *negative* truth, surely it may be possible for God to be as useful in teaching *positive* truth."—Pp. 81, 82.

"By the bye, you agree with Mr. Newman, I am sure, that God is to be approached by the individual soul without any of the non-sense of mediation, which has found so general—all but universal—sanction in the religious systems of the world?"

"Certainly," said Fellowes, "nor is there probably any "spiritualist" (in whatever we may be divided) who would deny that."

"Supposing it true, does it not seem to you the most delightful and stupendous of all spiritual truths?"

"It does indeed," said Fellowes.

"Could you always realise it, my friend?" said Harrington.

"Nay, I was once a firm believer in the current orthodoxy, as you well know."

" 'Now, you see with every different eyes. You can say, with the man in the Gospel, "This I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see?"'

" 'I can.'

" 'And you attribute this happy change of sentiment to the perusal of those writings of Mr. Newman from which you think that I also might derive similar benefits?'

" 'I do.'

" 'It appears then that to *you*, at least, my friend, it is possible that there may be a book-revelation of "moral and spiritual truth" of the highest possible significance and value, although you do not consider the book to be *divine*; now, if so, I fancy many will be again inclined to say, that what Mr. Newman has done in your case, God might easily do, if he pleased, for mankind in general; and with this advantage, that He would *not* include in the same book which revealed truth to the mind, and rectified its errors, an assurance that *any* such book-revelation was impossible.'

" 'But my ingenious friend,' cried Fellowes, with some warmth, 'you are inferring a little too fast for the premises. I do not admit that Mr. Newman or any other spiritualist has revealed to me any truth, but only that he has been the instrument of giving shape and distinct consciousness to what was, in fact, uttered in the secret oracles of my own bosom before; and, as I believe, is uttered also in the hearts of all other men.'

" 'I fear your distinction is practically without a difference. It will certainly not avail us. You say you were once in no distinct conscious possession of that system of spiritual truth which you now hold; on the contrary, that you believed a very different system; that the change by which you were brought into your present condition of mind—out of darkness into light—out of error into truth—has been produced chiefly by Mr. Newman's deeply instructive volumes. If so, one will be apt to argue that a book-revelation may be of the very utmost use and benefit to mankind in general—if only by making that which would else be the inarticulate mutter of the internal oracle distinct and clear; and that if God would but give such a book, the same value at least might attach to it as to a book of Mr. Newman's. It little matters to this argument—to the question of the possibility, value, or utility of an external revelation—whether the truths it is to communicate be absolutely unknown till it reveals them, or only *not known*, which you confess was your own case. If your natural taper of illumination is stuck into a dark lantern, and its light can only flash upon the soul when some Mr. Newman kindly lifts up the slide for you; or if your internal oracle, like a ghost, will not speak till it is spoken to, or, like a dumb demon, awaits to find a voice, and confess itself to be what it is, at the summons of an exorcist; the same argument precisely will apply for

the possibility and utility of a book-revelation from God to men in general. What has been done for you by man, even though no more were done, might, one would imagine, be done for the rest of mankind, and in a much better manner, by God. If that internal and native revelation which both you and Mr. Newman say has its seat in the human soul, be clear without his aid, why did he write a syllable about it? If, as you say, its utterances were not recognised, and that his statements have first made them familiar to you, the same argument (the Christian will say) will do for the Bible. It is of little use that nature teaches you, if Mr. Newman is to teach nature."—Pp. 84, 85, 86.

We find in reference to the passages in the *Eclipse of Faith*, which have impressed us either favourably or unfavourably, that they are difficult of quotation, from the drawn-out and leisurely way in which the several arguments, with which they are connected, are conducted. Time and space are not much cared for. The gentlemen engaged in the discussion have a good deal of both at their disposal. And moreover the passages run very much over and into each other, as they naturally would, if truly representative of conversation, so that the totality of the meaning or drift of an argument can rarely be gathered from a single page, or even page or two. At the risk of injuring the effect, therefore, we quote from another portion of these conversations, in which to our mind the author has a correcter view than those with whom he combats. While regarding him as taking altogether too low a view of the positive and independent value of the natural religious element in man, and of what, according to the self-evolving power of progress, with which God has endowed our nature as a whole, it can of itself accomplish by the ordinary laws of its progress; and of the very important and conspicuous part it plays in the combined action, by which alone their good is derived from all other means and appliances of religion—we yet entirely agree with our author in his exposure of the unconscious fallacy, under which it has always appeared to us writers of the school of Mr. Newman and Mr. Parker labour, in testing what they are, what the world is, and what achieved truth is, without the assistance of the Biblical Dispensation.

"I cannot help remarking here, that it is a most suspicious circumstance, if there be indeed any universal and sufficient 'internal

revelation,' that these writers find every memorable advance of what *they* deem religious truth in unaccountable connection either with the happy 'religious organisation of one race,' according to Mr. Parker, or in equally strange connection with the records of 'two books' originating among that race, according to Mr. Newman. 'The Bible,' says the latter, 'is pervaded by a sentiment, which is implied everywhere, viz., *the intimate sympathy of the Pure and Perfect God with the heart of each faithful worshipper*. This is that which is wanting in Greek philosophers, English Deists, German Pantheists and all formalists. This is that which so often edifies me in Christian writers and speakers, when I ever so much disbelieve the letter of their sentences.*

"It is unaccountably odd that the universal, spiritual faculty should act thus capriciously, and equally odd that Mr. Newman does not perceive, that if it were not for the 'Bible,' his religion would no more have assumed the peculiar cast it has than that of Aristotle or Cicero. Sentiments due to the still active influences of his Christian education he imputes to the direct intuitions of spiritual vision, just as we are apt to confound the original and acquired perceptions of our eyesight. He is in the condition of one who mistakes a reflected image for the object itself, or a forgotten suggestion of another for an original idea. In the *camera obscura* of his mind, he flatters himself that the coloured forms there traced are the original inscriptions on the walls, forgetful of the little aperture which has let in the light; and not even disturbed by the untoward phenomenon—that the ideas thus contemplated are all upside down.

"But surely it is natural to ask, how is it that Greek philosophers, Hindoo sages, Egyptian priests, English Deists,—that men of all other religions,—having always had access to the fountain of natural illumination within, have not also had their 'Baxters, Leightons, Watts's, Doddridges?' that the whole style of thought on this subject is so totally different in them all, by his own confession? If man possess the 'spiritual faculty' attributed to him,—if it be a characteristic of humanity,—it will be surely generally manifested; and even if those disturbing causes—which he and Mr. Parker so plentifully provide, by which the genius of religion is so unhappily marred, but which, alas! no revelation from without can ever counteract,—prevent its *uniform* or nearly uniform display, still its principal indications (partial though they may be everywhere) ought, at least, to be everywhere indifferently diffused throughout the race. Its manifestation may be *sporadic*, but it will be in one race as in another; it will not be suspiciously confined to one race with a peculiarly felicitous 'religious organisation,' or to 'two books' exclusively originating with that favoured race.

"For his 'spiritual' illumination, it is easy to see Mr. Newman's

* Phases, p. 188.

exclusive dependence on that Bible which he abjures as a special revelation. If it has not been so to mankind, it has at least been so to Mr. Newman. To it he perpetually runs for argument and illustration. Among those who will accept his infidelity, I apprehend there will be few who will not recoil from his representations of spiritual experience, so obviously nothing more than a disguised and mutilated Christianity. They will say that they do not wish the 'new cloth sewed on to the old garment;' scarcely a soul amongst them will sympathise with *his* soul's 'sorrows' or share *his* soul's 'aspirations!'—Pp. 145, 146, 147.

We cannot help specially calling attention to, though it is not to our present purpose to quote, the admirable statement of the argument between the Roman Catholic Church and the Bible, which surely was never (on the Protestant side at least) stated more pungently and tersely than in pp. 173-176. But keeping in view the matters which chiefly interest ourselves in this volume, we think the author right again in his rebuke of Mr. Newman's painfully-celebrated remark on Fletcher and Jesus compared.

" 'Well! let that pass,' said Fellowes; 'I was going to say further, that it is not so clear to every one that Christ is so very wonderful an ideal of humanity. Do you remember that Mr. Newman says in his "Phases" that, when he was a boy, he read Benson's Life of Fletcher of Madely, and thought Fletcher a more perfect man than Jesus Christ? And he also says that he imagines, if he were to read the book again, he would think the same. Have you nothing to say to that?'

" 'Nothing,' said I, 'except to point you to the infinitely different estimates of Christ formed by other men, who yet think of historical Christianity much as you do. How differently do such writers as Mr. Greg and Mr. Parker speak! How do they almost exhaust the resources of language to express their sentiments of this wonderful character! As to Mr. Newman's *impression*, I do not think it worth an answer. When a man so far forgets himself as to say what he can hardly help knowing will be unspeakably painful to multitudes of his fellow-creatures, on the strength of *boyish* impressions, not even thinking it worth while to verify those impressions and see whether after thirty or forty years, he is not something more than a boy—I think it is scarcely worth a reply. Christianity is willing to consider the arguments of *men* but not the impressions of boys.'"—Pp. 222, 223.

We fear that our author not only denies the exclusive concern of an exclusive religious faculty, or inward spiritual

power, with religious truth and faith, (in which we should coincide with him,) but limits the means and modes of religious knowledge and feeling. For he says (p. 95) he cannot understand "how you can get *at* the souls of people at all except through the intervention of the senses and the intellect:" and again (p. 303), where he a little enlarges his list of avenues to the soul, he says, "By what other means than through the intervention of your *senses*, by which you read his pages—your *imagination*, by which you seize his illustrations—your *intellect*, by which you comprehend his arguments—did he reclaim you, as you say he has done, from many of your ancient errors? How else, in the name of common sense, did he get access to your soul at all?" Well! not to go into the whole question with so rank an anti-spiritualist as the present writer (especially as the other side of the question we remember to have seen fully stated in a recent article of this Review on the intuitional faculty), we have seen that to his early list (p. 95), which he there represents as exhaustive (sense and intellect), by page 313 the author has a third window of and to the soul, "*imagination*," and, remarkably enough, he himself, by the time he gets to the concluding pages of his book, after arguing with all his might, through the help of the uncle, against Harrington's scepticism on intellectual grounds, and unsuccessfully, has recourse to a fourth avenue of access to and egress from the soul—*emotion and feeling*; for he introduces to Harrington the love of his mother, and rightly enough, as a motive to Christian faith. But every reader must feel how miserably weak and out of place it appears in a book conducted on such logical and intellectual principles. To what faculty, certainly not represented by the eye, by the reason, or by the imagination, does this argument appeal? But notwithstanding this defective psychology in our author as a writer on religion, we attach value to, and feel the justice of, the remark he makes in reference to an exclusively spiritualist school, where Harrington is made to say to Fellowes, "However, all your perplexity seems to me to arise from supposing the spiritual powers of man to act in greater isolation from his other powers than is conceivable or even possible. Not apart from these, but in intimate conjunction with them, are the functions of the

soul performed. The divorce between the 'spiritual faculties' and the intellect, which your favourite Mr. Newman has attempted to effect, is impossible. It is an attempt to sever phenomena which co-exist in the unity of our own consciousness. I am bound in justice to admit that there are others of our modern spiritualists who condemn this preposterous attempt to separate what God hath joined so inseparably." P. 304.

We are bound to say, while agreeing with the drift of these words, that no "attempt" to introduce the spiritual faculty, as a separate and special portion of our nature, meant to have to do with religious subjects, and distinct from the intellect and the senses, could at least be more "preposterous" than the creed faiths, the propositional salvations, the parchment religions, the sacramental efficacies, the *whole* Bible theologies, the "dost thou truly believe this? all this I steadfastly believe" absolutions, which it was the object of such writers as Mr. Newman to expose, and we hope will prove their achievement to destroy.

To conclude our present recital of the matters on which we partially or entirely agree with the author of the *Eclipse of Faith*, we heartily accord in his objection to Mr. Newman's three statements, relative to the Christian estimate of woman, of slavery, the early spread of Christianity, and of the action of Christian influences on the two first. We give our entire assent to our author's argument in refutation of the position of many writers, that miracles are in themselves impossible, and we think with him that the real question in reference to miracles is the evidence on which each miracle, for which our belief is asked, rests its claim to be considered as a historical fact. On this subject our author ingeniously presses into his service the impartial authority of Mr. J. S. Mill, who says, that to make any alleged fact contradictory to a law of causation, "the allegation must be that this happened in the absence of *any adequate counteracting cause*." Now, in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact opposite of this." He says, "that all which Hume has made out is, that no evidence can prove a miracle to any one who did not previously believe the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power, or who believed himself to have *full proof* that the character "of such being or beings is

inconsistent with such an interference."—(Eclipse, p. 281.) We further think that there is much truth in our author's able re-statement of the argument in favour of the antecedent probability of a revelation, though, as we shall presently show, we should ourselves put it in a different form, because the Christian revelation is not a revelation through a Book, but through a mind. The mind is the essential and original, the Book the contingent and subsequent, form and medium of the Revelation.

But with these many points of sympathetic contact with the author of the *Eclipse of Faith* and the object of his book, we have several grave grounds of difference with them—nay, we think several causes for a justifiable remonstrance with him. A writer of his class, dealing apparently, as a thoroughly informed writer and adventurous thinker, with educated and thoughtful men, has no right to dip his pen so small a way down into his inkstand. He has no right to ignore the considerations that lie at the basis of his whole argument. He has no right—professedly writing to meet the difficulties and objections of thorough-going inquirers, to skim his subject in the way in which he does do throughout his volume. There is a great and almost unnecessary air of venturesomeness in challenging and expressing every possible objection, however painful, however revolting, however hopelessly unbelieving—and yet he contrives not to give a hint throughout his 450 pages, of the gravest, and in one sense the only serious difficulty with which the evidences he supports have to contend. He writes very cleverly and very truly of the little weight to be attached to the discrepancies of statement to be met with in the evangelists, showing how the occurrence of such, to all who know the natural character of historical and narrative statement, is an indication of the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the main part of the accounts, rather than the contrary. He also shows, and to our minds the argument is not to be resisted, how the Gospel narrative, with its natural and supernatural, ordinary and miraculous material, is substantially one—is weft and warp, and cannot be separated without being torn asunder and ceasing to exist as worthy of any credit. We think he deals truly with the rationalist and mythical theories of Paulus and Strauss, and shows how the first, if it have any

force at all, instead of falsifying one part and verifying another part of the Gospels, falsifies the whole—while the last simply offers a dream as the interpretation of a dream—a fancy explaining a fancy—and leaves not one firm bone of reality in criticiser or criticized—in the exegesis or the Gospel. He justly rejects the tenability of the supposition of fraud on the part either of Jesus or the Apostles. But why does he not touch the point of difficulty to which all inquiries are for the present reduced? Why does he not consider the question, whether the actual disciples and companions of our Lord wrote accounts of what passed beneath their own eyes and ears, and how far the Gospels, which we now possess, with their present exact admixture of natural and supernatural, are the very Gospels, sentence for sentence, which proceeded from their hands? Now, if they be, there is no alternative to the modern reader of them, but to take them as they stand, all together, as constituting one gigantic truth, or one gigantic hallucination—we cannot bring ourselves to use the words imposture or deception, because we hold such a supposition to be absolutely excluded by the uncontestable accompanying moral features of the case. On the supposition of the indisputably apostolic character of our present Gospels, the arguments of the writer of this volume have a clear course, and the doubts and difficulties, or rather the half-way-house theories which he combats, must be very materially shaken, if not destroyed by the considerations he advances. In such a case the Gospel narrative is a calm truth, or a fevered dream. On the first supposition, it must be a divine revelation; on the second, it must be a human delusion—a beautiful madness—which may, indeed, make us at times weep—at times wonder—at times rejoice—at times believe—at times compassionate or scorn—at times hope—at times despair—now see the rainbow and now the cloud—now recognize a noble truth, and now mourn over the wayward fantastic misconception into which it has passed—but has on the whole a mixed, fitful, strange and wonderful hallucination, in the study of which we may feel painful and even lofty interest, but one on which we can place no reliance, one to which we can in no way surrender ourselves in the hope of valuable and trustworthy guidance.

But suppose that it is uncertain, in the first place, whether the personal companions and witnesses of Christ's life and ministry did commit their impressions and resolutions of it to writing; suppose, again, if this be proved, it is uncertain whether the Gospels which we possess were exactly the narratives they wrote; suppose the balance of evidence were in favour of our present Gospels being an accretion and gathering of two hundred years, the germ and spirit of the whole being true and apostolic, but many of the details being traditional and of doubtful authority, —then some one of the various theories, or something like them, which the author of the Eclipse scouts and ridicules, becomes a necessity; for the problem then to be solved is—here are materials containing truth, but not all truth; here is a revelation which consists in the spirit of a life, surrounded by details of doubtful literal exactness; how are we to separate the impression from the details, the soul from the body, the spirit from the history, and decide how much of this is divine, and how much human? On the solution of this previous question depends the issue, whether the author of the Eclipse is to ride so triumphantly over the field, or whether one of his despised spiritualists is to claim, if not the victory, yet the finger which points to the true path, by which ultimate victory may be attained. Now, this question our author has carefully avoided, yet everything in his book, and the worth or worthlessness of every argument in his book, depends upon its solution. Here are certain quotations in Justin Martyr from the *απομνημονεύματα* of the Apostles which correspond with passages now to be found in our Gospels. Do these prove the identity of our present Gospels with the Recollections to which Justin refers? Our own impression is, that in conjunction with other evidences, they do form a sufficiently strong presumptive evidence of their substantial identity. Many persons might not be inclined to admit this. But we agree with our author in believing that an uncritical, inconsistent demand for evidence, which they do not regard as necessary in parallel cases, and which indeed it is rarely possible to supply, characterizes the argument of those who deny the strong presumptive character of this evidence in favour of the substantial identity of our Gospels and Justin's *απομνημονεύματα*. But sup-

posing this to be conceded—(and we have long settled it in our own minds that it ought to be)—what is to be done with the preceding period intervening between the appearance of this testimony and the apostolic age? We are by no means satisfied with those posterior quotations of anterior evidence by which this chasm is filled up. We do not like post-obit or ex-post facto evidence in such cases. We confess that we do not feel the decisiveness of a subsequent writer in the third or fourth century, telling us of something which had been said upon the subject by a Christian of the end of the first or beginning of the second century. We may be peculiar in this respect, but we can only speak of the influence which this kind of evidence carries to our own minds. To us, therefore, the evidence of Justin Martyr in the middle of the second century is the first decisive evidence of the existence of writings corresponding to our Gospels. But even he does not attach the authority of distinct names to them, or speak, that we remember, of their separate existence.* Now, we believe that the presumptive evidence which leads us to regard these Recollections of the Apostles quoted by Justin, as substantially our present Gospels, will, with some variation in form, carry us through the intervening period we have spoken of between the middle of the second and the latter half of the first century; and to us the *presumption* is decidedly in favour of the existence, at least of the greater part of the Gospels, perhaps the whole of the Gospel of John, in the Apostolic age, and their use and circulation among the societies of the first century. It is to be observed, that the argument for the existence of St. Paul's epistles at this time is unassailable, and this is all that is absolutely essential to prove the historical reality and truth of the Christian religion. The question, then, is, whether in the absence of all positive proof of the absolute and complete identity of our present Gospels as the works which emanated directly from the pens of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, though in the presence, as we think, of presumptive evidence, that our present Gospels are in their germ and main substance the same documents which circulated and were received among the

* We write at a distance from our books, and therefore at some disadvantage.

early churches as containing trustworthy memoirs of the life of Christ—any latitude is to be allowed us in our unhesitating reception of some portions, and our doubtful reception of other portions, of these Gospels? We conceive that to prove, as our author desires to do, such a latitude inadmissible, he must be prepared to show the absolute identity—though not word for word necessarily—yet in every sentiment and fact, of the Gospels as we have them with the Gospels which are believed to have proceeded from the Evangelists. It is to the satisfactory clearing up of this point that the author must next address himself, and we can assure him that he must do so very effectually, before he can, from the ground of a free and logical criticism such as he has chosen, assume so triumphant a tone in dealing with those theories which variously attempt to construct a true and unassailable Christianity out of the records of the Gospels and the Epistles of St. Paul.

We have further to differ from our author in his definition or rather implied description of a revelation. Such a revelation as we all agree to speak of in the Christian revelation, can only be a communication of mind with mind—of the mind of God with the mind of man—and the mind of one man with that of another. There may be indeed a revelation of the life of God in the life of Man—and then that life of man so inspired, will itself be a source of inspiration and revelation to the lives of other men. Such a revelation it is easy to conceive of as possible to exist without the intervention of any book or writing. Nay, in the case of the Christian revelation, we know that for some time it really did so exist. The revelation by Jesus Christ was simply a spiritual communication, without the medium of writing, of the soul and life of Christ with the souls and lives of mankind. That in after-times a book came to be useful, or under the conditions necessary, to preserve and extend the memorials of this actual communication as it once existed, is of course to be admitted. It is a *dernier ressort*—it is the nearest we can get to the thing we want. But even with the book—the book does not form or hold the revelation. The revelation is still necessarily the communication between the mind of Christ and our own mind, and as there were persons who heard

Christ's words and saw Christ's life, and yet had no revelation from him; so there are millions of people who read Christ's words, and hear of his life, who scarcely receive any revelation from their reading. This revelation, then, is necessarily in its character spiritual—is a communication of knowledge and feeling and sympathy and support from one mind or nature to another. The book is not the revelation, and contains not the revelation, it may be the *means* of conveying the revelation—but the revelation is not a book-revelation but a spirit-revelation. When, then, in reply to Mr. Newman's strongly-worded objections to a book-revelation, the author of the *Eclipse of Faith* justly and beautifully pleads the influence of many outward things upon our minds, and the external evidence of Creation itself, and asks, "If you, then, acknowledge all this without derogation, as you imagine, to the sublime and divine functions of the indwelling 'spiritual' power, why this rabid, this I might almost say puerile (if I ought not rather to say fanatical) hatred of the very notion of a 'book-revelation?'" —we must be permitted to ask whether such extravagant insistence upon the necessity of writing, to revelation—as is contained in these expressions—"without a *book*, man remains an idolater in spite of his fine 'spiritual faculties,' and a barbarian in spite of his sublime intellect; in fact, not much better than the beasts, in spite of all those noble capacities which, although they are *in* him, are as it were hopelessly locked up till he has obtained this key to their treasures"—(p. 302)—and again, "The world waits for a book—among the varied external influences amidst which the human race is developed, that is incomparably the most important, and the only one that is absolutely *essential*—upon it the collective education of the race depends—it is the sole instrument of registering, perpetuating, transmitting thought"—(p. 302)—(how did Homer manage before Pericles?)—and when he speaks of the Bible as "a book *constructed* by divine wisdom" (p. 288)—we are tempted to retaliate—why this *rabid*, puerile, might we not say fanatical insistence on the absolute indispensableness of a book-revelation? Why a *Book* of all things? Surely what we want first is a spirit, a man, a life,—whose droppings indeed we may be thankful, if we can have nothing better, have been preserved to us in a book. And practically speak-

ing, therefore, we are equally thankful with the author for the Book—but he should be careful not to appear to misapprehend that on which the Book rests for its value.

But this "rabid" love of the letter arises from another grave error which pervades our author's volume. He seems to have no notion of any influence except what is extended in the form of an *opinion*. We should apparently doubt the influence of the life of Howard, and the effect which the deeds of his score or so of years of active God-like life had upon the treatment of criminals in the world—whether any influence could have flowed from his labours, except by the medium of a volume of his reports. The *reports* are the things, he would cry out—let us have his own written statement of what he did, saw and recommended! It is all essential that we should know the precise condition of the prison at Ely—and know how far the Bishop of that Diocese was to blame or not upon that horrible matter! Let us know whether the bar of iron was placed on the shin-bone, nearest to the ankle or to the knee, in those efforts to restrain the prisoner from flight instead of repairing the locks and walls. Is it only, then, through certain dogmatic opinions that we can reach the spirit of life that was in Christ Jesus? Was the revelation in Christ, a revelation of true and heavenly spiritual life, or was it a revelation of so many sound statements in reference to the existence and character of God and the duty of man? This author is as limited, unconsciously, in his scholastic, learned, estimate of what constitutes a revelation—is as limited in his character of "intellectualist," as any of those whom he rebukes are in their characters as "spiritualists." We have finally to observe in passing, on certain unfairnesses which pervade the book. The author seems to lose all idea of the individual right of a man to an individual opinion. He seems to think no opinion worthy of any respect, that is not corporate. Unless a knot of gentlemen can agree in a certain view so as to make it receivable by all, it is not worth considering at all! You can't agree among yourselves—this is quite enough to overthrow all their opinions! You have no *system* of unbelief! this ought to cure their unbelief! The writer's idea of a fixed form of faith, embodied in a creed—a compact army of warriors agreed to

march together in its defence to the same word of command—this demand for a creed and a church, in short, seems to vitiate to his mind, when it is not realized, the reasoning of every independent thinker; although we suppose that it might have been made manifest, that the early astronomers did not all agree in their theory of the universe, and that the members of the Vatican did, yet it did not follow that the astronomers were all wrong, and simply cut each other's throats, and the Vatican was all right, because they agreed to stick together in thinking—or perhaps in not thinking at all.

One further deviation from perfect fairness is to be detected in the ridiculous position in which the author places the views which he combats by introducing them as reflected through satellites. No one thing in the present variety and one-sidedness of theological theories stamps a man with such an ineffaceable mark of weakness, as the attaching himself to the skirts of some single writer, and adopting his leadership wholesale. This exclusive admiration of one writer, this willingness to adopt what he lays down, nothing more and nothing less, always betrays an inability to think in the admirer himself. He adopts the author as some one who is in the future to think for him. When we meet with a man who is all for Paulus or all for Strauss—all for Mr. Newman or all for Mr. Parker—all for Mr. Hennell or all for Mr. Greg—all for Dr. M'Neil or all for Dr. Pusey—the man's unconcealed admiration and exclusive discipleship always satisfies us that he is only one degree removed from a dunce or a simpleton—and had better leave these gentlemen, who really have something to say for themselves, to speak for themselves, and maintain their own theories, instead of making them percolate through their sieves, which seldom indeed retain anything but the grounds. In this ludicrous light are Mr. Newman and Mr. Parker placed throughout this work. The opponents are all stamped with the weakness of men who are always quoting the words of some master, having none of their own to quote—and the master is made to look silly through the silliness of his disciple. Poor Fellowes is the principal object and medium of this ridiculous effect, and Mr. Parker and Mr. Newman the special victims of it. He is always tumbling up against them, as if he had not a leg of his own to stand upon, and

never does so, without making one feel inclined to laugh both at the man who can be so thorough-paced a disciple, and at the Masters whose systems could attract the regards of so silly a sectator. "But are you in a condition to give an opinion?" said Fellowes with a serious air. Mr. Newman says in a like case, "The natural man discerneth not the things of the spirit of God, &c." So that even the Apostle Paul is only known to poor Fellowes through his hierophant. "I believe with Mr. Parker that the only true revelation is in all men alike." P. 46. "We shall see so-called sacred dogma and history exploded, for Mr. Newman"—"Thinks so of course," retorts Harrington, "because he has never been known to be wrong in any of his judgments, or even to vary in them." P. 48. Then poor Fellowes does not like the word "creed," and implores Harrington to employ in its place "spiritual truths," "sentiments," which are the product of an immediate "insight into God, or some other of Mr. Newman's beautiful expressions." P. 51. "As Mr. Parker says," as "Mr. Parker calls it," as "Mr. Newman himself admits"—are the notes on which poor Fellowes rings his weak changes, making the system of thought he represents look as foolish as himself. We sometimes have wished that the author of the *Eclipse* had had the men themselves to deal with, instead of their shadows. He would have found Messrs. Parker and Newman of tougher material, and not so easily prostrated. Take it altogether, however, this book is the cleverest, liveliest, most liberal and most successful attempt to expose the weak side of the school it combats, that we have met with.